Abstract

The offensive that led to the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s Syria regime was not spontaneous, but rather the culmination of months of extensive planning and coordination among rebel factions, primarily led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). However, it occurred within a complex landscape shaped by multiple external players whose interests often conflict with those of ordinary Syrians, posing significant challenges for the country, and for security in the Middle East.

 

Understanding Syrian Joy at the Fall of the Assad Regime

The joy expressed by Syrians at the Assad regime’s downfall is rooted in the extensive human rights violations committed under the regime. It has been characterised by authoritarian governance, suppression of dissent, and a lack of political freedoms. Reports from organisations such as Human Rights Watch document systematic torture, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and attacks on Syrian civilians. The use of chemical weapons against opposition-held areas further exemplifies the brutality faced by ordinary Syrians. As a result, many view any potential change in leadership as a chance to escape years of oppression and violence.

 

The Shadow Syrian Government since 2015

In the context of the Syrian Civil War, 2015 marked a significant turning point for Assad’s regime. Prior to the intervention of Russia and Iran, there were indications that the government was on the verge of collapse. Following Russia’s military intervention in September 2015 to bolster Assad’s position, the dynamics shifted dramatically. The reliance on external powers such as Russia and Iran became increasingly pronounced as they took on more active roles in supporting his government.

After 2015, while Assad remained nominally in power, argued that he ruled more as a puppet under the influence of these foreign powers, rather than as an independent leader with full control over Syria.

 

Key Actors in the Syrian Conflict

 

Fatah Damascus Operations Room

As Lebanon remains in a fragile ceasefire, the Syrian situation further destabilises the Middle East. The “Fatah Damascus Operations Room” includes five major rebel groups which participated in the conflict. The main player is HTS, formerly known as the Al-Nusra Front, which has been designated as a terrorist organisation by the United States and others. HTS has a pronounced jihadist agenda, and was previously linked with Al-Qaeda (AQ) before separating in July 2016. Under the leadership of Abu Mohammed Al-Golani (also known as Ahmad al-Sharaa), a former AQ fighter and whom the US has placed a bounty of US$10 million on, HTS has emerged as a significant player in the insurgency against Bashar Assad’s regime. His background as a former AQ fighter initially positioned him within a global jihadist framework; however, he has sought to rebrand HTS to appeal to a broader audience within Syria. By distancing himself from AQ’s ideology and focusing on local grievances against Assad’s regime, Al-Golani aims to consolidate power and legitimacy among Syrian rebels. HTS currently dominates within Idlib province in Syria. The next major player in the conflict is  Ahrar al-Sham, which consists of various armed Islamic factions operating primarily in Idlib and rural Aleppo.

Another key player is the National Front for Liberation, a military coalition that includes several Syrian factions, notably the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The FSA is made up of officers who defected from Assad’s regime and numerous volunteers, totalling tens of thousands of fighters. Additionally, there is the Syrian National Army, which was previously known as the  Free Syrian Army when established in 2017, and comprises armed groups that receive varying degrees of support from Turkey. This group has been involved in conflicts with Kurdish fighters in recent years and operates under the leadership of the Syrian opposition government. In addition, the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, a Sunni Islamist rebel group, which was part of the Syrian Revolutionary Command Council, has allied with Ahrar al-Sham to establish a coalition known as the Syrian Liberation Front.

 

Turkey’s Strategic Goals in Syria

 

Countering Kurdish Influence

 The ongoing conflict in Syria has seen a notable escalation in fighting, particularly in the regions of Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama. This increase in hostilities can be attributed to significant military actions undertaken by armed factions supported by Turkey. Ankara’s involvement is not merely a reactionary measure, but aligns with its broader strategic ambitions in northern Syria.

Turkey is acting independently to create separation between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and other armed Kurdish groups in Syria. This intervention aims to establish a 35-km buffer zone along the Turkish border to prevent any potential collaboration between armed Kurdish factions in Syria and those within Turkey, which could embolden separatist movements. One of Turkey’s primary concerns is the presence and influence of Kurdish groups, particularly the People’s Defense Units (YPG)  in Syria. Turkey views the YPG as a branch of the PKK, which it has designated as a terrorist organisation. By supporting various armed factions against these groups, Turkey aims to diminish their territorial control and political power.

 

Establishing a Safe Zone in Syria

Turkey aims to repatriate as many as two million Syrian refugees currently residing in the country, and this is contingent upon pro-Turkish militants gaining control of Aleppo. This move would alleviate some of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s domestic policy challenges. Turkey also wants pro-Turkish militants to succeed in removing the YPG from areas west of the Euphrates River, along its border, to improve security. To further consolidate its influence in Syria, Turkey helped initiate and deploy the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a mix of 12 different armed factions, which began carrying out tasks assigned by the Turkish military. That development was followed by multiple attempts by Mr Erdogan to engage in dialogue with Bashar al-Assad to unify the Syrian Army (SA) with the FSA, to form a single entity that would operate under Turkish directives. The most recent instance of this was Mr Erdogan’s decision to leave the Arab summit in Saudi Arabia during Assad’s address on 11 November 2024. It is worth noting that Assad refused any talks with Erdogan. He demanded the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Syria before engaging in discussions with Erdogan.

 

Israel’s Ambitions in Syria

Israel has taken control of land adjacent to its border with Syria and has conducted airstrikes targeting Damascus. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on 8 December 2024 that IDF troops established a buffer zone in the Golan Heights, coinciding with the rapid offensive by Syrians. Mr Netanyahu indicated that this action was necessary to ensure the safety of Israeli citizens following the withdrawal of Syrian troops from their positions and the infiltration of rebel fighters into an area monitored by the United Nations. On 3 December 2024, Voice of the Capital reported that Israeli forces had moved as far as Beqaasem, approximately 25 km from the Syrian capital, and several kilometres past the Syrian side of the buffer zone.  Beqaasem is located in the foothills of Mount Hermon, an area captured by Israeli forces on  8 December 2024 that is considered a strategically significant location situated at the intersection of Syria, Lebanon, and the Golan Heights. Additionally, Israeli fighter jets struck weapons depots and weaponry across the country — part of preventive measures aimed at preventing remnants Assad’s arms from falling into the hands of extremist groups.

The role of Israel in the Syrian conflict is undeniable, and is a matter of record: In an interview in January 2019, Gadi Eisenkot, a former Israel Defense Forces chief, confirmed that Israel had supplied weapons to Syrian rebels, and acknowledged support for HTS. Mr Eisenkot also indicated that Israel had provided light arms to opposition groups for self-defence purposes.

In September 2018, Foreign Policy (FP) magazine disclosed that Israel had covertly supplied arms and financial aid to at least 12 Syrian rebel groups to counteract the establishment of Iran-backed forces and Islamic State militants near its borders. Israeli officials had long maintained that the country was not involved in Syria’s internal conflicts; an assertion that beggars belief.  The FP article also indicated that Israeli support included paying the salaries of rebel fighters, as well as the provision of weapons and other supplies.

 

Russia’s Influence in Syria

Since the onset of the civil war in 2011, Russia has positioned itself as a key player in Syria, primarily through military intervention that began in 2015. Russia’s involvement in Syria was initially driven by its strategic interest in securing a foothold in the Middle East to counter the United States’ influence and maintain access to naval facilities at Tartus and Latakia. However, with the war in Ukraine taking precedence, these interests may be reassessed.

One of the primary justifications for Russia’s military intervention in Syria has been the fight against terrorism. The rise of extremist groups such as ISIS posed a significant threat not only to regional stability, but also to Russian national security. Moscow views these groups as potential exporters of terrorism that could destabilise regions within Russia itself, particularly areas with significant Muslim populations in Chechnya and Dagestan.

While Moscow has been Assad’s ally against Western influence in Syria, its capacity to project power there has been affected by its ongoing war in Ukraine. Russia’s military operations in Ukraine have necessitated a substantial allocation of resources, both financial and military. The war effort requires significant troop deployments, logistics support, and advanced weaponry. This commitment limits Russia’s ability to maintain its previous level of military assistance to the Assad regime. However, Bashar al-Assad has been granted asylum in Russia.

 

Iran’s Position in Syria

Iran’s military engagement in Syria has increased over the past few years, and has become more apparent, making it easier for the Israeli air force to target Tehran’s forces. Consequently, between 2017 and 2018, Iran sought alternative strategies to safeguard its militias. This led to an ambitious initiative to redefine its presence in Syria by establishing the Local Defence Forces — Syrian Shia militias, which were recruited mainly from northern Aleppo, northern Homs, and parts of Raqqa. The National Defence Forces, another militia, are trained in urban guerilla warfare by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, with Hezbollah instructors at facilities inside Syria, Lebanon, and Iran.  It has also recruited Sunni individuals, particularly from clans in the Aleppo, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor provinces, to its Syrian militias. Once individuals are recruited into these militias, they undergo training that lasts between twenty-one and 45 days for light and medium weapons, and up to six months for heavy weaponry.

It has been reported that Iran had lost confidence in the ousted Syrian president even before his downfall: Its Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, informed Assad that a weakened Tehran could no longer provide additional military support for his regime. This came during the Iranian foreign minister’s visit to Damascus that took place on 1 December, shortly after the fall of Syria’s second largest city, Aleppo, to rebel forces. However, the rapidity of Assad’s collapse, which exposed the fragility of his regime, was unexpected and shocking for Iran as well.

Iran’s influence in Syria has diminished because due to the current conflict in Lebanon. Several of its militias withdrew from Syria and were redeployed to Iraq and Lebanon. At that time, Iraqi militias were on high alert due to the potential for confrontations with American military bases. Concurrently, Hezbollah pulled its fighters out of Syria, prompting Iran to send some members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to Lebanon to support Hezbollah. This situation created a void within the Syrian army, which struggled to effectively address threats from ISIS, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and HTS. Two sources from the Syrian army reported that members of Iranian-backed Shia groups crossed into northern Syria from Iraq on 3 December 2024 to bolster the Syrian army’s efforts against armed factions.

Since the victories claimed by the Fatah Damascus Operations Room insurgent groups symbolise challenges to Russia and Iran’s interests in Syria. Therefore, they are often regarded as significant blows to both Russian and Iranian ambitions within Syria.

 

Implications of the Fall of al-Assad Regime

 

Potential Regrouping of ISIS and Al-Qaeda (AQ) in Syria

Following the overthrow of Assad’s regime, there are significant concerns over the potential resurgence of violent jihadist groups, particularly ISIS and AQ. The power vacuum caused by the collapse of Assad’s regime can be exploited by ISIS to reassert itself and regain a foothold in Syria, potentially re-establishing safe havens from which the group can operate.

Similarly, HTS, which has roots in AQ, poses significant risks as it may pursue objectives aligned with establishing a radical Islamic governance model akin to a caliphate. This concern is amplified by HTS’ control over certain regions in northwest Syria, particularly Idlib province, where it has established administrative structures that reflect its Islamist ideology. However, the US stated on 8 December 2024 that it would remain in Eastern Syria to prevent an Islamic State resurgence.

 

Increased Risk of Syria’s Fragmentation into Quasi-States

As a diverse country with many ethnic and religious groups, such as the Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Alawites, who are linked to the Shia, Christians, and Druze, Syria under the Assad regime has historically maintained control through a combination of authoritarian governance and sectarian favouritism. This has often exacerbated divisions among these groups rather than fostered unity. The Syrian Civil War has intensified these divisions. Various factions have emerged, each vying for control over territory and resources. The power vacuum after the Assad regime could lead to increased competition among various factions for control over different regions of Syria.

 

A Kurdish State

The Kurds have established significant autonomy in northern Syria through the SDF; they may now seek to formalise their autonomy and forge an independent state, or an autonomous region linked with other Kurdish areas across borders in Iraq and Turkey. This scenario could have far-reaching consequences for regional stability and international relations, particularly concerning the Treaty of Lausanne, which defined Turkey’s modern borders and effectively precluded the establishment of a Kurdish state.

 

A Shia State

In central and southern Syria, particularly around Damascus and areas such as Homs and Aleppo, Shia militias, many supported by Iran, have gained significant ground during the Syrian Civil War. These groups could consolidate their power after the collapse of Assad’s regime. They might aim to establish a state that aligns more closely with Iranian interests or seek greater autonomy from Sunni-majority regions.

 

A Sunni State

The majority Sunni population in western and southern Syria may also push for greater representation or autonomy if they perceive themselves as marginalised under a new political order dominated by either a Kurdish or Shia faction. This could lead to calls for establishing a Sunni-led state that encompasses key urban centres such as Aleppo and Idlib.

This potential fragmentation could lead to a scenario where local extremist groups establish control over specific regions, undermining any central authority that may attempt to govern.

 

Regional Destabilisation

The implications of the Assad regime’s downfall extend beyond Syria’s borders — the fragmentation could trigger responses from neighbouring countries and regional powers concerned about security threats emanating from the country. Turkey and Israel have already seen fit to intervene militarily or politically to protect their interests, which could further escalate tensions in an already volatile region. The resurgence of extremist groups could lead to increased cross-border terrorism as these factions seek to expand their influence regionally. Additionally, regional powers may react defensively or aggressively to perceived threats from a resurgent ISIS or AQ.

 

A New Middle East: Netanyahu’s Vision

A new geopolitical landscape in the Middle East is emerging, and it seems to align with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s view that his country stands to gain significantly from these developments. This transformation occurs against the backdrop of the US’ strategic intention to reduce its military presence in the region.

Achieving this withdrawal, however, hinges on two critical strategies. The first involves diminishing Iran’s influence, while simultaneously fostering normalisation between Saudi Arabia and Israel. During Donald Trump’s first term, efforts were focused on establishing a Sunni coalition to counter Iran’s Shia axis. In his second term, Mr Trump’s agenda would likely pivot towards further solidifying this new Middle Eastern order, emphasising the establishment of a Sunni-dominated framework devoid of significant Shia opposition.

 

Conclusion

The downfall of Assad’s regime presents a complex and precarious scenario for Syria. The fragmentation of the country into quasi-states raises significant concerns regarding governance, security, and the resurgence of extremist groups such as ISIS and AQ. As various factions look for power in a post-Assad landscape, the risk of renewed Islamic radicalisation looms large, threatening to exacerbate the suffering of the Syrian people, who have already endured years of conflict.

The joy expressed by many Syrians at the prospect of change must be tempered with caution. The historical context reveals that power vacuums often lead to instability, and can be exploited by extremist elements seeking to re-establish their influence. This situation could result in a cycle of violence and repression that undermines any hope for a peaceful resolution or reconstruction.

Moreover, the international community’s role will be crucial in shaping Syria’s future. Without coordinated efforts to support moderate forces and promote inclusive governance, there is a real danger that Syria may devolve further into chaos. The question remains whether a unified Syrian state can emerge from the ashes of war, or if it will splinter into competing entities driven by sectarianism and extremism. The future existence of Syria as a cohesive nation-state hangs in the balance, and is contingent upon how domestic stakeholders and international actors approach this transition.

 

Image Caption: A man hands over an assault rifle to a masked woman holding a sign depicting the Syrian opposition flag and wearing the same flag across her face, outside the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus on 10 December 2024. Islamist-led rebels took Damascus in a lightning offensive on 8 December, ousting president Bashar al-Assad and ending five decades of Baath rule in Syria. Photo: AFP

 

About the Author

Dr Ghada Farag Sayed Soliman is a Research Fellow in the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Her research focuses on extremism in the Middle East and North Africa region.