MEI Perspectives Series 32: The Israel-Hamas War’s Profound and Widening Implications in the Region and Beyond

By Gadi Yishayahu*

 

The poignant images capturing children, mothers, and elderly women returning home from Hamas captivity evoke a glimmer of light amid the prevailing darkness that has shadowed Israel since the events of 7 October this year. The intricacies of the hostage and prisoner exchange agreement between Israel and Hamas, orchestrated within the framework of a humanitarian pause, invite a contemplative examination of the unfolding circumstances from that fateful day in October.

Approximately 55 days have transpired since Israel became embroiled in a fierce war with Hamas, resonating not only within the region, but also globally. This article delves into the profound implications of the ongoing conflict on Israel’s decision-making apparatus, its domestic political landscape, the volatile Middle Eastern region, and the broader international system.

 

Security Landscape and Historical Reflections

From a security standpoint, the 2023 War represents Israel’s most significant historical defeat. In a sense, one might liken the Israeli-Gaza border on the eve of 7 Oct to the Maginot Line built by France in the 1930s to deter invasion by Nazi Germany. Both exemplified state-of-the-art barriers equipped with the best technology, yet, as history showed, they failed to hold the line. Within Israel, parallels are being drawn between Hamas’ unexpected strike and historical events like the 9/11 attacks, Pearl Harbour, or the Egyptian-Syrian surprise strike in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. One would postulate that Hamas’ attack could be comprehended as one of Glenn D. Paige’s insightful modules on surprise types, either as a “Not Anticipated at All” (Neta) surprise, akin to Pearl Harbour, or an “Anticipated Generally, but Unanticipated Specifically” (Agus) surprise, resembling the 1973 War. Others would argue that unlike the 1973 war, where intelligence about Egyptian and Syrian plans was gathered and analysed, 7 Oct caught Israel and its entire intelligence community off-guard. However, it would not be incorrect to suggest that everyone — Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran (Hamas’ ideological partners), and Hamas itself, which was surprised by the scale of the attack’s success — was taken by surprise.

It is true that an analogy can be made between the current war between Israel and Hamas and similar campaigns, such as operations Cast Lead in 2009, or Protective Edge in 2014. While some similarities exist, characterising this war as merely another chapter in the historical conflict between the two sides oversimplifies the situation. As an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) general told the author: “We are witnessing Israel’s most significant shift in its security paradigm since 1948, some may say a tectonic shift. Although the threat is not existential, the atrocities and unprecedented crimes against humanity taken by Hamas on 7 Oct stimulated existential fears not only among Israelis, but also within the global Jewish community. Consequently, any solution that does not eliminate the threat would be deemed unacceptable by Israelis.” In this light, Israel’s manoeuvres inside Gaza City, and its determination to assume control of Hamas’ command centres allegedly located inside hospitals, underscore this tectonic shift. There was thus no doubt in my mind that fighting would resume after a short pause, as it already has, despite earlier anticipation that the truce to facilitate the hostage and prisoner exchanges would evolve into a lasting ceasefire. Israel remains resolute in pursuing its objectives to eradicate Hamas’ military capabilities, and will persist until these goals are achieved.

 

Domestic Political Pressures

From an Israeli domestic political perspective, the leadership faces immense pressure. Public accusations of failing to provide adequate protection to citizens and prevent a devastating outcome are prevalent.

In this context, Israel’s decision-making apparatus is grappling with the most complicated scenarios it has ever encountered. Simultaneously navigating the dynamics of a manoeuvre in Gaza, while trying to locate many hostages assumed to be held underground, and constantly monitoring the northern border to avoid a full-scale war with Hezbollah represent a tremendously complex task. Additional challenges, particularly concerning the Iranian nuclear project approaching a pivotal stage, further complicate matters. In many aspects, this decision-making process that involves painful decisions, or, as the writer Don Winslow put it: “Hell isn’t having no choice. It’s having to make a choice between horrific things.”

The responsibility assumed by key IDF and security establishment figures further intensifies pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, placing him in the midst of a political earthquake, not just from the Israeli left-wing but also within his own constituency, where he is also perceived as a part of the failure. Mr Netanyahu’s legacy as Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, one who internationalised the Iranian threat, initiated the Abraham Accords, and who positioned Israel as an economic and technological powerhouse, hangs in the balance. Some analysts suggest parallels with Golda Meir, who resigned as PM after the 1973 war. Considering the complexities of this war and its potential implications on the region and the international system, Mr Netanyahu will have to find a delicate balance between unprecedented domestic challenges and the international impact. In this tumultuous period, Israel’s decision-makers are struggling to formulate strategies that will preserve the country’s security, strengthen regional stability, and uphold its international standing. Any resolution that falls short of neutralising the military capabilities of Hamas and its leadership would not be met kindly by the Israeli public. Mr Netanyahu, who is renowned for being risk-averse, is acutely aware of the clear mandate bestowed upon his government to accomplish the objective of eliminating Hamas. In this context, there is a consensus among Israel’s decision-makers that eradicating Hamas’s military capabilities and its leadership while leaving the northern border with Hezbollah unchanged addresses only half of the problem.

Examining the dynamics between Israel and Hezbollah in the context of military clashes along the northern border suggests that both sides are seeking to strike a delicate balance, cautiously navigating their next steps in order to avoid an all-out war. But while their actions appear to be carefully calibrated, the risk of miscalculation remains.

Although both parties have formally declared their lack of interest in expanding the conflict, significant apprehension over the potential for Hezbollah to misinterpret Israel’s threat perception and its commitment to resolve it — whether via military action or, at the least, charges that Hezbollah  is violating UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which resolved the Second Lebanon War in 2006 — lingers.

Resolution 1701, which was accepted by both sides but regrettably has not been enacted, Hezbollah was to have withdrawn from southern Lebanon to the Litani River, approximately eight kilometres from the border. This area was envisioned as being free of any armed personnel, assets, or weapons, except those under the jurisdiction of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). A miscalculation risks causing the situation to spiral out of control towards a regional war.

 

Regional Dynamics and Balancing Act

From a regional perspective, the 2023 war appears to heighten the prospects of war involving Israel and Iran’s proxies  — Hezbollah, and Houthi and Shia fighters from Iraq and Syria — adding more danger to an already intricate geopolitical puzzle. The Iran-Hezbollah axis challenges not only Israel, but also Sunni Arab countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. These states face growing demands from their populations to support the Palestinian cause, and must strike a balance between this and their national interests. Conversations with senior officials from these countries paint a clear picture: The vast majority of moderate Sunni axis countries will not shed a tear if Hamas is eliminated, and even see the end of its rule as inevitable.

Here, the significant role of Saudi Arabia as a regional power comes to the fore. Until two years ago, it was ostracised by the West, but its astute political conduct has brought it back into the fold, and positioned it as an influential regional power, perhaps even a balancing factor, in the current turmoil. Many countries in the West now see Saudi Arabia as a key player in the future of the Gaza Strip post-Hamas. Arraigned against it are the Iranians, whose conduct, mostly through its non-state actor proxies in the region, illustrates the grave concern of the moderate Sunni countries, Israel, and the West. At this stage, it is evident their efforts were aimed at thwarting the expansion of the Abraham Accords and the normalisation process with Israel, and that they have succeeded. Be that as it may, the Israel-Hamas war paradoxically poses an unprecedented threat to the Iranian regime, by endangering its most significant proxy, Hezbollah, as well as its nuclear project and its ambitions for regional hegemony — which are attracting renewed scrutiny post-7 Oct.

 

The International Order

The war between Israel and Hamas has the potential for far-reaching consequences. The arrival of two American aircraft carrier strike groups on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea at the beginning of the war, as well as President Joe Biden’s visit to Israel, signify the end of the United States’ two-year effort to dial back its physical presence from the Middle East. Furthermore, it illustrates the role of the United States as the indispensable power in the Middle East. The US-led Western bloc’s pro-Israel stance is in stark contrast to that of the opposite pole, led by China, Russia, and Iran. The US stance indicates that the liberal West is at a turning point, and cannot afford another Ukraine because the next in line will be Taiwan.  In this sense, the current conflict illustrates that the international system is reverting to a bipolar structure, sharpening the between the West and the opposing bloc.

Unlike the Cold War, where both poles were led by two superpowers from similar religious backgrounds (Christianity), the current fracture pits the US-led bloc against a hybrid pole comprised of different actors who share a common disdain for liberal Western values. To compound matters, the new line drawn in the international system extends to the streets of major cities in the West, illustrating the spill-over of the Israeli-Hamas war in Europe. . In a recent demonstration against anti-Semitism in Paris two weeks ago, an unprecedented event occurred: Representatives of the far right, led by Marine Le Pen, marched hand in hand with Jews, while far-left parties led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon were absent. In Britain, Home Secretary Suella Braverman was fired by Prime Minister Rishi Sunak following her unauthorised article criticising the way pro-Palestinian protests had been policed. In the United States, there has been significant pushback against Israel by left-leaning voters, as well as progressives, even while Congress and the Biden administration are in lock-step over support for the country.

However, even within the Biden administration, senior officials are openly expressing discontent over its pro-Israel stance, while a growing chorus of Democratic voters is speaking out, further imperilling the President’s already shaky re-election bid.

By the time the dust clears in Gaza, the current conflict could well be a defining moment in the shaping of a new order, not just in the Middle East, but the world.

 

 

Image Caption: Israeli soldiers walking among the pictures of people taken captive or killed by Hamas militants duing the Supernova music festival on 7 October, at the site where the deadly incident took place near Kibbutz Reim in southern Israel, on 1 December 2023. Photo: Jack Guez / AFP

 

About the Author

*Dr Gadi Yishayahu is Crisis and Security Fellow at the Cambridge Middle-East and North Africa Forum. He contributed this article to the Middle East Institute-NUS.

 

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