*By Emir Hadžikadunić

Abstract  

After over a year of war in Ukraine, some 50 Muslim-majority states from Morocco to Indonesia have revealed new foreign policy trends, raising important questions about the prevailing international order and the role of the Muslim world in it. The behaviour of these countries is striking in that many of them voiced neutrality towards both opposing parties: Russia, on one hand, and Ukraine and its supporters from the West, on the other. However, beyond their unified neutral stances, assertive foreign policy paradigms with broader international implications have emerged. Among others, Muslim-majority states are demonstrating a new readiness to “de-Westernise” their international affairs; establish strategic partnerships with other great powers; and avoid interfering in the domestic affairs of fellow Muslim-majority states or other authoritarian great powers. This article discusses their foreign affairs in two directions – descriptive and explanatory. The descriptive section highlights observable data, such as their foreign policy views, commitments, or actions to demonstrate their balanced approach to international affairs. The explanatory part questions this nature: Why, for example, do many Muslim-majority states carefully navigate between the US and Russia? Why do they pursue cautious neutrality, and diversify their relationships beyond Western partnerships?

Introduction

Muslim-majority states from Morocco to Indonesia have internal and external differentiations that preclude understanding them as a compact, singular entity. Given the distinct sectarian, ideological, or geopolitical contexts within which their foreign policies are often formulated, similar reference points have appeared only occasionally, and perhaps even superficially. In practical terms, this has made it difficult to find Muslim-majority countries which pursue like-minded policies motivated by similar considerations. Unifying incentives have been at play in only a few issues, such as the safeguarding of Islamic symbols from defamation at the international level.

Recently, however, there has been a proliferation of similar foreign policy models among them. After over a year of war in Ukraine, this trend has raised important questions about the prevailing international order and the role of the Muslim world in it. The behaviour of these Muslim-majority countries is striking in that many of them voiced neutrality towards both opposing parties: Russia, on one hand, and Ukraine and its supporters from the West, on the other. Their approach is generally reminiscent of the first rule of the late American scholar Samuel Huntington, in which core states (core Muslim states, in this particular case) abstain from conflicts in other civilisations. Beyond their unified neutral stance on the war in Ukraine, assertive foreign policy paradigms, models, and visions with broader international implications, have emerged. Among others, Muslim-majority states now demonstrate a new readiness to “de-Westernise” their international affairs; establish strategic partnerships with other great powers; avoid interfering in the domestic affairs of fellow Muslim-majority states or other authoritarian great powers; and reduce their dependence on arms suppliers from the United States.

This study is divided into descriptive and explanatory parts. In the descriptive section, the main question is what guiding foreign policy principles have Muslim leaders adapted and expressed about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and international affairs in general? What actions have these states taken — or not — at bilateral or multilateral forums? To answer these questions, the study relies on available data from different Muslim-majority states that highlight the regularity-seeking nature of their foreign policy and international affairs. More specifically, it collects, compares, and analyses their individual foreign policy views, commitments, and actions to reach any meaningful generalisation. Indeed, rather than individualising each Muslim-majority state and making specific case studies, this article seeks to identify patterns in their foreign policy actions. The explanatory part questions their uniformity: Why, for example, have Muslim-majority states rejected the Western narrative on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? What underlying factors make it possible for them to pursue their neutral, independent, and assertive foreign policies? This part generalises their illiberal preferences for international and domestic order as central building blocks for their foreign policy, holding other internal and external causes largely consistent. It also demonstrates their tendency to favour multi-polarity, and opposition to the American-led liberal international order. At the domestic level, the study observes their tendency to prefer strong, authoritarian, and illiberal state orders.

Neutrality as a Guiding Foreign Policy Principle in 2022

Presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers or other foreign policy agents of Muslim-majority states have generally highlighted a single meaning in their official deliberations about Russia’s war in Ukraine. It is all about neutrality, whether “practical”, “cautious” or “uneasy”. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, for example, said: “We cannot hold sides. We cannot take sides. And it wouldn’t be right for us to do that.”[1] Former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan avoided holding either side responsible for the war. He said “countries like Pakistan should not pass any value and moral judgment on this”. They should be “non-aligned, neutral, and friendly to both”,[2] he added. Malaysian Foreign Affairs Minister Datuk Seri Saifuddin Abdullah, meanwhile, said in a written reply to the country’s parliament that Kuala Lumpur does not support either side of the conflict.[3] Riyadh, like other Arab capitals, generally views the war in Ukraine as a complicated European conflict which does not require Arab states to stand against Vladimir Putin.[4] Indeed, for the past year, it is hard to find any statement by Muslim political elites that backs the West’s — or  Russia’s — stance on the war.

It is more difficult to find a general pattern with their votes in the United Nations when Russian aggression in Ukraine has been on the agenda. Indeed, votes by Muslim-majority states in the UN General Assembly in all the four rounds so far have appeared inconsistent. After predominantly backing the UN General Assembly Resolution demanding a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine in the early days of the conflict in March 2022, they gradually began to demonstrate a different tendency. In the UN General Assembly Resolution (ES-11/1) calling for Russia to be suspended from the Human Rights Council in April 2022, which received a two-thirds majority from those voting, the number of Muslim-majority states which supported it fell considerably, despite heavy lobbying from the US. Of the 10 states with the highest percentage of Muslims, none voted in favour. Among those with the largest Muslim populations, seven abstained, two voted against, and only Turkey voted in favour. In total, the number of Muslim-majority states that voted against, abstained, or were absent increased from 17 in the March 2022 vote to 39 in the April 2022 vote. However, in the third (October 2022) and fourth UN General Assembly votes (February 2023), most rejected Russia’s move to annex Ukrainian territory, or demanded a Russian withdrawal from occupied areas — their votes favouring Russia in the second round were balanced by votes that favoured Ukraine in the third and fourth round.

Moreover, votes by individual Muslim-majority countries in the UN General Assembly that occasionally favoured Ukraine were balanced by other specific moves or UN votes that favoured Russia. Unlike its vote favouring Kiev at the UN General Assembly— which is less consequential — the United Arab Emirates has not supported the UN Security Council Resolution that demanded a Russian military withdrawal from Ukraine. Indonesia voted in favour of a UN General Assembly Resolution that condemned Russia’s invasion, but refused to impose sanctions on Moscow or clearly condemn Mr Putin’s actions in Ukraine. Jakarta has also refused Ukrainian requests for weapons.[5] While Egypt voted in favour of a General Assembly Resolution demanding that Russia halt its use of force, its permanent representative made very clear that the country would not impose sanctions, adding that the resolution should not lead to turning a blind eye to the root causes of the crisis.[6]

Minor exceptions to this “cautious”, “uneasy”, or “practical” neutrality exist, but only a few Muslim-majority states have openly backed either Russia or Ukraine/US/EU. Of those that have taken a side, their moves were largely expected, given their  relationships with the US or Russia. For example, Syrian President Basher Al-Assad not only backed the Kremlin, but also recognised occupied provinces in Ukraine as Russian territory. Meanwhile, official statements from two Muslim-majority states in the Balkans, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, indicated that they supported the US-led liberal, international, and rules-based order. In at least three cases, reactions from Muslim-majority states illustrated deep internal divisions within them. The Houthi leadership in Yemen has openly backed the Russian side, including the recognition of occupied provinces in Ukraine as Russian territory. The internationally-recognised Yemeni government, however, denounced the invasion. Meanwhile, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah rejected the Lebanon Foreign Ministry’s statement that placed at least some blame on Russia, and blamed Washington instead.[7] He argued that “Moscow has the right to protect its borders and national security”. Bosnian support of Ukraine in all four UN votes generated serious internal opposition from Serb leader Milorad Dodik, who preferred neutrality at the state level, but personally sided with Mr Putin.

Other Assertive Foreign Policy Paradigms, Models and Vision

 The Muslim world’s approach to the invasion is symptomatic of their wider stance: A readiness to establish political, economic, or security partnerships with multiple players in the international system. Rather than choosing an alliance with a single pole, as S. Huntington and A. Dugin suggested with Islamic-Confucian or Islamic-Orthodox alliances, Muslim-majority states prefer constructive engagements with various great powers based solely on their commercial, security or geopolitical interests. Turkey, for example, sees Russia as its important partner for energy, tourism, and regional security. At the same time, as a member of Nato, Ankara has diversified its security options. Saudi Arabia counts on China as its second-largest trading partner, but generally regards the US as its most important security partner. Having to choose one relationship over the other would be costly, so Turkey and Saudi Arabia tend to pursue multi-directional foreign policies. Abu Dhabi, Cairo, Jakarta, Islamabad, and Doha, to name just a few, also go by the realism book, respecting “self-interest” and “self-help” — respecting the US as a great power, while relating themselves to other great powers.

This behaviour at the bilateral level has placed many Muslim-majority states in closer proximity to non-Western groups, such as BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Both groups approach international affairs in a multi-polar manner, and act as an alternative to the US-led order. In the Middle East alone, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are current or prospective dialogue partners of the SCO.^[8] All medium-sized Muslim-majority countries, such as Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia, or Saudi Arabia, look positively to BRICS. The same holds for other parts of the Muslim world, specifically Kazakhstan, Nigeria, the UAE, Senegal, Algeria, Uzbekistan, and Malaysia. They all prefer to participate in the remaking of the rules of the international system that is now underway. More consequential commitments from Muslim-majority states at the multilateral level, however, are found within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, they defied calls from the US to pump more crude as prices of oil rallied to multi-year highs.^[9] In October 2022, Muslim-majority member states within OPEC+ decided to cut crude production by two million barrels a day, a move that benefitted not only Russia, but themselves — their interest in staying friendly with the US was subordinated to their national interest to make more money.

Muslim-majority states are also generally reluctant to interfere in the domestic affairs of fellow Muslim states, including on issues of serious human rights violations. In a telling example, no Muslim-majority state that is a member of the UN Human Rights Council voted for the establishment of an international fact-finding mission to independently investigate alleged human rights violations in Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022 after the death in police custody of a young woman, Mahsa Amini. Muslim-majority states also ignore the domestic affairs of other great powers, including on the issue of serious human rights violations of Muslim minorities. The behaviour of their political leaders, including their state religious bodies, is striking in that many of them remained silent on the massive detention and forced re-education of Uighurs in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in northwest China. In July 2019, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, and other Muslim-majority states helped to block a Western motion at the United Nations calling for China to allow “independent international observers” into the Xinjiang region.^[10] This year, a delegation from the World Islamic Communities (TWMCC) from 14 Muslim-majority states even visited Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital. According to its statement, TWMCC “hailed the efforts of the Chinese authorities in combating terrorism in Xinjiang”.^[11] Former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has also complained that hardly any Muslim country (Turkey being an exception) stands with Pakistan on the rights of the Kashmiri people.^[12]

Neutrality and militarisation

Neutrality in the exercise in international affairs generally does not come cheap. Given their preference for neutrality, it is important to note that many Muslim-majority states have taken appropriate measures to protect and pay for their stances. According to the SIPRI Fact Sheet (Arms Transfers Database), 14 Muslim-majority states are listed among the top 30 largest importers of arms, accounting for 38.8 per cent of the total volume of arms imports from 2017 to 2021. Five of them — Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Pakistan, and the UAE — are listed among the top 10.^[13] Weapons proliferation is the most extensive connection between Russia and Muslim-majority states. According to the SIPRI fact sheet, Russia was the largest arms supplier for at least four Muslim-majority states (Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, and Pakistan) from 2017 to 2021, and the second- and third- largest supplier for at least four additional Muslim nations (Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and the UAE).^[14] Of the top 30 Russian weapons importers, more than half are Muslim-majority states. At the regional level, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was the second most lucrative and growing foreign market for Russian arms sales between 2009 and 2018.^[15] In that period, Russia delivered arms to 14 countries in the region, accounting for 26 per cent of its total weapons export volume. It also accounted for 18 per cent of the total volume of arms imports by MENA states, following the US (44 per cent).

In recent years, Russia’s share of MENA’s defence market has doubled. Its arms deliveries increased by 125 per cent between 1999-2008 and 2009-2018. [16] From 2009 to 2018, Russia arms deliveries to the region accounted for 26 per cent of its weapons exports, while from 1999-2008, the figure was only 14 per cent.^[17] While their arms imports from Russia increased, US purchases decreased, from a 47 per cent share in 2012-2016 to 43 per cent in 2017-2021.^[18] For example, arms exports from the US to the UAE fell by 36 per cent between 2016–20. The UAE was the second-largest recipient of US arms in 2012–16, but was the eighth-largest between 2017–21. Over the same period, US arms exports to Turkey fell 81 per cent. Mr Erdogan, the Turkish President, has gone so far as to say that the country is no longer dependent on the United States. “Turkey will take care of itself if the US doesn’t send F-16 jets”.[19] The US also froze arms deliveries and military assistance to Egypt after the 2013 military coup deposed the first democratically-elected, civilian-led government.^[20] As a result, Egypt’s arms imports from the US fell by 70 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21.^[21] The US eventually accounted for only 6.5 per cent of Egyptian arms imports in 2017–21, making it the fifth-largest supplier of major arms to Egypt. One reason for decreasing US arms sales is that Russian or Chinese arms come either without, or with far fewer, conditions regarding domestic affairs.

But what is Muslim-majority states’ stance towards each other in a polarised and fluid world order with multiple great and regional powers? What happens between rival Muslim-majority states in a world that is no longer unipolar? Data on civil, proxy, or interstate conflicts suggests that rival Muslim states compete far less today than in the past. States which earlier had strained relations with each other earlier, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Turkey and Syria, and the United Arab Emirates and Turkey, have made bilateral U-turns. The recent deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran also marks a departure from years of open hostility. Perhaps most unexpectedly, Turkey has begun a rapprochement with Syria. While the rivalry between Muslim-majority states is certainly not expected to cease completely in the emerging multi-polar world, especially within grey areas where their interests overlap, their old differences could shrink considerably in importance.

Why Question

 Leaders in the West may be puzzled as to why so many Muslim-majority states are reluctant to embrace their narrative about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fact that some of those states host US military troops, and ally — or tend to ally — with Washington makes this all the more surprising. International Relations scholars may also be puzzled over why so many Muslim nations produce any regularity-seeking nature in their foreign policy, given their domestic and international variations. Dugin and Huntington attempted to explain these issues by depicting the Muslim world as a unitary one. They generalised Islamic civilisation as a single variable or meta-force in international affairs, provoking serious and never-ending debate. Some Muslim scholars who criticised Huntington also sought to distinguish Islamic civilisation from others. For example, contributions from A. Davutoğlu “created an inter-subjective worldview that reflected an Islamic collective identity and highlighted a common interest in adopting an Islamic paradigm to ensure a better position for Muslims in world politics”. For Davutoğlu, “there is a common interest in adopting Islam as an emancipatory framework that liberates Muslim nations and individuals all over the world from the vices of Western civilisation and its dominant aspects”.[22] This article, however, neither sees religion as the central defining element, nor does it discuss the relationship between Islam and the forms of government in these countries. It instead brings to bear other underlying causes for Muslim-majority states’ pursuit of cautious neutrality in their foreign policy. By extension, the same causes explain other implications and consequences of their international affairs, or even predict their external behaviour in the future.

That many Muslim-majority states share more independent foreign policies could be reduced to two underlying, and inter-related, factors, one being at the level of nation-states, the other at the level of the international system. This article does not give priority to or over-emphasise the impact of either level of analysis, but focuses on their mutual interplay. At the domestic level, the great majority of Muslim-majority states view liberal ideology as a threat to their political systems. At the same time, their opposition to liberal ideology is only comparable to their preference for strong, sovereign, and authoritarian states. This generates specific “if-then” propositions that can be tested. For example, if many Muslim-majority states find liberal democracy so inhospitable to their domestic political orders, then that particular animosity will limit their support for liberal interventionist states, such as the United States. Likewise, if Muslim-majority states, Russia, and China share similar authoritarian and populist tendencies, then similar domestic preferences will make it difficult for them to oppose each other completely.

At the international level, Muslim-majority states resent the liberal international order and the threat that this order poses to their political society. Their common fear of US-led liberal interventionism, which reached its peak during the extended unipolar moment and American military interventions in Afghanistan (2002-2020) and Iraq (2002-2011), is only comparable to their preference for pluralisation and multi-polarity of the international system as its antipode. Constraining conditions generate related and testable assumptions again. For example, if Muslim-majority states, Russia, and China prefer polarisation of the international system, then similar external preferences would make it difficult for them to oppose each other. Likewise, if many Muslim-majority states find the US-led liberal international order inhospitable to their policies, then their animosity to that particular order would limit their support for the West.

More importantly, however, their shared opposition to liberal norms at the national level aligns with their shared opposition to the international liberal order. Simultaneously, their preference for strong, sovereign, and authoritarian states interacts with their preference for pluralisation of the world order. Together, they create a powerful force that exerts a good deal of influence by affecting states’ perceptions of internal and external realities. These perceptions then outline a set of constraining conditions for Muslim-majority states which prevent them from taking certain foreign policy actions, or pressuring them towards others.

Shared Opposition to Liberal Democracy at the National Level

Foreign policy, like domestic policy, is formulated within the state, but unlike domestic policy, it is directed and implemented in the environment external to the state.[23] As a bridge between domestic and international policy, it is under the influence of both internal and external realities. In this part, the article observes specific domestic realities in Muslim-majority states. It generalises their preference for an illiberal domestic order as a building block that facilitates the convergence of their foreign policy, including international affairs. At the same time, it holds other domestic factors largely consistent, including religious norms and values.

While the debate on the relationship between Islam and democracy is ongoing, with two opposing narratives, the nature of political order within the Muslim world remains unfriendly to liberal democracy, irrespective of domestic variations related to faith practices, diverse ideologies, regime characteristics, elite interests, and such. In the real world, the governments of Muslim-majority states are either non-democratic (monarchies, dictatorships, military regimes, one-party system), or have no functional democracy, by Western standards. Liberalism has not penetrated their domestic and national level yet. It has not spawned a political generation of authentic Muslim leaders who are convinced liberals. One can think of a few exceptions in our contemporary time, such as Ahmet Davutoglu, Anwar Ibrahim, or Rached Ghannouchi. However, such political figures could not subvert long-lasting tendencies. For example, in most states in the Middle East and North Africa, electoral democracy has failed to put down deep roots. Furthermore, none of the core Arabic-speaking societies falls into the category of electoral democracies. Those few Muslim countries that hold regular elections, such as Turkey, Malaysia, or Indonesia, have not reached the status of “consolidated democracy”, according to Freedom House. A similar point can be made after considering available data on “individual freedoms”. Their scores on freedoms, ranging from the right to vote to freedom of expression, are all quite low as well. Of all the Muslim-majority states that are members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), none scored enough to be given the status of “free” state. The majority of them (28) are considered “not free”. The rest are “partially free”. Little faith in the principles and performance of democracy is also evident from their contemporary history. For example, the unrest against authoritarian and populist political systems in countries that were engulfed by the Arab Spring did not bring about meaningful change. Popular protests inevitably generated stronger resistance from authoritarian regimes or the political elites who benefit from such systems. In the end, almost all attempts to democratise Muslim societies failed.

Given this preference, contemporary Muslim kings, presidents, and prime ministers have built stronger partnerships with President Donald Trump, who ran against the liberal order at home and did not set much store by previous American leaders’ zeal to spread democracy around the world. Turkey’s Mr Erdogan, Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed Bin Salman, and the Emirates’ Mohamed bin Zayed, just to name a few, all preferred the isolationist, illiberal, and populist Mr Trump over liberal president Joe Biden. It is thus no surprise that President Biden has shown no affinity for the political leadership of some Muslim-majority states. During his election campaign, he vowed to treat Saudi Arabia as a “pariah” state, saying there was very little social redeeming value in the present government in Riyadh.[24] Mr Biden also described the Turkish president as an “autocrat”, and suggested that the United States should “embolden” his opponents to defeat him in this year’s elections.[25] This explains why Muslim leaders see the authoritarian rule of Russian and Chinese leaders as a proven model for themselves — they tend to be “strongmen” themselves.

That opposition to liberal ideology has been a dominant feature of the Muslim world is not a new idea. The general failure of liberal democracy to take hold in Muslim societies, according to Huntington, has been a continuing and repeated phenomenon for an entire century, beginning in late 1800.^[26] This thesis posits that there are sharp differences between the core political values common in societies sharing a Western Christian heritage — particularly those concerning representative democracy — and the beliefs common in the rest of the world, especially Islamic societies.^[27] Hence, Muslim-majority states seem less likely to develop stable democratic political systems at the domestic level. Dugin also generalised Muslim-majority states in their opposition to the liberal West. For the Russian philosopher, Islamic civilisation recognises its difference from others, liberal Western civilisation in particular.^[28] The line that separates the American-led unipolar order from the Muslim world (and the Russian one as well) concerns the values associated with liberal democracy. Dugin also believed that the Muslim and Russian worlds complement each other ideologically. Surprisingly or not, two intellectuals that come from two opposing societies (liberal American versus illiberal Russian) reached complementary conclusions about the Muslim world. For them, Western ideals of individualism, liberalism, human rights, the separation of church and state, and the rule of law, often have little resonance in Islamic civilisation.

That this particular domestic feature of the Muslim world could have international consequences is not a new idea as well. Huntington, for example, argued that Islamic discourse determined enemies and allies for Muslim-majority states.[29] For Dugin, the domestic order of Muslim-majority states is not only compatible with the Russian order, but their common enemy is the global West and its interventionist liberal ideology.^[30] He believed that all forces that struggle against liberal democracy should be included. “This means Muslims and Christians, Russians and Chinese, Leftists and Rightists, and Hindus and Jews who challenge the present state of affairs, globalisation, and American imperialism.”^[31] Similar ideas appear in the popular press as well. Amr Salih writes that polarisation over the model of governance shapes reactions to many global issues, including the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine.[32] As he argued, the narrative which finds support in a populist mood claims that the strongman model (exemplified by Mr Putin) should inspire the Arab people as a path to development and influence over the global order. “That rationale was behind public support for military officers, such as President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Egypt, and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in Eastern Libya. It also animated President Kais Saied’s decision to suspend Tunisia’s democratic trajectory after sensing a domestic mood that might support — or, at least, not oppose — a return to authoritarianism. The same narrative makes constant reference to two Eastern models — those of China and Russia — as examples of strongman rule, affording significant attention to the case of Mr Putin.”[33]

Certainly, in reviewing the recent diplomatic history across the Muslim world, it would be difficult to portray their foreign policies as simply a consequence of domestic realities, ignoring the impact of external preferences. Likewise, it would be an oversimplification to argue that many Muslim leaders unify around their uneasy balance against the West just because of a single domestic variable, namely their domestic opposition to liberal democracy, or their preference for strong and authoritarian rule. But this explanation for their sceptical approach to the West is strengthened when we add inter-related external variables, namely their shared opposition to the US-led unipolar world order or their shared preference for multipolarity, to the equation. When these two merge, they create a powerful force that exerts a set of constraining conditions for Muslim-majority states.

Shared Opposition to Liberal International Order

 As discussed previously, Muslim-majority countries have been reluctant to support the narrative from the West for domestic reasons. A similar point can be made if we shift our gaze from the domestic to the international order. Our assumption here is that the political elite from Muslim-majority states generally dislike what John Mearsheimer calls “a liberal unipole”, in which the United States, as a sole superpower in the international system, and a liberal democracy, pursues a policy of liberal hegemony — remaking the Muslim world in the image of liberal elites in the United States. Spreading democracy abroad has been a high-priority goal for almost all US administrations since the end of the Cold War. It was endorsed by the first Bush administration, with Secretary of State James Baker declaring in April 1990 that “beyond containment lies democracy”. In his 1992 campaign, Bill Clinton repeatedly said that the promotion of democracy would be a top priority of his administration. Once in office, he recommended a two-thirds increase in funding for the National Endowment for Democracy; his National Security Adviser defined the central theme of Clinton foreign policy as the “enlargement of democracy”; and his Secretary of Defence identified the promotion of democracy as one of four major goals.”^[34] President George W. Bush used military might to a bid to turn Afghanistan, Iraq, and others across the Middle East into liberal democracies. He said: “By the resolve and purpose of America, and of our friends and allies, we will make this an age of progress and liberty. Free people will set the course of history, and free people will keep the peace of the world.”[35]

However, almost all non-Western civilisations pushed back against this pressure. According to Huntington, the greatest resistance to Western democratisation efforts came from Islam and Asia.^[36] Indeed, the Muslim world has not accepted the supposed universality and superiority of liberal ideology that is pursued by the political liberal elite in the West. In practical terms, Muslim-majority states saw no benefits from military interventions that sought to spread liberal democracy in Afghanistan (2002-2021), Iraq (2003-2011), or Libya (2011). In each case, as argued by Mearsheimer, American policymakers thought they could put in place a stable democracy that would be friendly to the US and help it deal with serious problems like nuclear proliferation and terrorism. But they failed every time, bringing destruction to the greater Middle East and committing the United States to lengthy wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.[37]

In addition to what they generally oppose, Muslim-majority states have found alternative orders which are better fits their international ambitions. Their shared preference for multipolarity reflects their desire for a voice in the international system, and to move from the “periphery” of international politics to the “centre”. This has prompted core Muslim-majority states to call for better representation within the international system. Speaking at the “Dialogue Among Asian Civilisations” in 2001, then-Iranian President Mohammad Khatami proposed a permanent UN Security Council seat for the Islamic world. In 2013, Mr Erdogan used phrase “the world is bigger than five” to make a similar call. Last year, Al Farhan al-Saud, the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs, called for Security Council reform to enable it to be fairer and more representative of today’s world. For many other Muslim leaders, the prevailing order of contemporary global interactions is not acceptable. They want a multi-polar system, with one pole allocated for the Muslim world, as the fundamental organising principle of the inter-state order. In doing so, they are — perhaps unwittingly — echoing Huntington’s idea of multi-polarity.^[38] According to him, core states from each “civilisation”, such as India, China, and Japan, should be represented at the Security Council. Civilisations lacking core states would have rotating seats; Muslim-majority members would be selected by the Organisation for Islamic Conference.^[39]

This shared preference to move Muslim-majority states from the “periphery” of international politics to the “centre” facilitated gradual convergence on their foreign policy, including in international affairs. One by one, pro-American governments have given way to ones that  identify less with the West, or are even explicitly anti-Western. They have moved on from being dependent on and serving the foreign policy objectives of other great powers to a phase that former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan associated with “more dignity”, “self-respect” and “independence” in international affairs. Four diverse countries — Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia — illustrate this trend. Despite differing circumstances, all four have arrived at a similar outcome: Adoption of a multi-dimensional foreign policy that interacts with various great powers within the international system.

The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) was the first among the four major Muslim-majority states to abandon its strong alliance with the United States. By rejecting the rules of bipolarity in 1979, the new revolutionary government wanted to become a dominant pole in the regional sub-system to attain “strategic depth”. Since it came into being, the IRI has also been strongly committed to what students of IR call “balancing”.[40] A new foreign policy of “neither East, nor West,  but the Islamic Republic” reflected the new orientation. As Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said: “On the basis of this principle, our policy will not be subjected to any group, neither Eastern nor Western, and this is part of our principles and foundations.”[41] In practical terms, Iran gradually improved relations with other poles in the international system, China and Russia, to balance its enmity with the US. Their cooperation included regular bilateral exchanges, including joint military exercises, and weapons transfers.

Pakistan’s alliance with the US against the Soviet Union was a logical move in the bipolar era, particularly since the USSR invaded Afghanistan. As the US promoted liberal democracy abroad in the post-Cold War period, this alliance grew obsolete, and Pakistani reliance on other great powers, first China, and then Russia, become the new reality. Close relations between Pakistan, Iran, and China also crystallised in the early 1990s, with the visits of President Yang Shangkun to Iran and Pakistan, and that of Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani to Pakistan and China. Reinforcing this pattern, Benazir Bhutto visited Iran and China immediately after becoming prime minister in October 1993.[42] The development of this relationship has been strongly supported by those in Pakistan belonging to the “independence” and “Muslim” schools of thought on foreign policy.[43]

Turkey soon promoted independent foreign policy, too. Since the end of the Cold War, Ankara has gradually moved away from being periphery state in the Western bloc (Huntington calls it a torn state[44]) to a core one in the regional sub-system, projecting strategic depth in the Balkans, the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. It accelerated its efforts to pursue a more multi-dimensional and multi-directional foreign policy as the international system evolved from a unipolar order into a post-unipolar era.[45] Turkey appears to have passed the point of what Huntington termed “its frustrating and humiliating role as a beggar pleading for membership in the West” to resuming its “more impressive and elevated historical role as interlocutor and antagonist of the West”.^[46]

Over the past few years, meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has developed a flexible and ambiguous international posture, avoiding excessive proximity to Washington on one hand, and attempting to associate with other great powers on the other. Although Riyadh has long been a US ally, its recent stance on the crisis in Ukraine underlines an important shift to a new balancing behaviour in a new world order where Russia — and China — are important for its security and prosperity. China is now the Saudis’ second-biggest trading partner (after the United Arab Emirates) and is a destination for about one-fifth of its exports. Both sides also signed a  Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement in December 2022.

 

Huntington Versus Dugin on Muslim-majority States – Where Both of them Got it Wrong

In the current system, the ideas of two advocates of multi-polarity, Dugin and Huntington, have re-emerged as reference points about the prevailing international order, and the role of the Muslim world in it. Both generally argue that Islamic religion and culture provide the basis for the distinction of Islamic civilisation from others. They also expect Muslim-majority states, as a distinct civilisation, to share some important views, commitments, and actions in international affairs. Dugin held the view that if there is to be a “clash of civilisations”, it would be between the West and the “rest of the world”, with “Eurasianism” the political formula that best suits the latter. He envisaged that Muslim-majority states would be in harmony and peace with the Russian world, but at war with the West. Huntington, on the other hand, saw Muslim-majority states and China in an alliance against the West. He recognised their cooperation on a variety of issues, including human rights, economics, and, most notably, efforts to develop their military capabilities, particularly weapons of mass destruction, to counter the conventional military superiority of the West. By the early 1990s a “Confucian-Islamic connection” was in place between China and North Korea, on the one hand, and — to varying degrees — Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Algeria, on the other, to confront the West.[47] For Huntington, unlike Dugin, borders between Islamic and Orthodox civilisations were quite bloody. Russia’s relations with Muslim-majority states were shaped by the historical legacy of centuries of expansion through war against the Turks, North Caucasus peoples, and Central Asian emirates.^[48] He also cited contemporary conflicts between Bosnian Muslims and Orthodox Serbs; Armenia and Azerbaijan; and Turkey and Greece, among others, as justification — 19 of 28 fault line conflicts in the mid-1990s between Muslims and non-Muslims were between Muslims and Christians: 11 were with Orthodox Christians, and seven with adherents of Western Christianity in Africa and South-east Asia.^[49]

But rather than choosing an alliance with a single pole, as Huntington and Dugin suggested, Muslim-majority states have preferred constructive engagements with various great powers, based solely on their commercial or geopolitical interests. As Michael Singh has suggested, small and medium-sized states^[50] are “eschewing both alignment with a single power and non-alignment, and are instead choosing omni-alignment: Participation in both the multilateral institutions led by the United States and those spearheaded by its rivals.” He added that “omni-alignment also serves as a hedge against the unpredictability of great-power behaviour. This hedging is most clearly seen in the Middle East, where the future of both US and Chinese engagement in the region remains unclear.”

Conclusion

That Iran, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or other Muslim-majority states share a more independent and assertive foreign policy outlook is down to two underlying causes that interact with each other. At the national level, these states view liberal democracy as a threat to their political systems. However different, they prefer more authoritarian, populist, and strong states. At the international level, they resent the liberal interventionist order, and prefer multi-polarity instead. They have left behind their past, which saw more dependence on great powers, peripheral status in international affairs, and problematic intra-state relations, for a new international posture that facilitates the reduction of antagonisms within the Muslim world. This post-Western world order also gives a larger number of them a bigger say in global decision-making processes. They are also aiming to become central within their regional sub-systems, and global actors in international affairs. Their leaders also relish the prospect of moving towards a post-liberal and new global order where the East balances the West — one in which Muslim states are no longer “client”, “torn”, “vassal”, or “periphery” states.

It remains to be seen how core Muslim-majority states’ push for increased centrality within their regional sub-systems will play out in the longer term. But in the grand scheme of things, the new, assertive foreign policy of the Muslim world would certainly strengthen the forces of multipolarity, such as China and Russia. However, their preference for this will not determine their enemies and allies in the emerging world, despite arguments that suggest otherwise. Muslim leaders are not expected to follow what Huntington defined as the Islamic-Confucian alliance against Western civilization, or what Dugin proposed as a common front of Islamic-Orthodox civilisations against the liberal West. On the contrary, they will continue to establish political, economic, or security partnerships with different poles in the international system without explicit military alliance assurances with any great power. Muslim states may even contribute to the stability of the anarchic and more complex international multi-polar system by offering their mediation in conflict zones that involve opposing great powers. Indeed, understanding these patterns from the Muslim world is crucial to discerning new realities that will shape international affairs in the medium and long term.

 

Image Caption: Muslim countries’ leaders at the annual gathering of the Organisation of Islamic Countries. Photo: Ozan Kose / AFP

 

*Emir Hadžikadunić is currently visiting professor at the University of Sarajevo School of Science and Technology, and previously served as distinguished fellow at the Universiti Teknologi MARA (Malaysia) and visiting fellow at Istanbul Commerce University (Turkey). He has also served as Bosnian Ambassador to Iran (2010-13) and Malaysia (2016-2020). Dr Hadikadunic obtained a PhD in international relations from the International University of Sarajevo, and is the author of two books and several journal articles on peace-building, foreign policy, and international affairs.

End Notes

Cafiero, Giorgio. “Analysis: The Russia-Ukraine war and the view from Saudi Arabia.” Aljazeera, October 24, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/24/analysis-russia-ukraine-war-view-from-saudi-arabia

Daniele, Ushar, Raihana Sayeeda Kamal, Heba Hashem. “Muslim countries maintain awkward neutrality over the Russo-Ukrainian War.” Salaam Gateway, April 6, 2022. https://salaamgateway.com/story/muslim-countries-maintain-awkward-neutrality-over-the-russo-ukrainian-war

Dugin, Alexander. The fourth political theory, Arktos, 2012. https://archive.org/details/TheFourthPoliticalTheory/page/n157/mode/1up

Ghebouli, Zine Labidine. “The war in Ukraine: A test for Algiers’ non-alignment doctrine.” MEI, July 7, 2022. https://www.mei.edu/publications/war-ukraine-test-algiers-non-alignment-doctrine

Ghosh, Bobby. “The Real Reason Turkey Is Mad at Joe Biden.” Bloomberg, August 17, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-08-17/the-real-reason-turkey-s-erdogan-is-mad-at-joe-biden?leadSource=uverify%20wall

Hafezi, Parisa, and Guy Faulconbridge. “Iran applies to join China and Russia in BRICS club.” Reuters, June 28, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-applies-join-brics-group-emerging-countries-2022-06-27/

Helmore, Edward. “Saudi Arabia and UAE leaders ‘decline calls with Biden’ amid fears of oil price spike.” The Guardian, March 9, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/mar/09/saudi-arabia-and-uae-leaders-decline-calls-with-biden-amid-fears-of-oil-price-spike

Huntington, P. Samuel. The clash of civilizations?. Penguin Books. UK, London, 1996

Hutt, David. “Indonesia juggles Russia, Ukraine and the West.” July 7, 2022. https://www.dw.com/en/indonesia-jokowi-walks-tightrope-balancing-ties-with-russia-west/a-62396110

Ibrahim, Arwa. “UAE stance on Ukraine war reflects ‘strong alliance’ with Russia.” Aljazeera, March 3, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/uae-stance-on-ukraine-war-reflects-strong-alliance-with-russia

Jervis, Robert. “Understanding the Bush Doctrine.” Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 3 (Fall 2003).

Khan, Imran. “Town Hall Meeting with Imran Khan.” December, 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pvyywLWPSSMhttps://youtu.be/2UElC_YZ0Eo.

Kuimova, Alexandra. “Russia’s Arms Exports to the MENA Region: Trends and Drivers.” Policy Brief, European Institute of Mediterranean, (2019). https://www.iemed.org/publication/russias-arms-exports-to-the-mena-region-trends-and-drivers/

Mahbubani, Kishor. “The Dangers of Decadence – What the Rest Can Teach the Rest.” Foreign Affairs, 72, No. 4 (Sep. – Oct., 1993).

Marandi, Seyed Mohammad and Raffaele Mauriello. “The Khamenei Doctrine – Iran’s leader on diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations.” In Islam and International Relations, Politics and Paradigms. Edited by Nassef Manabilang Adiong, Raffaele Mauriello, and Deina Abdelkader, Routledge (2019).

Mearsheimer, J. John. The great delusion: Liberal dreams and international realities. Yale University Press, 2018.

Meredith, Sam. “OPEC+ agrees gradual output hike despite oil price rally, intensifying Russia supply fears.” CNBC, March 2, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/02/russia-ukraine-crisis-opec-to-decide-on-oil-production-policy.html

Monten, Jonathan. “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy.” International Security, 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005).

Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. “Islam & the West: Testing the Clash of Civilizations Thesis.” Faculty Research Working Papers Series, John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University, April 2002.

Oğuzlu, H. Tarik. “Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order.” All Azimuth V9, N1, 127-136. 19 October 2018, (Abstract), DOI: 20991/allazimuth.464076

Perry, E. Glenn. “Huntington and his critics: The West and Islam.” Arab Studies Quarterly 24, No. 1 (Winter 2002). https://www.jstor.org/stable/41858402?seq=12#metadata_info_tab_contents

Salih, Amr. “Why Does Some of the Arab Public Support Putin’s War in Ukraine?.” CARNEGIE. June 16, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/87353

Salah, Ehsan. “Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia abandon neutrality in UN vote, condemn Russian invasion.” MADA, March 2, 2022. https://www.madamasr.com/en/2022/03/02/news/u/egypt-uae-saudi-arabia-abandon-neutrality-in-un-vote-condemn-russian-invasion/

Shaimaa Magued, Shaimaa. “Constructivism in the Islamic approach to International Relations: Davutoğlu and Qutb as case studies.” in Islam and International Relations, Politics and Paradigms. Edited by Nassef Manabilang Adiong, Raffaele Mauriello, and Deina Abdelkader, Routledge (2019).

Singh, Michael. “The Middle East in a Multipolar Era.” Foreign Affairs. December 7, 2022.

Wezeman, D. Pieter, Alexandra Kuimova and Siemon T. Wezeman. “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2021.” SIPRI Fact Sheet, 2022. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/fs_2203_at_2021.pdf

White, B. “Analyzing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches.” in M. Clarke and B. White (eds.), Understanding Foreign Policy. Hants: Edward Elgar, 1989.

Woodruff, Judy. “Turkey President Erdoğan on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the future of NATO.” PBS News Hour. September 19, 2022. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/turkey-president-erdogan-on-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-and-the-future-of-nato

[1] Judy Woodruff, “Turkey President Erdoğan on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the future of NATO,” PBS News Hour, September 19, 2022, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/turkey-president-erdogan-on-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-and-the-future-of-nato

[2] Imran Khan, “Town Hall Meeting with Imran Khan,” December, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pvyywLWPSSMhttps://youtu.be/2UElC_YZ0Eo.

[3] “Malaysia remains neutral for Russia-Ukrainian war,” Malaysian Reserve, July 18, 2022, https://themalaysianreserve.com/2022/07/18/malaysia-remains-neutral-for-russia-ukrainian-war/

[4] Giorgio Cafiero, “Analysis: The Russia-Ukraine war and the view from Saudi Arabia,” Aljazeera, October 24, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/24/analysis-russia-ukraine-war-view-from-saudi-arabia

[5] David Hutt, “Indonesia juggles Russia, Ukraine and the West,” DW, July 7, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/indonesia-jokowi-walks-tightrope-balancing-ties-with-russia-west/a-62396110

[6] Ehsan Salah, “Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia abandon neutrality in UN vote, condemn Russian invasion,” MADA, March 2, 2022, https://www.madamasr.com/en/2022/03/02/news/u/egypt-uae-saudi-arabia-abandon-neutrality-in-un-vote-condemn-russian-invasion/

[7] “Hezbollah Chief Says US to Blame for Ukraine Crisis,” Fars News, March 1, 2022, https://www.farsnews.ir/en/news/14001210000464/Hezbllah-Chief-Says-US-Blame-fr-Ukraine-Crisis

[8] Michael Singh, “The Middle East in a Multipolar Era,” Foreign Affairs, December 7, 2022.

[9] Sam Meredith, “OPEC+ agrees gradual output hike despite oil price rally, intensifying Russia supply fears,” CNBC, March 2, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/02/russia-ukraine-crisis-opec-to-decide-on-oil-production-policy.html

[10] Editorial Board, “Muslim countries joined China in defending its cultural genocide of Uighurs. Aren’t they ashamed?,” Washington Post, July 20, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/muslim-countries-joined-china-in-defending-its-cultural-genocide-of-uighurs-arent-they-ashamed/2019/07/20/0a7d62b4-aa3f-11e9-86dd-d7f0e60391e9_story.html

[11] “Chairman of TWMCC: Relationship Between Islamic Civilization and China is Historical and Characterized by Friendship, Cooperation and Alliance,” The World Muslim Community Council, January 9, 2023, https://www.twmcc.com/en/news/1673268844

[12] Imran Khan, “Town Hall Meeting with Imran Khan,” December, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pvyywLWPSSMhttps://youtu.be/2UElC_YZ0Eo.

[13] Pieter D. Wezeman, Alexandra Kuimova and Siemon T. Wezeman, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2021,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, 2022, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/fs_2203_at_2021.pdf

[14] Ibid.

[15] Alexandra Kuimova, “Russia’s Arms Exports to the MENA Region: Trends and Drivers,” Policy Brief, European Institute of Mediterranean, April 1, 2019, https://www.iemed.org/publication/russias-arms-exports-to-the-mena-region-trends-and-drivers/

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Pieter D. Wezeman, Alexandra Kuimova and Siemon T. Wezeman, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2021,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, 2022, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/fs_2203_at_2021.pdf

[19] “Erdogan: Turkey will take care of itself if it does not get F-16s from the U.S,” NEWS, September 20, 2022.  https://news.am/eng/news/721125.html

[20] Alexandra Kuimova, “Russia’s Arms Exports to the MENA Region: Trends and Drivers,” Policy Brief, European Institute of Mediterranean, April 1, 2019, https://www.iemed.org/publication/russias-arms-exports-to-the-mena-region-trends-and-drivers/

[21] Pieter D. Wezeman, Alexandra Kuimova and Siemon T. Wezeman, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2021,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, 2022, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/fs_2203_at_2021.pdf

[22] Shaimaa Magued, “Constructivism in the Islamic approach to International Relations: Davutoğlu and Qutb as case studies,” in Islam and International Relations, Politics and Paradigms, edited by Nassef Manabilang Adiong, Raffaele Mauriello, and Deina Abdelkader, Routledge (2019), page 128.

 

[23] B. White, “Analyzing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches,” in M. Clarke and B. White (eds.), Understanding Foreign Policy, Hants: Edward Elgar, 1989, 1-26 (5).

[24] Edward Helmore, “Saudi Arabia and UAE leaders ‘decline calls with Biden’ amid fears of oil price spike”, The Guardian, March 9, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/mar/09/saudi-arabia-and-uae-leaders-decline-calls-with-biden-amid-fears-of-oil-price-spike

[25] Bobby Ghosh, “The Real Reason Turkey Is Mad at Joe Biden,” Bloomberg, August 17, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-08-17/the-real-reason-turkey-s-erdogan-is-mad-at-joe-biden?leadSource=uverify%20wall

[26] Samuel P. Huntington, The clash of civilizations?, Penguin Books, UK, London, 1996, 114. https://books.google.com.my/books?id=Iq75qmi3Og8C&pg=PA79&dq=%22Samuel+P.+Huntington%22&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q=%22Samuel%20P.%20Huntington%22&f=false

[27] Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, “Islam & the West: Testing the Clash of Civilizations Thesis,” Faculty Research Working Papers Series, John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University, April 2002, page 3.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=316506

[28] Alexander Dugin, The fourth political theory, Arktos, 2012, p. 95.

https://archive.org/details/TheFourthPoliticalTheory/page/n157/mode/1up

[29] Huntington, The clash of civilizations?, 1996.

[30] Dugin, The fourth political theory, 157-58. https://archive.org/details/TheFourthPoliticalTheory/page/n157/mode/1up

[31] Ibid, p. 158.

[32] Amr Salih, “Why Does Some of the Arab Public Support Putin’s War in Ukraine?,” CARNEGIE, June 16, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/87353

[33] Ibid.

[34] Huntington, The clash of civilizations?, 193.

[35] Bush speaking at the AEI Annual Dinner. On the Bush Doctrine, see The National Security Strategy of the United States; George W. Bush, address to the West Point Graduating Class, June 1, 2002; Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 365–88; Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy,” International Security 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005): 112–56.

[36] Huntington, The clash of civilizations?, 193.

[37] John J. Mearsheimer, The great delusion: Liberal dreams and international realities, Yale University Press, 2018., page 165.

[38] Glenn E. Perry, “Huntington and his critics: The West and Islam,” Arab Studies Quarterly Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter 2002), pp. 31-48 (42) https://www.jstor.org/stable/41858402?seq=12#metadata_info_tab_contents

[39] Huntington, The clash of civilizations?, 317-318.

[40] “In effect, this is a policy that Iran – decades before Khomeini and Khamenei – also tried to pursue in the early 1950s under the brief and unfortunate leadership of Dr. M. Mosaddeq. Within his larger foreign policy of nonalignment, he tried, and failed, to cooperate with the US to balance not only against British and Soviet influence in both worlds but also internal (Iranian) affairs. In this respect, Ayatollah Khamenei stated that Mosaddeq was naïve in his trust in the US.” See: Seyed Mohammad Marandi and Raffaele Mauriello, “The Khamenei Doctrine – Iran’s leader on diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations,” in Islam and International Relations, Politics and Paradigms, edited by Nassef Manabilang Adiong, Raffaele Mauriello, and Deina Abdelkader, Routledge (2019), page 44.  

[41] Seyed Mohammad Marandi and Raffaele Mauriello, “The Khamenei Doctrine – Iran’s leader on diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations,” in Islam and International Relations, Politics and Paradigms, edited by Nassef Manabilang Adiong, Raffaele Mauriello, and Deina Abdelkader, Routledge (2019), page 44.  

[42] Huntington, The clash of civilizations?, 239.

[43] Ibid.

[44] These are countries whose leaders want their countries to be members of the West but whose history, culture, and traditions are not western (Samuel P. Huntington, The clash of civilizations?, Penguin Books, UK, London, 1996).

[45] H. Tarık Oğuzlu, “Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order,” All Azimuth V9, N1, 127-136.
19 October 2018, (Abstract), DOI: 10.20991/allazimuth.464076

[46] Huntington, The clash of civilizations?, 178-179 https://www.jstor.org/stable/41858402?seq=10#metadata_info_tab_contents

[47] Huntington, The clash of civilizations?, 185.

[48] Ibid., 243.

[49] Ibid., 212.

[50] Michael Singh, “The Middle East in a Multipolar Era,” Foreign Affairs, December 7, 2022.