2023 Summer Transfer Window – A False Dawn
Saudi Arabia grabbed headlines across the globe when it launched a high-profile campaign to revitalise its little-known Saudi Pro League (SPL) during football’s summer transfer window of 2023. The arrival of superstars like Cristiano Ronaldo and significant investments initially generated widespread excitement. Ronaldo’s move to Al-Nassr from Manchester United, in particular, dominated headlines, and promised to herald a new era in the Kingdom’s footballing ambitions. His arrival had the desired impact: Other elite players, such as Karim Benzema, Neymar, and N’golo Kante, left Real Madrid, Paris Saint-Germain, and Chelsea, respectively, and headed for the Middle East, drawn by hugely lucrative contract offers.[1] Powered by a total of US$957 million in spending, Saudi Arabia and its previously obscure football league were on everyone’s lips. However, just months after this surge in attention, the buzz seemed to have largely faded, raising questions about the SPL’s ability to sustain its momentum, and whether its allure was doomed to be brief to begin with.
Indeed, when the new football season kicked off in August, Saudi Arabia’s league drew little interest. Despite earlier rumours, there were few big transfers to grab the headlines: Some elite players, such as Ivan Toney, João Cancelo, and Moussa Diaby, did move, but they were several rungs below in stature compared to the Class of 2023. Spending plunged,[2] and questions about the long-term vision for Saudi football, and how it would fit into the country’s broader plans, grew.
Where and Why did it Start?
Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman’s vision of reshaping Saudi Arabia from an oil-dependent nation into a global powerhouse has had far-reaching implications so far, not just economically, but socially, and culturally, as well. At the heart of this ambition is Vision 2030, a transformative plan designed to diversify the Kingdom’s economy and elevate its global standing in various industries, including sports. The Saudi Pro League (SPL) is one of the crown jewels of this strategy, with football serving as a catalyst for economic growth, social progress, and loftier goals such as international acclaim — such as winning the right to host the 2034 Fifa World Cup. Football was also a key reason Saudi Arabia climbed the 2024 Global Soft Power Index (it ranked 18th, up eight places from the previous year)[3].
But a year after making staggering leaps, enthusiasm surrounding the Saudi Pro League has waned significantly. Several players, notably the former Liverpool captain Jordan Henderson, expressed regrets about his move, citing personal motivations and the lack of competition. Factors such as the climate have also contributed to this, but the utter lack of interest among Saudis themselves is probably the major reason: One fixture last season, between Al-Riyadh and Al-Khaleej attracted a mere 144 fans, though it must be said that both teams are the league’s bottom-feeders. Ronaldo’s Al-Nassr fared better, drawing an average of about 18,000 fans, but that was still a far cry from the English Premier League’s average attendance of almost 40,000 (Ronaldo’s old team, Manchester United, is the league’s biggest draw, with close to 74,000)[4].
Additionally, moving to the Saudi league can significantly diminish a player’s standing — most of those who moved have been seen as either over the hill, or money-grubbers. Former Dutch international Stephen Bergwijn, for instance, was dropped by the Netherlands’ coach, Ronald Koeman, who bluntly said the player’s move to Saudi Arabia effectively closed the door on his international career. “When you are 26, your main ambition should be sporting, not financial,” Koeman said.[5] Other, bigger, names, including Brazil’s Roberto Firmino, and France’s Benzema, were also dropped by their national teams in the wake of their moves. Henderson continued to be called up by former England coach Gareth Southgate, but the move was criticised by fans.[6]
A Familiar Model – Major League Soccer and Chinese Super League
The Saudi Pro League is not the first to try and boost its popularity by dangling extravagant salaries before ageing superstars. The United States’ Major League Soccer (MLS), and the Chinese Super League (CSL), trod similar paths.
The American league blazed the trail, implementing a controversial “designated player” rule which allowed teams to exceed salary caps for top, if fading, talent from around the world. In 1975, it enlisted the legendary Pele. Since then, others have followed, including David Beckham in 2007, and, more recently, Lionel Messi. While these signings generated a surge in popularity and fanfare for MLS, they failed to establish the league as a true competitor to Europe’s top leagues.[7]
Similarly, the CSL experienced a boom from 2016 to 2019, luring high-profile players like Brazilians Hulk and Oscar with astronomical salaries, the latter reportedly earning €400,000 per week. At one point, Gareth Bale was rumoured to be considering a move, having had his head turned by a staggering 1 million euros per week offer. However, the league’s lavish spending eventually led to its downfall. Regulatory changes, including salary caps and a luxury tax, combined with rampant debt and the Covid-19 pandemic, saw clubs like Hebei FC, once home to Argentinian star Javier Mascherano, disbanded. The CSL, once touted to be a rising force — and a key part of President Xi Jinping’s pet project to turn China into a football powerhouse — is now largely considered a non-entity.[8]
While there are parallels between these leagues and the SPL, their core motivations differ slightly. The MLS aimed to cultivate a football culture in a country where the sport lacked deep-rooted traditions, and focused on long-term financial sustainability, rather than immediate expenditure. The CSL’s aims are closer to that of the SPL: Both are aimed at increasing their countries’ global influence, although the former’s stated aims include building a healthy population through sport. All three leagues, however, have fallen well short of their goals, and offer a cautionary tale about trying to ride the coat-tails of popular, but “alien”, cultures by throwing good money at the problem.
What’s in a Game?
There are several factors that make the beautiful game, beautiful. To fully analyse why the Saudi league is an unpopular one to begin with, one needs to dive deep into the fundamentals since its inception:
Inconsistent Format
From its inception until the 1989-90 season, the Saudi Pro League was little more than a regional tournament, lacking the structure needed for national or international appeal. In 1989, the Saudi Football Federation merged the league with the King’s Cup, introducing the Golden Box, an end-of-season knockout competition to crown the league champion. However, this format changed several times over the years, including a return to a round-robin system in 2007.[9] This inconsistency failed to create a clear identity or an engaging competition, which made it difficult to attract a global audience to a league already struggling with internal issues.
Perceptions of the Saudi Pro League – ‘Low Quality, Retirement League’
The Saudi Pro League has been viewed as a low-quality competition, with analysts suggesting that attracting a handful of superstars in the twilight of their careers will not be enough to generate sustained fan interest. While these high-profile signings may raise the league’s profile, the overall quality of play remains significantly lower than that of top European leagues[10]. This has characterised Saudi Arabia as a lucrative retirement destination for ageing stars, rather than a competitive footballing hub.[11]
PIF & Newcastle Put the Product on the Map
No international fan took notice of Saudi Arabia in football until the Public Investment Fund (PIF), the country’s sovereign wealth fund, purchased Newcastle United in 2021. At the time, Newcastle languishing in second-last place in the English Premier League (EPL). However, after investing around US$310 million in new players, the new owners transformed the club in just one season, with Newcastle finishing fourth in the 2022-2023 season, securing a spot in the Champions League the next year.
The PIF then extended its ambitions to the local scene by unveiling its “Sports Clubs Investment and Privatisation Project”. This initiative included transforming four major Saudi clubs — Al Ittihad, Al Ahli, Al Nassr, and Al Hilal — into companies, with the PIF holding 75 per cent ownership, and non-profit foundations controlling the rest. Previously, SPL clubs were mostly under the control of the Saudi Ministry of Sports, and relied heavily on government funding. This structure hindered the league’s ability to attract private investments, global TV deals, and international attention, ultimately limiting its global appeal and growth[12]. The shift marked the start of a broader privatisation effort. According to the PIF, the goal was to attract new investments and sponsorships, including from the private sector, to drive growth in football and other sports[13].
Disparity and Lacklustre Matchday Atmosphere
These moves had limited traction, however. While the “Big Four” – Al-Ittihad, Al-Hilal, Al-Nassr, and Al-Ahli – were drawing significant attention thanks to their star players, other clubs in the Saudi Pro League (SPL) were struggling to fill their stadiums. Recent matches have seen the highest attendance hover around just 16,000 spectators. Even Al-Ettifaq, with Henderson in the side, and managed by Liverpool legend Steven Gerrard, averages a paltry 7,021 fans per match. Even teams in the lower tiers of European football draw more fans — Britain’s Football League Two game between Bradford City and Wrexham, for instance, attracted 21,552 spectators. Smaller clubs such as Abha and Al-Riyadh fare even worse, with some matches seeing as few as 2,000 fans[14]. Ronaldo, perhaps the league’s global face, has expressed frustration with playing in front of half-empty stadiums, alongside teammates whose performances sometimes lead to visible discontent.
Fans are crucial to football’s success. As one writer noted: “Viewers don’t want to watch a match that can’t even draw local support.” Worse, the PIF’s investment has concentrated power in just four teams, resulting in one-sided matches, like Al-Nassr’s 5-0 win over Al-Fateh, and Al-Hilal’s 6-1 thrashing of Al-Riyadh. These lopsided games reduce the league’s competitiveness, diminishing excitement, and further discouraging fans from attending.
Despite efforts to increase international exposure, such as IMG’s management of media rights, the SPL struggles to replicate the success of even lower-tier European leagues such as France’s Ligue 1 and the Dutch Eredivisie, never mind the behemoth that is the English Premier League (EPL), which generates over US$11 billion in global broadcast deals. Without a passionate and consistent fanbase, the Saudi league will find it difficult to compete with the likes of the EPL.[15]
Environmental and Attendance Challenges for the Saudi Pro League
Another challenge faced by the Saudi Pro League (SPL) is the nation’s extreme climate, with summer temperatures reaching as high as 48.89 degrees Celsius (the league’s season runs from August to May). This makes playing conditions difficult, often forcing matches to be scheduled late at night to avoid intense heat. Even early in the season, pitch temperatures can exceed 37.78 degrees C, creating an uncomfortable environment for both players and fans. These environmental factors, combined with logistical difficulties related to the heat, affect the overall football experience. Attendance is further hindered by issues like ticketing problems and scheduling conflicts with prayer times, which can deter fans from attending matches. Together, these challenges highlight the broader difficulty the SPL faces in building a consistent and passionate fanbase.[16]
Given these factors, the SPL’s ambitions appear doomed to fail. Without a solid foundation to build upon, the league suffers from a glaring absence of compelling narratives, which often drives fan interest and engagement.
Where does the SPL Go from Here?
The Saudi league must take a holistic approach that goes beyond heavy spending and short-term signings if it is to succeed. The experience of Major League Soccer (MLS) and the Chinese Super League (CSL) highlights the risks of relying solely on attracting high-profile players to generate buzz, as both leagues have faced challenges in sustaining long-term growth and global relevance. While the SPL’s early focus on bringing in big names has raised the league’s profile, the novelty is already wearing off, and without deeper structural changes, the SPL risks facing the same stagnation seen in these leagues.
The key to ensuring the SPL’s future lies in shifting its focus towards grassroots development, fostering homegrown talent, and creating a rich football culture rooted in rivalries, tradition, and competitive balance. The lessons from the EPL and other top leagues such as Spain’s La Liga are clear: Sustained success is not built on financial excess alone but on solid foundations — such as youth academies, smart investments in infrastructure, and competitive balance — which support long-term growth. Both leagues have successfully built global fanbases not just through marquee signings, but by ensuring that football is accessible, competitive, and engaging across all levels of play.
If the SPL is to achieve its lofty ambitions as part of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, it must broaden its appeal within domestic borders first. In this respect, some fundamentals are already in place: Football is the most popular sport in the country, and the national team has widespread support, and international success (its 2-1 victory over the eventual champions, Argentina, in the 2022 World Cup was among the biggest upsets in football). To broaden the league’s appeal domestically, the SPL will need to go back to the drawing board, and build its credentials with Saudis from the ground up. Only then can it generate the long-term excitement and global appeal that will attract players from around the world who are in their prime, up the standard of play, and make it a force in football.
*The writer is a Senior Executive in Communications and Publications at MEI-NUS.
Image Caption: Al-Nassr’s Portuguese forward, Cristiano Ronaldo, cools down during the Saudi Pro League football match against Al-Ahli at the King Abdullah Sport City Stadium in Jeddah on 15 March 2024. Photo: AFP
About the Author
V Shakthii Vel is a communications specialist at the Middle East Institute-National University of Singapore, with several years of experience in the field. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Mass Communications with Public Relations from the University of Northumbria.
End Notes
[1] Amy Woodyatt, Krystina Shveda, and Antonio Jarne Cubero, “Saudi Arabia is Trying to Disrupt Soccer’s World Order. The Reasons Why Might Surprise You,” CNN, September 20, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/20/sport/saudi-arabia-soccer-spl-bin-salman-intl-spt-cmd-dg/index.html.
[2] Can Erozden, “Saudi Football League Spends Quiet 2024 Summer Transfer Window,” *Anadolu Agency*, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/sports/saudi-football-league-spends-quiet-2024-summer-transfer-window/3324612.
[3] Fareed, Aisha. “Beyond the Pitch: Star Quality, Strategic Vision Put Saudi Pro League on Global Stage.” Arab News, September 22, 2024. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2572341/saudi-arabia.
[4] Peters, Jerrad. “Opinion: No One Cares About Saudi League.” Winnipeg Free Press, August 29, 2024. https://www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion/columnists/2024/08/23/no-one-cares-about-saudi-league#:~:text=Last%20March%2C%20despite%20a%20prime,in%20itself%2C%20is%20embarrassing%20enough.
[5] Reuters, “Netherlands: Ronald Koeman’s New Era Begins with Steven Bergwijn and Virgil van Dijk,” *The Guardian*, September 3, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/football/article/2024/sep/03/netherlands-ronald-koeman-steven-bergwijn-virgil-van-dijk.
[6] Firstpost. “Henderson, Benzema: Why Stars Want to Leave Saudi Arabia.” September 21, 2024. https://www.firstpost.com/sports/football-news/henderson-benzema-why-stars-want-to-leave-saudi-arabia-13632762.html.
[7] Thomas Britton, “The Ghost of Football Past: Why the Saudi Pro League Will Fail,” *The Oxford Blue*, September 21, 2024, https://theoxfordblue.co.uk/the-ghost-of-football-past-why-the-saudi-pro-league-will-fail/.
[8] Duerden, John. “Saudi Arabia’s Football Ambitions: The Impact of High-Profile Transfers.” *The Guardian*, July 3, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/football/2023/jul/03/saudi-arabia-football-china-transfers-cristiano-ronaldo-benzema.
[9] Feed. “Saudi Pro League: Only 144 People Turn up to Watch Game.” The Economic Times, December 18, 2023. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/saudi-pro-league-only-144-people-turn-up-to-watch-game/articleshow/106101959.cms?from=mdr.
[10] Smith, Elliot. “Saudi Arabia’s Cash Splurge on Soccer Could Cause Ripple Effects Across the Sports World.” CNBC, January 6, 2023. https://www.cnbc.com/2023/01/06/saudi-arabias-new-love-for-soccer-could-cause-ripple-effects.html.
[11] Doyle, Mark. “Cristiano Ronaldo, Karim Benzema and more superstars on the way: Is the Saudi Pro League a threat to Europe’s elite or a well-funded retirement league?” Goal, September 27, 2023. https://www.goal.com/en-sg/lists/ronaldo-benzema-saudi-pro-league-threat-europe-retirement-league/blt59545284754b7594#csa493419e6baa4add.
[12] Yrashed. “How The Saudi Pro League Transformed From Being Unknown to Inescapable – Atlantic Council.” Atlantic Council, June 14, 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/how-the-saudi-pro-league-transformed-from-being-unknown-to-inescapable/.
[13] Saleh, Tariq, and Tariq Saleh. “PIF Takes Over Top Saudi Soccer Clubs, More Private Investments Lined Up.” Sportcal, June 6, 2023. https://www.sportcal.com/news/pif-takes-over-top-saudi-soccer-clubs-more-private-investments-lined-up/.
[14] King, Kieran. “Saudi Pro League’s Biggest Problem Not Even Cristiano Ronaldo Is Able to Solve.” The Mirror, October 24, 2023. https://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/football/news/saudi-arabia-ronaldo-gerrard-attendances-31263652.
[15] Mohamed, Mostafa. “Saudi Pro League: Why Even Ronaldo, Benzema and Neymar Can’t Pull in the Fans.” Middle East Eye, October 5, 2023. https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/saudi-pro-league-ronaldo-benzema-neymar-cant-pull-fans.
[16] Franklin-Wallis, Oliver, and Benjamin McMahon. “Can Saudi Arabia Buy Soccer?” GQ, February 20, 2024. https://www.gq.com/story/can-saudi-arabia-buy-soccer.
