Series Introduction

Israel–Asia Relations: New Trends, Old Challenges?

Much of the scholarship on Israel’s foreign policy focuses on its relations with countries in the West or with its Arab neighbours; the significant rapprochement between Israel and countries in Asia has been largely neglected. There have been many indicators in the past decade pointing to these burgeoning ties – from China’s involvement in Israel’s infrastructure (in particular, Haifa port), the rise of Israel-India economic and security cooperation, and the expanding trade between Israel and Indonesia to the recent establishment of a new quadrilateral forum, the “I2U2”, comprising India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States.

Against the backdrop of these burgeoning relationships, the Middle East Institute at NUS convened a two-day workshop in February 2023 gathering together scholars from across the world – including Israel, China, the United States, Turkey, Indonesia, France and Singapore – to explore the depth of Israel’s partnerships across Asia. The seminar delved into the political and economic drivers of these relationships as well as their scope (and limitations). Particularly, it discussed the evolution of Israel’s policy towards China, India and Japan. It also looked into lesser known areas, such as Israel-Azerbaijan relations and the development of Holocaust studies in China. Altogether, the seminar shed light on a research topic – Israel’s Asia policy – that is likely to expand in the coming years. This is one of the papers based on the seminar.

 

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By Engin Koç*

 

Following Azerbaijan’s defeat against Armenia in the first Karabakh war, it sought a new military ally against Armenia: Israel, which, for its part, was seeking to enhance relations with countries in the Caucasus region that could help neutralise the threat from Iran. Israel’s military and technical support for Azerbaijan allowed the latter to achieve military balance with Armenia and emerge victorious in the second Karabakh war in 2020. This article discusses the growing relationship between Azerbaijan and Israel, and the role it has played in exacerbating the longstanding competition between Iran and Azerbaijan.

 

 

Although Israel had established diplomatic relations with most of the countries in the South Caucasus in the post-Soviet period, its political presence in the region was limited initially. However, with the perceived existential threat from Iran mounting, especially with Iran’s nuclear programme, Israel has sought in recent years to enhance its relations with countries in the region that could serve to encircle Iran. Cultivating ties with Azerbaijan fits in with this goal.

The second war of September 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region presented a unique opportunity for Israel to keep Iran in check by supporting Azerbaijan. The main argument of this paper is that the second Karabakh war not only played a crucial role in developing Israel-Azerbaijan relations but has also seriously strained relations between Iran and Azerbaijan.

Background

The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dates back to the 18th and 19th centuries. Following Czarist Russia’s victory over Iran and the Ottoman empire in the South Caucasus, local Armenians began to settle in the area under the treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchay (1828).[1] Subsequently, in 1921, Karabakh was made an autonomous region within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.

As Armenians in the Karabakh region sought to unite with Armenia, tensions and clashes began to rise between the Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia in the late 1980s. This ultimately led to the first Karabakh war as Armenians in Karabakh declared independence in 1991 after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia’s conventional army aided the Armenians. A truce brokered by Russia in 1994 left in Armenian hands Karabakh and seven other districts in Azerbaijan, making up about 16 per cent of Azerbaijan’s total land area.[2] Although the fighting ended, the disputes remained unresolved. The conflict resulted in the deaths of over 30,000 individuals and the displacement of more than a million people in Azerbaijan.[3] The socioeconomic rifts between the old and new elites arising from the perestroika reforms of the late Soviet era also continued to fester and add to existing tensions.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s relations with neighbouring Iran have not been free of tensions despite the two sharing strong historical ties. Although Iran and Azerbaijan have a shared sectarian identity based on their adherence to Shi’a Islam, Azerbaijan’s more secular orientation is at odds with the Iranian regime’s Islamic fervour. The two countries also have ethnic affinities and family links – there are more Azeris in Iran than there are in Azerbaijan. But Tehran sees Baku as a serious threat because of Azerbaijan’s potential for influencing ethnonationalism among the Azeris who make up a third of its population. Indeed, Azerbaijan’s declaration of independence in the dying days of the Soviet Union aroused concerns of this nature in Iran. Baku, for its part, is concerned about the influence that Tehran has sought to wield in Azerbaijan by surreptitiously backing Shi’a groups.

During the first Karabakh war, Iran indirectly aligned itself with Armenia and Russia.[4] As a neighbour of both Azerbaijan and Armenia, Iran did try to mediate a resolution between the two in 1992 and again in 2000, but its efforts were unsuccessful. Meanwhile, Abulfaz Elchibey, who became president of Azerbaijan in 1993, began to make claims about Iran that were irredentist and nationalist. The president’s assertive foreign policy stance and pan-Turkic policies, Iran’s own explicitly geopolitical aspirations, the diverse alliances of the two countries as well as disputes over the Caspian Sea contributed to the deterioration of relations between Iran and Azerbaijan.[5]

 

Expanding Israel-Azerbaijan Ties

Israel and Azerbaijan have maintained friendly relations and cooperation since Azerbaijan gained independence in 1991. Indeed, from the time of Azerbaijan’s independence, the United States has encouraged the country to strengthen ties with Israel to form a regional alliance together with Turkey and Georgia to counteract the anti-US coalition of Syria, Iran, Armenia and Russia. The Jewish community in Azerbaijan – mainly the so-called Mountain Jews, and the Georgian and Ashkenazi Jews – has a long history in the country and is also said to have played a significant role in strengthening ties between Israel and Azerbaijan.[6]

Israel established diplomatic ties with Azerbaijan and Armenia in April 1992 and opened an embassy in Baku the following year.[7] However, Azerbaijan did not reciprocate owing to worries about losing Arab support at the United Nations for the Karabakh conflict.[8] Azerbaijan established an office for Azerbaijan Airlines in Tel Aviv[9] but it remained cognisant of the potentially detrimental reactions from Iran and the Muslim world regarding its relationship with Israel.

Notwithstanding Azerbaijan’s squeamishness about openly acknowledging its relations with Israel, it felt it needed an ally to redress what it saw as the power imbalance in the region. Support from Turkey, a staunchly pro-Azerbaijan player, was not considered strong enough in the 1990s to counterbalance Armenia, which was backed by Russia as well as Iran. Instead, Israel was seen as having the military and technological prowess to support Azerbaijan. Israel, for its part, was looking to exert pressure on Iran by building alliances with new non-Arab Muslim states in the region.

Thus, Iran-Azerbaijan relations have been flourishing. There are two main pillars to the relationship: the geopolitical one, centring on both countries’ concerns about Iran, and the strategic angle centring on energy, military and technology cooperation as well as cooperation in intelligence and counterterrorism. The oil trade has been crucial in strengthening relations between the two countries – Azerbaijan supplied 40% of Israel’s oil consumption in 2012[10] – but national security interests have been even more critical. In the same year, the state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries sold Azerbaijan US$1.6 billion worth of weapons, which represented 43% of Azerbaijan’s total military spending. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), there was a spurt in Azerbaijan’s arms purchases from Israel from 2015 onwards and, indeed, since in the last five years, Azerbaijan was Israel’s second largest arms customer after India. Israeli weaponry was used in the April 2016 Four-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh. According to SIPRI, Israeli exports of military equipment to Azerbaijan, including high-tech Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Harop Kamikaze drones, constituted 69% of Azerbaijan’s military equipment and played a significant role in the 2020 war in Karabakh.[11] Israeli military advisers also helped prepare Azerbaijani forces for the 2020 war.[12]

As far as naval assistance is concerned, Israel provided cutting-edge boats outfitted with guided missiles with a range of 25 km and superior navigation systems, as well as OPV-62 and Shaldag Mk. V ships. It also provided Gabriel V anti-ship missiles with a range of 200–400 km and high accuracy.[13] Israeli military and security cooperation were also important in building Azerbaijan’s domestic defence sector. The parties agreed to jointly produce Saar S72 corvettes to boost Azerbaijan’s naval deterrence capabilities. These corvettes will be outfitted with anti-aircraft missile systems, cruise missiles and AESA radar.[14] In 2011, an Israeli defence company, Aeronautics, set up a factory for producing military drones in Azerbaijan. The full extent and nature of Azerbaijan’s ties with Israel has not been publicly acknowledged but in a 2009 US diplomatic cable leaked by WikiLeaks, Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, was quoted as having said that the relationship was like an iceberg, with nine-tenths of it being “below the surface”.[15]

Apart from incorporating Israeli UAVs into its defence system, Azerbaijan has also incorporated Turkish UAVs.[16] Since Azerbaijan’s independence, Ankara and Baku have been vaunting their natural strategic partnership with the slogan “one nation, two states”. It was through the mediation efforts of the president of Azerbaijan that Turkey and Israel declared the restoration of their diplomatic relations in August 2022 following the rift that arose over the Palestinian issue in 2010. Azerbaijan’s geographical location may have been crucial to mending relations between Israel and Turkey.

 

The Second Karabakh War

Domestic political developments in Armenia in 2018 allowed the emergence of Nikol Pashinyan as president. His subsequent rhetoric on the Karabakh conflict was one of the factors in the outbreak of the second Karabakh war in 2020. But, Armenia’s inability to effectively organise its troops and community delivered victory to Azerbaijan. As mentioned earlier, support from Israel strengthened Azerbaijan’s capability. Turkey’s political and military rise by then and its involvement was also a significant factor in Azerbaijan’s victory in the war.

Azerbaijan expected Iran’s support in the second Karabakh war on religious and neighbourly grounds, but Tehran preferred a “wait and see” policy. Iran in fact favoured the pre-war status quo, which would have perpetuated Baku’s dependence on Tehran to reach the province of Nakhichevan, an enclave separated from the Azerbaijani mainland by Armenian territory.[17] Iran’s primary concern is that Azerbaijan’s potential victory would directly impact its own Turkic-speaking population, threatening domestic security and national sovereignty in the long run.[18] These concerns have been exacerbated by Azerbaijan’s growing partnership with Turkey and Israel and influenced Iran’s stance on the Armenia-Azerbaijan issue.[19] Eventually, Iran chose to back Armenia covertly.[20] Indeed, Iran has for some time been enhancing its ties with Armenia and Russia, to the detriment of Azerbaijan.

 

The Aftermath of the War

Israel’s support for Azerbaijan in the second Karabakh war not only damaged the Jewish nation’s relations with Armenia but also drew strong condemnation from the Orthodox-Christian Armenian community in Israel, which has already been aggrieved by the Israeli parliament’s failure to recognise what is widely known as the 1915 Armenian genocide. Israeli Armenians demonstrated on the streets against the government’s stance during the crisis. An Israeli-born Armenian describes Israel’s support for Azerbaijan thus: “The world has seen the footage: Israeli weapons have killed Armenian civilians. Now we know – Israel is responsible too.”[21] Israeli Armenians demonstrated on the streets against the government’s stance during the crisis.

More significantly, Israel’s support and cooperation with Azerbaijan during the war with Armenia was well received by many ethnic Azeris in Iran. This added to the Iranian government’s concerns.[22] Iran has been concerned about growing Israeli-Azerbaijani security ties and the frequent visits of high-ranking Israeli military officials to Azerbaijan since the 2020 war.

It is important to note that Israel has not publicly recognised any direct involvement in the battle, and Azerbaijan has also publicly denied receiving military assistance from any nation during the conflict. Azerbaijan insists that it maintains a neutral stance between Israel and Iran. But Iranians are questioning why Azerbaijan still needs to purchase Israeli weapons and maintain a military relationship with Israel after its victory against Armenia.[23] Tehran is especially concerned over the possibility of Israeli intelligence using Azerbaijani territory to spy on Iran and potentially destabilise the Islamic government.

Iran is also worried about Azerbaijan’s potential development of the Zangezur overland transport corridor, which would connect eastern Azerbaijan to the aforementioned enclave of Nakhichevan. The idea of a transport corridor was raised as part of the ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia although Armenia objects to the Zangezur corridor proposal. The corridor would have serious geopolitical impacts on Iran and Armenia. It would not only isolate Iran from Armenia and bring Azerbaijan closer to Turkey and Western influences, but it would also effectively cut off Syunik in southern Armenia from the rest of the country, resulting in a significant loss of territory. Iran fears the corridor would also allow for the presence of Israel and NATO near Iran’s borders. However, it could also eventually connect Azerbaijan to the European Union, which would benefit Azerbaijan economically.[24]

Tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan have been increasing since the second Karabakh war and intensified in late 2021 after Azerbaijan began imposing levies and checking Iranian trucks heading for Armenia through territory that was newly wrested back from Armenia during the second Karabakh war.[25] In apparent response, the Iranian army conducted military drills close to the border of Azerbaijan in October 2021. The drills involved tanks, helicopters, artillery and soldiers called “Conquers of Khaybar”, in reference to the war between Muslims and Jews during the Prophet Muhammad’s time.[26]

In this context, the foreign minister of Iran, Hossein Amirabdollahian, asserted, “We do not allow the presence and operation of the Zionist regime, or Israel, next to our borders, and we will take any appropriate measures in this regard.” Although he recognised that Iran’s relationship with Azerbaijan was “vital”, he maintained that Iran had the “right” to carry out military drills.[27] A month later, a hard-line Iranian parliamentarian, Mahmoud Ahmadi-Bighash, declared during a visit to Armenia that any change of borders in the South Caucasus was a “red line” for Iran.[28]

Tensions mounted further when Iran opened a consulate in the Azeri city of Kapan in Armenia in November 2022.[29] In response, Azerbaijan’s parliament announced in late November 2022 that it would open an embassy in Israel.[30] The decision, which has since been implemented, may have been facilitated by Israel’s growing rehabilitation in the Arab world following the signing of the Abraham accords from September 2020 onwards. Iran accused Azerbaijan of allowing Israel’s intelligence and weapons systems to operate near Iran’s border. It claimed Azerbaijan was a “puppet” of Israel. Additionally, in November 2022, Iran conducted a provocative military exercise and practised crossing the Aras River, the border between Iran and Azerbaijan.[31] Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev strongly condemned Iran’s military drills and stated, “We will do our best to protect the secular lifestyle of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis around the world, including Azerbaijanis in Iran.”[32] Azerbaijan also arrested some individuals suspected of working with Iranian intelligence.

 

Conclusion

Armenia’s victory in the first Karabakh war taught Azerbaijan valuable lessons about long-term strategy and regional power dynamics. While the energy trade has been crucial in shaping the relationship between Israel and Azerbaijan, national security considerations have been even more critical. Israel and Azerbaijan have a relationship based on shared practical interests, similar to the relationship between Iran and Armenia. However, the close strategic alliance between Tel Aviv and Baku has negatively affected Tehran-Baku relations. 

 

 

Image Caption: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks with pupils during his visit to the Jewish school Chabad Or Avner in Baku on December 13, 2016. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is on his official visit in Azerbaijan. Photo: Tofik Babayev / AFP

 

*Dr Engin Koç is an Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations at Bursa Technical University, Turkey. He specialises in Middle East politics, Turkey’s foreign policy, and China’s foreign policy. Dr Koç holds a PhD from the Department of International Relations at Uludag University, Turkey. He was a visiting scholar for six months at the American University in Cairo. He knows Turkish, English and Arabic. His works have appeared in several academic and media outlets.

 

End Notes

[1] Arshi Khan “Revisiting the Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia”, The Indian Journal of Politics 54, no. 1–2, (2020): 2.

[2] M. Hakan Yavuz and Michael Gunter, “The Causes of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War” in The Karabakh Conflict Between Armenia and Azerbaijan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), pp: 33-66; Thomas Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures in an Oil-Rich, Wartorn, Post-Soviet Republic (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998).

[3] Ali Askerov, “The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict: The Beginning of the Soviet End”, in Post-Soviet Conflicts: The Thirty Years’ Crisis, ed. Stefan Brooks and Lasha Tchantouridze, pp. 55–82 (Lexington Books, 2020), p. 56.

[4] Zaur Gasimov, “Active but Inefficient? Iran’s Strategy Towards the Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh”, in The Karabakh Gambit: Responsibility for the Future, ed. Turan Gafarlı and Michael Arnold, TRT Research Center, 2021, p. 210

[5] Nasib Nassibli, “Azerbaijan-Iranian Relations: Past and Present”, Journal of Azerbaijani Studies (1999): 3–23.

[6] Gabriel Lerner, “Jews of Quba, Azerbaijan”, Minutario, 28 August 2010, https://www.minutario.com/the-jews-of-quba-azerbaijan-699

[7] Michael B. Bishku, “Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the Karabakh Conflict”, in Nagorno Karabakh Conflict, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and Michael M. Gunter, pp. 366–381 (Routledge, 2022), p. 372.

[8] Avinoam Idan and Brenda Shaffer, “Israel’s Role in the Second Armenian-Azerbaijan War”, in The Karabakh Gambit: Responsibility for the Future, ed. Turan Gafarlı and Michael Arnold, TRT Research Center, 2021, p. 191.

[9] Gallia M. Lindenstrauss, “Israel-Azerbaijan: Despite the Constraints, A Special Relationship”, Strategic Assessment, 17, no. 4 (2015): 69–79.

[10] Cnan Liphshiz, “Azerbaijan Fosters Close Ties with Israel despite Iran”, The Times of Israel, 18 September 2013, https://www.timesofisrael.com/azerbaijan-fosters-close-ties-with-israel-despite-iran/

[11] Seth Frantzman, “Did Azerbaijan’s Use of Israeli Weapons Make the War Worse or Better?” Jerusalem Post,

18 March 2021, https://www.jpost.com/international/did-azerbaijans-use-of-israeli-weapons-make-the-war-worse-orbetter-662442; Fuad Shahbazov, “Tactical Reasons Behind Military Breakthrough in Karabakh Conflict”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 3 November 2020, http://gpf-europe.com/context/publications/?id=69160

[12] Avinoam Idan and Brenda Shaffer, “Israel’s Role in the Second Armenian-Azerbaijan War”, in The Karabakh Gambit: Responsibility for the Future, ed. Turan Gafarlı and Michael Arnold, TRT Research Center, 2021, p. 190.

[13] Rusif Huseynov, “The Sky is the Limit: The Azerbaijan-Israel-Turkey Trip and the Greater Middle East”, Turkey Scope Insight on Turkish Affairs 6, no. 4 (July–August 2022), p. 3.

[14] Rusif Huseynov, “The Sky is the Limit: The Azerbaijan-Israel-Turkey Trip and the Greater Middle East”, Turkey Scope Insight on Turkish Affairs 6, no. 4 (July–August 2022), p. 3.

[15] The Economist, “Odd but Useful Allies”, 1 January 2021, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2012/01/21/odd-but-useful-allies

[16] Avinoam Idan and Brenda Shaffer, “Israel’s Role in the Second Armenian-Azerbaijan War”, in The Karabakh Gambit: Responsibility for the Future, ed. Turan Gafarlı and Michael Arnold, TRT Research Center, 2021, p. 190.

[17] Umut Basar, “Is Iran One of the Losers of the Karabakh War?”, Anadolu Agency, 26 November 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-is-iran-one-of-the-losers-of-the-karabakh-war/2056842

[18] Hülya Kınık and Sinem Çelik, “Turkey’s Grand Strategy: National Independence, Regional Leadership and Global Status”, Vol. 23, No. 4, Insight Turkey 23, no. 4 (Fall 2021): 169–192.

[19] Mesiagha Mahammadi and Vasif Huseynov, “Iran’s Policy Toward the Karabakh Conflict”, in Nagorno Karabakh Conflict, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and Michael M. Gunter, p. 381–402 (Routledge, 2022).

[20] Brenda Shaffer, Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity (MIT Press, 2002).

[21] Eetta Prince-Gibson, “For Armenians in Israel, a Sad Holiday and Identity Crisis Following Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Haaretz, 24 January, 2021, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2021-01-24/ty-article/.premium/im-in-mourning-for-one-of-my-countries-im-furious-with-the-other/0000017f-e31e-d568-ad7f-f37f7bc90000

[22] Michael B. Bishku, “Israel and Armenia: So Near Experientially, But So Far Away Geopolitically”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 2 (Winter 2021): 20–43.

[23] Benyamin Poghosyan, “Azerbaijan Becomes a New Battlefield for Iran-Israel Rivalry”, Armenian Weekly, 16 November 2022, https://armenianweekly.com/2022/11/16/azerbaijan-becomes-a-new-battlefield-for-iran-israel-rivalry/

[24] Namig Abbasov and Emil A. Souleimanov, “Azerbaijan, Israel and Iran: An Unlikely Triangle Shaping the Northern Middle East”, Middle East Policy 29 (2022: 139–153).

[25] Heydar Isayev and Ani Mejlumyan, “Azerbaijan starts charging Iranian trucks supplying Armenia”, Eurasianet, 14 September 2021, https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-starts-charging-iranian-trucks-supplying-armenia

[26] “Army to Test Four New Military Equipment in the Northwest Iran” Tehran Times, 1 October 2021 https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/465639/Army-to-test-four-new-military-equipment-in-northwest-Iran

[27] Riya Baibhawi, “Conquers of Kheibar: Iran Begins Military Drills on Border with Azerbaijan”, Republic World, 2 October 2021, https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/rest-of-the-world-news/conquerors-of-kheibar-iran-begins-military-drills-on-border-with-azerbaijan.html

[28] “Iran Reaffirms ‘Red Line’ on South Caucasus Borders”, Azatutyun, 22 December 2021, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/31621670.html

[29] Farid Mirzali, “Azerbaijan to Open an Embassy in Israel: Why Now?”, Topchubashov Center, 4 November 2021, https://top-center.org/en/analytics/3437/azerbaijan-to-open-an-embassy-in-israel-why-now

[30] “Azerbaijan to Open an Embassy in Israel”, Jewish News Syndicate, 20 November 2022, https://www.jns.org/azerbaijan-to-open-embassy-in-israel/

[31] IRGC Forces Practice Crossing Aras River on Border with Azerbaijan”, Tehran Times, 18 October 2022, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/477752/IRGC-forces-practice-crossing-Aras-River-on-border-with-Azerbaijan

[32] “Azerbaijan to Protect All Azerbaijanis including Those in Iran: President”, Yeni Safak, 25 November 2022, https://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/azerbaijan-to-protect-all-azerbaijanis-including-those-in-iran-president-3656122