The anti-Israel, anti-American “Axis of Resistance” frequently mentioned by the Islamic Republic of Iran is referred to by Israel and the United States as an Iranian-led “terrorist network”, which includes the Islamic Republic, the former Syrian government, Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi militia in Yemen, and other groups in Iraq. After another round of the brutal Israeli-Palestinian conflict escalated on 7 October, 2023, Israel not only launched heavy attacks on Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Iranian proxies, but also engaged in direct military attack exchanges with Iran. To date, forces like Hamas and Hezbollah, part of the “Axis of Resistance” have suffered severe setbacks, suggesting potential new shifts in Middle Eastern international relations.
The “Axis of Resistance”
The establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979 fundamentally changed Iran’s relationship with Israel. Before that, while the Pahlavi dynasty did not officially recognise Israel diplomatically, the country’s development direction of secularisation, close ties with the United States, and complex relations with Arab countries provided Iran and Israel with many reasons to get closer to each other under the leadership of the Pahlavi King. At that time, the two countries maintained good relations. For instance, Iran supplied Israel with oil, while Israel assisted in building Iran’s security capabilities. However, these developments ended with the Islamic Revolution. Under the spiritual leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, religious groups and other forces dissatisfied with the status quo resented the Pahlavi dynasty’s secularization, and its alliance with the United States, which was seen as detrimental to the interests of the state and the people. In 1979, amidst the broader historical context of Middle Eastern Islamic nations searching for paths of national development, Iran established the Islamic Republic, positioning itself as a leader of the Islamic world, particularly Shia Muslims.
Given its self-perceived role in the Islamic world, the Islamic Republic has taken up the cause of the plight of Muslims in the Middle East, particularly the suffering of the Palestinian people. Israel’s brutal policies of land occupation in Palestine have been a key factor in Iran’s refusal to recognise Israel’s legitimacy. Notably, after toppling the Pahlavi regime, the Islamic revolutionary forces of Iran immediately handed over the de facto Israeli embassy in Tehran, now the current location of the Palestinian Embassy, to the Palestine Liberation Organization. Iran has been a strong supporter of Hamas, officially known as the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, since its establishment in 1987 amidst resistance to Israeli occupation.
The antagonism between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel over the Palestinian issue extends beyond Palestine. On 6 June, 1982, citing the assassination of its ambassador in Britain by Palestinian guerrillas, Israel launched a large-scale offensive against the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Syrian forces in Lebanon, occupying much of Lebanon within days. This conflict, the so-called Fifth Middle East War, fundamentally stemmed from the Palestinian issue.[1] During resistance to the Israeli invasion, the Shia resistance group Hezbollah was established in Lebanon in 1982. According to reports by Reuters, Hezbollah was formed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[2] The New York Times described Hezbollah as the world’s most heavily-armed non-state organisation, with operations extending to Syria, and providing assistance to Iranian-affiliated groups in Iraq, Yemen, and beyond.[3] After achieving significant success in the 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah, with its close ties to Iran, became a major concern for Tel Aviv.
The Houthi militia in Yemen is considered another major member of the “Axis of Resistance”.[4] In 1992, the leader of Yemen’s Shia branch, the Zaidi sect, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, launched the “Believing Youth” movement. After the US war against Iraq in 2003, the movement’s criticism of and opposition to the US and Israel escalated, leading to deteriorating relations with the pro-US Yemeni government. After Hussein was killed in 2004, the “Believing Youth” gradually became known as the “Houthi Movement”. Following the outbreak of the Arab Spring in late 2010, Yemen descended into greater chaos, with the Houthi-controlled area expanding, during which the Islamic Republic of Iran was seen as playing a significant role.[5]
After the United States started the Iraq War in 2003, several militia groups emerged in the predominantly Shia Muslim country. Some members of these militias had suffered persecution under Saddam Hussein’s regime, and had taken refuge in Iran. The influence of the Islamic Republic over anti-American Iraqi Shia militias was strong, and these groups, with Iranian support, also grew stronger.[6]
Close ties between Iran and the Syrian government were evident during the Iran-Iraq war. During that eight-year conflict, the Shia Assad regime in Syria firmly supported Iran. After the outbreak of the Syrian war in 2011, Iran invested significant manpower, material, and financial resources to support Assad, not only preventing the regime’s collapse, but also establishing a military presence in Syria. Israel has already regarded the Assad regime as a hostile regime, and with an even more powerful enemy (the Islamic Republic) establishing its own military presence in Syria, Israel was clearly concerned, and worked to destroy it.
The Setbacks of the “Axis of Resistance”
Unlike Hezbollah, the Houthi militia, Iraqi militias, and the Assad regime in Syria, Hamas is a Sunni Muslim group, which indicates that sectarianism is not the core factor in becoming members of the “Axis of Resistance”; instead, opposition to Israel and the United States is the more prominent characteristic. The United States and Israel consider the “Axis of Resistance” to be an aggressive offensive camp and terrorist organisations, but ignore the context in which they were born — they were formed in response to perceived aggression and oppression. Before 7 Oct, 2023, the “Axis of Resistance” was developing smoothly; even if Iran did not directly attack Israel, groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, which had Iranian backing, posed a significant security threat to Israel.
The surprise attack of 7 Oct by Hamas and other militants, which resulted in over 1,000 deaths within Israel and over 200 hostages taken to Gaza, was viewed as the most severe attack on Israel in decades. On the day of the attack, Israel said Hamas’ actions were supported by Iran, drawing the Islamic Republic into the fray.
In the 14 months since the attack, Israel has nearly destroyed Hamas’ military capabilities, and sharply diminished its political influence, while Hezbollah has suffered severe losses. Israeli strikes against both are continuing, despite a ceasefire with Hezbollah. Following Houthi attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea, the United States and Britain repeatedly launched airstrikes on Houthi weapons depots. Israel has recently carried out similar actions, and has warned that it is “just getting started” with anti-Houthi actions. Though Iran directly attacked Israel with missiles and drones twice in 2024, the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran by Israel revealed vulnerabilities in Iran’s defences. It can be said that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has overcome his most challenging phase, will continue to strike against Iran and its “Axis of Resistance”. At least in the short term, Palestinian forces like Hamas no longer pose a major threat to Israeli security. Looking ahead, Hezbollah’s future is a critical issue. In Lebanon, its position and role are under scrutiny. Israel is unlikely to tolerate Hezbollah’s continued existence as an independent and powerful force within Lebanon, and its efforts to limit Hezbollah militarily and politically are expected to persist.
Whether it is Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, or Iraqi militias, all are non-state actors that, despite some support within their respective countries or larger political entities, also face strong domestic opposition. Iran’s influence in these countries is also controversial. Thus, when faced with powerful strikes from countries like Israel and the United States, these groups often fail to secure substantial support from their national governments or other domestic factions. Moreover, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen — all in the midst of national reconstruction — do not wish for their territories to become battlefields or bargaining chips for Iran in its struggle against Israel and the US. Furthermore, as the leading force of the “Axis of Resistance”, the Islamic Republic of Iran also faces internal challenges. In fact, many Iranians do not support aligning their country with “resistance forces” like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, preferring instead to use limited foreign currency and resources for domestic development. Some factions are testing public sentiment and even discussing the possibility of succession within the leadership, suggesting preparation for political change. Additionally, domestic discontent with Iran’s investment in the “Axis of Resistance” is palpable. Citizens, burdened by international sanctions and economic hardship, increasingly question the value of diverting scarce resources to external conflicts.
The fall of Syria’s Assad regime has further complicated Iran’s position, disrupting its logistical support to Hezbollah, and necessitating more complex and less efficient routes for aid. Iran’s willingness and ability to support the “Axis of Resistance” also seem to be waning. To maintain and enhance its regional influence, Tehran must adapt its foreign policy — failing to do so could further undermine its standing.
The Reshaping of the Middle East
The impact of the surprise attack on Israel by Hamas and other Gaza-based militants on 7 Oct, may not yet be fully understood. Although members of the “Axis of Resistance” continue to proclaim their determination to fight, and the Islamic Republic of Iran has repeatedly affirmed its ongoing support for them, there is no doubt that their combat effectiveness and regional influence have entered a declining phase.[7] If Iran seeks to maintain or even enhance its regional influence, it can no longer rely on the “Axis of Resistance”. Tehran needs to find a new path for its development. Since the Islamic Revolution, anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment has been a core aspect of Iran’s foreign policy. However, after more than 40 years, does the Islamic Republic’s steadfast refusal to recognise Israel’s legitimacy and its opposition to the US still align with national and popular interests? Considering domestic and international conditions, particularly the urgent need for internal development, Tehran needs to recognise Israel’s legitimacy as a state and ease relations with the United States.
However, the weakening of the “Axis of Resistance” is not necessarily a reason for Israel to celebrate. Decades of turmoil in the Middle East have repeatedly proven that the unresolved issues of Iran-Israel confrontation and the Palestinian question are the two key factors affecting regional relationships. Despite the international community’s consensus on the “two-state solution” for Palestine, if there is no solution acceptable to the Palestinian people, resistance will not disappear, even if Hamas is eliminated. Israel’s approach of using force may bring short-term calm, but will not lead to lasting peace. Unless Israel rethinks and changes its policies towards Palestine and its broader Middle Eastern diplomacy, a weakened “Axis of Resistance” will not bring peace and security to Israel. The country and its main backer, the US, must recognise this.
Following years of proxy wars, Iran and Israel attacked each other’s territory twice in 2024. After Donald Trump won the 2024 US presidential election, Prime Minister Netanyahu addressed the Iranian people, urging them to overthrow the regime, while also announcing plans to continue targeting Hezbollah. Clearly, the upcoming Trump administration has instilled confidence in Mr Netanyahu and many Israelis, who believe the time has come for Israel and the United States to reshape the Middle East.[8] To these Israelis, destroying the Islamic Republic is seen as the ultimate solution.[9]
If Israel believes that destroying Tehran’s regime by force is the path to reshaping the Middle East, this path is likely to fail. One of my current concerns is that the relatively smooth military campaigns against Hamas and Hezbollah may blind some Israelis and their supporters into thinking that everything can be solved by force. Even if Iran is a troublemaker in the Middle East, it is not the only one — Israel, at least, is another. Many Arab countries and Turkey are not eager to see the balance between Israel and Iran disrupted. On 11 November, Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman condemned Israel’s “genocide” of Palestinians at a special Arab-Islamic summit, calling for a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon, and urging the international community to ensure Israel “respects Iranian sovereignty and does not violate its territory”. On 13 Nov, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Turkey had severed ties with Israel, declaring that he would not take any measures to continue or develop bilateral relations in the future.[10] Such statements deserve Israel’s attention.
Changes may also be on the horizon for US Middle East policy. The war with Hamas has sparked strong pro-Palestinian movements within the United States, along with unprecedented criticism of Israel. Under these circumstances, even with Mr Trump’s return to the presidency, Washington will have to consider its interests. During Mr Trump’s first term, the US adopted a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. However, will his second term see a similarly strong stance against Iran, as Israel wishes? Not necessarily. According to a New York Times report on 14 Nov, Mr Trump’s adviser Elon Musk met Iran’s UN ambassador on 11 Nov to discuss easing US-Iran relations.[11] Currently, both sides do not have fundamental conflicts of interest, and it is more likely that bilateral relations will improve rather than worsen.
The Middle East does need change — change towards greater stability and peace — but such a state cannot and will not be achieved by eliminating one of its major countries or regimes. The only path to enhancing security and promoting regional peace for Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran — who are both at the heart of Middle Eastern turbulence — is reconciliation, not a life-or-death struggle. Israeli and Iranian policymakers, as astute as they are, surely understand this.
So far, the Islamic Republic of Iran has not recognised the legitimacy of the state of Israel. Interestingly, the Pahlavi dynasty, which was replaced by the Islamic Republic, also did not formally and publicly recognise Israel, yet this did not prevent the Shah from having rather friendly interactions with Israel. Moreover, while the current Iranian government still officially denounces Israel’s existence as illegitimate, very few people in Iran genuinely believe that Israel can be eliminated. In fact, few Iranians consider that the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic stems from the elimination, or non-recognition, of Israel. Given domestic and external changes, it is possible for Iran to adopt a more conciliatory stance towards Israel. The change in the situation in the “Axis of Resistance”, especially the sudden fall of the Assad regime, could become the last straw that forces Tehran to reform. If it chooses to continue its confrontation with the US and continues to refuse to recognise Israel, it will face extremely severe internal and external pressures.
On the other hand, although Israel has achieved remarkable development in its more than 70 years of existence, its national security issues remain unresolved. Its ongoing confrontation with a regional power like Iran has always been one of the core factors threatening Israel’s national security. Tel Aviv thus also has a need to ease relations with Tehran. If Iran’s relations with the United States and Israel were to improve during Trump’s second presidential term, this would largely be a blessing for both the Middle East and the world.
Image Caption: Flags of (R to L) Yemen, Palestine, Lebanese armed movement Hezbollah, Iraq, Iraqi Hashed Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation Forces or PMF) paramilitary forces, and Iran are raised during a denouncing Israel and in solidarity with Palestinians in the Huthi-controlled capital Sanaa on January 3, 2025. (Photo by Mohammed HUWAIS / AFP)
About the Author
Professor Fan Hongda is a professor at the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University, China. His main research areas are the Middle East studies and China diplomacy. Since 2010 he has been doing in-depth fieldwork in USA, Israel, Palestine, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. He spent one year as a visiting professor at Tel Aviv University in Israel and one year as a teacher at Isfahan University in Iran. He has just completed a one-year visiting scholar program at the University of California, Berkeley. Prof Fan published four books, hundreds of research papers and column articles in academic journals and media of China, Singapore, Iran, Turkey and USA. He is also an international affairs commentator on Chinese TV and an interviewee of many mainstream media in the world, including Bloomberg, NBC, Newsweek, The Diplomat, Financial Times, etc.
End Notes
[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20050126071912/http:/news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2003-01/20/content_6743.htm
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-irans-axis-resistance-which-groups-are-involved-2024-01-29/
[3] https://www.nytimes.com/article/axis-resistance-iran-militia.html
[4] http://paper.dzwww.com/dzrb/content/20240119/Articel05004MT.htm
[5] https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-yemen-who-are-the-houthis-20181229-story.html
[6] https://www.nytimes.com/article/axis-resistance-iran-militia.html
[7] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/axis-resilience
[8] https://www.ft.com/content/9af7a433-db1a-4c19-a0fb-d587ffec8f99
[9] https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-829043
[10] http://www.news.cn/20241114/ad632f81871d444b8c1db99c15825a58/c.html
[11] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/14/world/middleeast/elon-musk-iran-trump.html?smtyp=cur&smid=tw-nytimes
* An earlier version of this article was first published by World Affairs (Issue 23, 2024). MEI Research Fellow Lin Jing has translated it from Mandarin and updated the content based on an interview with Prof Fan and certain perspectives drawn from his written interview with Guancha website.
