By Gyorgy Busztin, Visiting Research Professor, MEI-NUS

Let bygones be bygones. This might have been the reasoning behind the Arab League’s decision to re-admit Syria during its rump session in Cairo on 7 May. Apart from the decision to re-embrace a one-time pariah, the meeting was also notable because of the countries which were absent: Eight did not show, most notably Qatar. Doha has insistently condemned the Assad regime, and does not appear to be in a particularly forgiving mood, although it said later that it would not stand in the way of an “Arab consensus”.

The decision to re-admit Syria was taken in Amman, after Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia proposed the move. It amounts to an admission that the Arab League failed to resolve the Syrian crisis. Welcoming Damascus back into the fold without having it enact a new constitution, or elections — as proposed by the United Nations Security Council — or, really, any other changes to regime behaviour that led to its suspension 11 years ago, underlines that failure.

Syrian re-admission comes on the heels of the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. The Gulf Arab states have evidently decided that isolating Syria is no longer useful since the confrontation with Iran has cooled, somewhat. By contrast, the destabilising effects of the Syrian crisis continue to reverberate across the region: The influx of refugees poses an intolerable burden for Lebanon, and strains Arab ties to Turkey, while illicit activities such as drug- and human smuggling threaten security. The competition between Turkey, Russia, and Iran for control over Syria, complicated by Israeli airstrikes to ward off Iran, poses a further threat. Given the circumstances, re-establishing dialogue with Damascus seems a reasonable option. After all, isolation only served to drive the Assad regime into the arms of Iran and Russia, which continually toggle between being the region’s arsonists and firemen, depending on which role serves their interests.

Now comes the hard part. Syria has changed beyond recognition since the failed uprising. Large parts of the country lie in ruins, and at least a third of its population has been uprooted. The country is in dire need of help with reconstruction, but Its two patrons, Iran and Russia, are in no position to do so. The West has made it abundantly clear that it will steer clear unless a comprehensive political solution is implemented — a demand that will not be met as long as the current regime remains in power.

That leaves the Arab League to pick up the pieces. The outlook, however, is less than optimistic. The organisation’s track record of successful conflict resolution since its inception is non-existent, but it now has a chance to prove skeptics wrong. A solution tailored to the realities of Syria, and without political demands, may be the chosen path. Steps such as a staged release of prisoners and the re-admittance of refugees, both inside and outside the country, with reconstruction where no homes are left, could provide the right start. This approach worked in Iraq after the devastation caused by the Islamic State.

In fact, Iraq could be a blueprint for Syria in more than one way. The country is still in Iran’s embrace, but has managed to create enough wiggle room to begin to re-assert itself, if only haltingly. Something along these lines might also work for Syria, where the regime could open the gates for Gulf investment without ruffling feathers in Tehran. Iran would certainly like to see Syria as a new terrain of engagement with the Gulf countries, Jordan, and Egypt, as it seeks to evade sanctions and reintegrate economically with the region as it labours under crippling sanctions. A “Tehran Bazaar” in Syria would provide Iran with a backdoor to some sanctions relief. It is difficult to predict Arab engagement in such a scenario, but trade is certainly a more realistic option than pushing for a political solution.

Ultimately, while the Arab League’s decision is certainly a plus for the Assad regime, it is almost certainly a Pyrrhic victory. Bashar Al Assad may be Syria’s leader, but he has no effective control over large parts of the country. The northwestern Idlib province and Kurdish enclaves along the Turkish border are under opposition Islamist and Kurdish rule, and will likely remain so. East of the Euphrates, a security vacuum partially filled by US-backed Syrian Kurdish opposition forces squaring off against Islamic State remnants also poses a challenge to the regime. Any attempt by the regime to re-establish authority over the entire country is likely to re-ignite armed conflict.

What the League may have in mind is a de facto partitioning of Syria along the lines of the current status quo. It would see the country resembling its former self only as an economic unit, but under various competing authorities. This is less than what Damascus wants, but more than it has today, and could usher in a slow normalisation on the ground, and, at least, ease the plight of refugees.

Despite the formidable challenges ahead, Syria’s re-admission into the Arab League is a watershed moment that marks a new stage in the country’s history. It may gradually lead to normalisation in its current cantonised condition, and the beginning of a period of healing. Nothing is guaranteed, but a new start fits right into the current pattern of a fast-reordering Middle East. For the people of Syria, it may be a long-awaited glimmer of hope.

Image Caption: Syrian President Bashar Assad(left) speaking with then Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and current UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi on 18 March 2022. Photo: Syrian Presidency / Facebook

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