This article examines why the strengthening of Asean–Central Asia relations is important and how this could be achieved. The eastward shift of the Eurasian Economic Union, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and growing Central Asian concerns regarding Chinese economic influence have created possibilities for greater interaction and connectedness between the two regions. Central Asia is also interested in adapting the Asean model for its own regionalism. Both sides should therefore consider establishing a C5+Asean dialogue mechanism to facilitate greater interaction. Singapore is particularly admired and well-received in Central Asia, and can play a key role in strengthening Asean–Central Asia relations.
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By Paradorn Rangsimaporn
Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the Central Asian republics have been keen to establish diplomatic relations with the countries of Southeast Asia and vice versa. Despite initial enthusiasm from Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia to pursue new relationships with Central Asian countries, which were seen as fellow Asians and also fellow Muslims, those ties quickly stagnated. This was due to internal instability within most of these Central Asian states and their unfavourable business and investment climate, which made it difficult for external investors to fully realise the initial promise of economic opportunities.[1] Moreover, the vast geographical distance, logistical problems and lack of mutual awareness between them proved further obstacles to closer relations. In the past five years, however, there has been growing interest on both sides to pursue greater engagement. This article examines why it is important for the countries of Central Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), which encompasses 10 countries of South-east Asia, to strengthen their relations and how they can do so.
Why Are Stronger Asean–Central Asia Relations Important?
As the prominent US expert on Central Asia, S Frederick Starr, argued, Central Asia is important to the countries of Southeast Asia due to the former’s geopolitical significance as a region surrounded by nuclear powers and a nexus for great-power engagement that can affect the development of international relations. Asean countries have a stake in helping to ensure Central Asia’s stability and can do so through constructive engagement to help the region avoid economic breakdown or external hegemony. A self-governing and prosperous Central Asia will be the best partner for Asean countries, and can offer them abundant natural resources.[2]
Moreover, both regions are growing in global importance and potential connectedness. Asean has a population of nearly 650 million and a combined GDP of US$2,986 billion.[3] Asean is also evolving into a regional community and has played a leading role in Asia–Pacific regionalism. Central Asia’s location in the heart of Eurasia, and possession of vast energy and natural resources entails its long strategic importance for the great powers with global implications. The region’s total population of about 72.5 million and a combined GDP of around US$286 billion represent a relatively large untapped market for Asean countries.[4] Likewise, Central Asian countries view Asean as a large market for their goods and a potential investor. Enhanced relations with Asean can also help facilitate Central Asian states’ integration into the dynamically growing Asia–Pacific region. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which encompasses the “Silk Road Economic Belt” that goes overland through Central Asia to Europe and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” that passes through the countries of South-east Asia, has meant greater possibilities to connect South-east Asia to Central Asia in a single economic corridor.[5]
Furthermore, the Central Asian states have all been pursuing some variant of a multi-vector foreign policy, especially in terms of energy politics and security, by seeking multiple partners and pipeline routes to provide some strategic balancing and leverage with regards to the great powers.[6] Although Asean has not traditionally been seen as one of the external actors that Central Asian states have engaged with to balance the influence of other powers, greater engagement with Asean could provide some counterweight. This is especially the case as the Asean countries are distant and pose no threat but can offer economic opportunities. The importance of strengthening relations with Asean and its member countries has been increasingly recognised by the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan’s and Tajikistan’s foreign policy concept both mention the strengthening of relations with Southeast Asian countries,[7] while one of Uzbekistan’s stated foreign policy tasks is to enhance co-operation with countries in South-east Asia.[8] Growing Central Asian concerns regarding China, ranging from an influx of Chinese migrants, perceived lack of transparency in Chinese business dealings and investments, fears of being caught in a “debt trap”, and China’s treatment of its Muslim minorities in Xinjiang,[9] have led to some in Central Asia to view the strengthening of relations with Asean countries as one possible counterweight. As one Kazakhstani expert noted, such concerns had prompted the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), in which Kazakhstan is a member, to look towards the countries of Asean to help balance Beijing’s growing economic influence. He further proposed that Central Asia and Asean co-operate to develop a free trade agreement (FTA) as one alternative to Chinese dominance.[10] Kazakhstani experts also noted that Asean countries tend to have a more positive image and their presence would be more welcomed in Central Asia.[11]
Asean’s successful experience in regionalism can also serve as a useful model for Central Asia. Exclusive Central Asian regionalism, which does not involve the role and influence of external powers, has long been an elusive goal. The change in Uzbekistan’s leadership in late 2016 ushered in a new era of greater openness and engagement with its regional neighbours under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, which helped remove obstacles to regionalism. In March 2018, a Central Asian summit was held for the first time in Astana. A second Central Asian summit was held in November 2019 in Tashkent, where the leaders pledged to develop mechanisms for co-operation and to discuss the most suitable institutional structures for co-operation.[12] Such momentum towards greater Central Asian co-operation has prompted discussion among experts within and outside the region about the possibility of Central Asia following other successful models, including Asean.[13] Asean’s suitability has been highlighted due to South-east Asia’s similarities to Central Asia, being composed of small to medium-sized states that have to deal with great-power rivalry and dynamics. Central Asian leaders also subscribe to the Asean principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and the peaceful resolution of disputes.[14] The attractiveness of the Asean model has also been raised by Central Asian leaders and experts. At the 1993 summit of Central Asian leaders in Tashkent, Kazakhstan’s then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed that the Central Asian states form an economic union like Asean.[15] Kazakhstani analysts likewise see Asean’s success in uniting small states to withstand pressure from larger states as an attractive model for Central Asian states, which are similarly faced with the expansion of great powers.[16] A 2006 survey conducted by one Uzbekistani expert on more than 50 experts from Central Asian republics, Russia and the UK found that the majority (95 per cent) consider the European Union and Asean as good models for regional integration in Central Asia “but with local peculiarities”.[17] Asean could therefore help Central Asia achieve exclusive regionalism that would foster intra-regional co-operation and help ensure regional stability and prosperity.
How can Asean–Central Asia relations be strengthened?
Firstly, stronger relations between Asean and the EAEU, including the conclusion of an FTA, should be actively pursued. The West’s sanctions on Russia following its annexation of Crimea in 2014 also affected the economy of other EAEU members, including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. These EAEU members have had to look towards Asia for alternative economic opportunities to mitigate the impact of the sanctions.[18] Asean is seen as one potential partner. At the 2016 EAEU summit in Astana, then-President Nazarbayev proposed that co-operation with other international associations, including Asean, be pursued.[19] Asean and its members have also shown interest in the EAEU, seeing it as an attractive market with a population of nearly 184 million and a combined GDP of approximately US$1.9 trillion.[20] In November 2018, a memorandum of understanding on co-operation was signed between the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), the EAEU’s executive and regulatory body, and the Asean Secretariat. Trade between the EAEU and Asean had also risen to US$35.7 billion in 2017, a 40 per cent increase from 2016.[21] Vietnam and Singapore have already signed an FTA with the EAEU in 2015 and 2019 respectively. Indonesia, Cambodia and Thailand have signed a memorandum of co-operation with the EEC, with the hope of concluding an FTA later. In March 2020 Uzbekistan became an EAEU observer, raising the possibility of it eventually becoming a full member, thereby increasing to the EAEU’s attraction. Uzbekistan’s population of around 34 million means that it can potentially become the second-largest market in the EAEU after Russia.[22]
Secondly, the possibility of better logistics and transport links via China’s BRI has prompted Asean countries to explore greater trade and economic opportunities with Central Asia. Asean’s attention is particularly focused on Kazakhstan due to its central location and its “Nurly Zhol” (Bright Path) infrastructure programme that is closely connected to the BRI, which positions Kazakhstan as a transit and trade bridge between Europe and Asia. Kazakhstan’s attraction is further enhanced due to its Khorgos transport and logistics hub on the border with China, which is connected by railway to its logistics terminal in China’s Lianyungang port, that can then transport goods by sea to Asean countries. The transportation of goods between Europe and Asean through this route is at least twice as fast as via the Indian Ocean, saving both time and money.[23] In addition, since March 2019, Vietnam had started to use the railway route through China and Kazakhstan to transport its goods to Europe. Starting from Hanoi and ending in Duisberg, Germany, the journey took 22 days.[24] Other Asean countries such as Thailand have begun to explore using the Lianyungang–Khorgos route as well.[25] The BRI also opened up the potential for enhanced relations between the Philippines and Central Asia. Through links with the BRI and China, President Rodrigo Duterte believed that the Philippines would gain access to the markets of Central Asia and Europe.[26] Overall, Asean–Central Asia economic ties may be strengthened through enhanced connectivity between the two components of China’s BRI (land and sea) as well as between the BRI and the Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity 2025.[27]
Thirdly, Asean can play a greater economic role in Central Asia as it would be welcomed as a counterweight to China. In addition to being seen as potential alternative trade and investment partners, Asean countries are viewed as new sources of technology and expertise in such areas as agriculture, the halal food industry, smart cities, education and training, hospitality and tourism, information and communication technologies, and the medical industry. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have recently refocused their foreign policy on economic diplomacy, seeking more foreign investment and new markets. Kazakhstan singled out economic co-operation with Vietnam on agricultural and livestock products, learning from the experiences of Singapore and Indonesia on diversifying and modernising the economy, and tapping on Malaysia’s halal food expertise.[28] Uzbekistani experts stressed the growing role of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore as economic partners for Central Asian states.[29] The Turkmenistan president’s first state visit to Singapore in August 2019 likewise focused on the expansion of economic ties and attracting Singaporean investments. President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov proposed co-operation in the fuel and energy sector, chemical and textile industries, and transport and communications.[30] Moreover, Turkmenistan’s high dependence on exporting its gas to China has exposed its vulnerability to fluctuations in Chinese demand particularly due to the Covid-19 crisis.[31] Turkmenistan has thus tried to diversify its export market, by promoting the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India pipeline project (Tapi). Turkmenistan’s president raised the possibility of Tapi providing gas onwards to the South-east Asian market during his meeting with Singaporean business leaders, although it was not made clear how this would proceed.[32]
Fourthly, relations between Central Asia and Asean as a regional organisation should be strengthened. Kazakhstan has been the most active Central Asian state to engage with Asean, although it has so far been unsuccessful in joining the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) and attaining dialogue-partner status. Only Uzbekistan (2011), Kazakhstan (2014) and Turkmenistan (2015) have accredited their ambassadors to Indonesia and Malaysia (in Turkmenistan’s case) as their ambassadors to Asean. But apart from that, there has been no further substantial co-operation.[33] Nevertheless, a dialogue mechanism to facilitate stronger relations, such as a C5+1 format, can be established between the five Central Asian countries and Asean. The Central Asian states already have such a dialogue with Japan, the US, South Korea and India. Asean itself has similar formats with its dialogue partners so both sides are familiar with such a mechanism.[34] This format has also been proposed by the then Kazakhstani President Nazarbayev[35] and Central Asian experts.[36]
Lastly, the Asean Secretariat and member countries should work with Central Asian states to share their experiences and expertise on Asean as a model for Central Asian regionalism. A first step was taken in February 2019 when 13 participants from all five Central Asian states as well as Afghanistan and Mongolia were invited to Singapore to learn about the Asean experience. The “Understanding Asean” seminar was hosted by the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore, and featured talks on Asean delivered by former foreign ministers from Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore.[37] One Kyrgyz participant described how Kyrgyzstan, a similarly small state to Brunei and Laos, could benefit from Central Asian integration based on the Asean model due to subsequent access to a wider market.[38] A roundtable discussion on Asean was also held in May 2019 in Bishkek that was attended by Central Asian experts, including some participants of the Singapore visit, to share views and get acquainted with Asean.[39] However, thus far, none of the Central Asian states has officially contacted the Asean Secretariat regarding their intent to study the Asean model.[40]
Conclusion
Both Central and South-east Asian countries have an increasing mutual interest to strengthen their relationship, primarily for economic reasons but also geopolitical ones in terms of providing balance in Central Asia’s foreign relations. The BRI and the EAEU’s eastward shift has opened up possibilities for enhanced engagement between the two regions, while a dialogue mechanism to facilitate such greater interaction should be established, such as in a C5+Asean format. Asean can also help the growing momentum towards Central Asian regionalism by providing a useful model for the Central Asians to study and adapt from.
Among the Asean countries, Singapore is well placed to play a key role in strengthening Asean–Central Asia relations. As one of the leading “Asian Tigers”, the Singaporean model or “miracle” is widely admired by Central Asian leaders and often seen as a model to emulate. The “economy first, politics second” developmental model resonated particularly well with Central Asian leaders. Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew is also held in particularly high esteem as a role model.[41] Moreover, Singapore has played an active economic role in Central Asia. As of 2017, Singapore jointly financed more than 20 enterprises in Uzbekistan with joint projects in the sphere of finance, oil and gas, and light industries.[42] In 2019, Singaporean companies made plans to invest in building a network of international educational centres in several cities in Kazakhstan.[43] Singapore plays a particularly prominent role in the field of education and capacity-building in Central Asia and has shared its developmental experience with more than 1,200 participants from Central Asia through the foreign ministry’s Singapore Cooperation Programme (SCP).[44] Singapore has also looked to the future to a post Covid-19 world where Singapore can work together with Kazakhstan on digital economy and a strong healthcare system as part of China’s “Health Silk Road”.[45]
About the Author
Dr Paradorn Rangsimaporn is a Thai diplomat and independent researcher. He is the counsellor and deputy head of mission at the Royal Thai Embassy in Nur-Sultan, Republic of Kazakhstan. He is also an associate research fellow at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek. His research interests are in Russia’s relations with Asia and Asean, and Central Asia’s relations with Southeast Asia. He has published articles in peer-reviewed journals and a book entitled Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia: Perceptions and Policies from Yeltsin to Putin (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). He holds an MPhil in Russian and East European Studies and a DPhil in International Relations from St Antony’s College, University of Oxford. The views expressed are his own and do not represent those of the Royal Thai Government or any other organisation.
Image caption: The statue of Vladimir Lenin behind the the State Historical Museum in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Photo by Dan Lundberg, shared on Flickr.
[1] Pushpa Thambipillai, “Southeast Asia, Russia and the Ex-Soviet Republics: Expanding the Links”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, no. 1 (June 1994): 95–97.
[2] S. Frederick Starr, “Why Central Asia Counts”, Middle East Insights (National University of Singapore), no. 175, (6 November 2017): 2–3.
[3] “ASEAN: Selected Basic Indicators (as of June 2019)”, ASEAN Secretariat, accessed 17 November 2019, https://data.aseanstats.org/.
[4] “World Bank data for the five Central Asian countries (2018)”, World Bank, accessed 15 May 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=KZ-KG-UZ-TJ-TM.
[5] Nicola P Contessi, “Central Asia in Asia: Charting growing trans-regional linkages”, Journal of Eurasian Studies no. 7 (2016): 3.
[6] Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 68.
[7] “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2020-2030”, Administration of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, accessed 12 May 2020, http://www.akorda.kz/en/legal_acts/decrees/on-the-concept-of-the-foreign-policy-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-for-2020-2030; “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Tajikistan”, Approved by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan on 27 January 2015, no. 332, accessed 10 March 2020, https://www.tajikemb.kg/files/2016/concept-of-the-foreign-policy-of-the-republic-of-tajikistan.pdf.
[8] “Foreign Policy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan”, accessed 9 March 2020, https://mfa.uz/en/cooperation/.
[9] Philippe Le Corre, “Kazakhs Wary of Chinese Embrace as BRI Gathers Steam”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 February 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/28/kazakhs-wary-of-chinese-embrace-as-bri-gathers-steam-pub-78545; Temur Umarov, “China looms large in Central Asia”, Carnegie Moscow Center, 30 March 2020, <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/81402; and author’s interviews with Kazakhstani experts in Almaty, 16 September 2019, and Nur-Sultan, 1 November 2019.
[10] Aidar Amrebayev, “Eurasia’s Economic Union and ASEAN: Why Interaction is Important”, RSIS Commentary no. 233, (21 September 2016).
[11] Author’s interviews with experts in Almaty, 16 September 2019, and Nur-Sultan, 1 November 2019.
[12] S. Frederick Starr, “Is this Central Asia’s ASEAN Moment?”, The Diplomat, 5 December 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/is-this-central-asias-asean-moment/.
[13] Svante E Cornell and S Frederick Starr, “Modernisation and Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: A New Spring?”, Silk Road Paper (November 2018); Bilahari Kausikan, S Frederick Starr and Yang Cheng, “Central Asia: All Together Now”, The American Interest, 16 June 2017; and Rafael Sattarov, “ASEAN, Uzbek-Style: Tashkent’s New Ambitions in Central Asia”, Carnegie Moscow Center Commentary, 19 January 2018, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/75308.
[14] Loro Horta, “ASEAN as a model for Central Asia”, RSIS Commentaries no. 108, (6 June 2014).
[15] Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (New York: The New York Review of Books, 2017), 226.
[16] Zhainara Iskakova, Marat Sarsembayev and Zarina Kakenova, “Can Central Asia be integrated as ASEAN?”, Opción 34, no. 85 (2018); and Amrebayev, “Eurasia’s Economic Union and ASEAN”.
[17] Mirzokhid Rakhimov, “Internal and external dynamics of regional cooperation in Central Asia”, Journal of Eurasian Studies no. 1, (2010): 97.
[18] Maria Shagina, “Drifting East: Russia’s Import Substitution and its Pivot to Asia”, CEES Working Paper no. 3, (April 2020), https://www.cees.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ab647675-d360-4e05-bf96-1bce74dcb725/CEES%20Working%20Paper%203.pdf.
[19] Amrebayev, “Eurasia’s Economic Union and ASEAN”.
[20] “About the EAEU”, EAEU Website, accessed 17 May 2020, http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about.
[21] Seow Bei Yi, “ASEAN, Eurasian Economic Commission sign agreement to promote further collaboration”, The Straits Times, 14 November 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/asean-eurasian-economic-commission-sign-agreement-to-promote-further-collaboration.
[22] “Uzbekistan to become observer in Russia-led trade bloc”, Reuters, 7 March 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uzbekistan-russia-trade/uzbekistan-to-become-observer-in-russia-led-trade-bloc-idUSKBN20U0E2.
[23] Usen Suleimen, “Central Asia and ASEAN: Convergence through Belt and Road”, The Diplomatic Herald of Kazakhstan no. 2 (2018): 22–25.
[24] “Vietnam-China-Kazakhstan-Europe rail route launched”, Kazinform, 6 March 2019, https://www.inform.kz/en/vietnam-china-kazakhstan-europe-rail-route-launched_a3505064.
[25] Kanokwan Kerdphalanan, “‘Kazakhstan’ sen thang suu talad Europe” [‘Kazakhstan’ the pathway to the European market], Krungthep Turakit, 12 September 2019, https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/news/detail/846977.
[26] Renato Cruz de Castro, “Explaining the Duterte Administration’s Appeasement Policy on China: The Power of Fear”, Asian Affairs: An American Review 45, no. 3–4 (2018): 169 and 183.
[27] “ASEAN-China Joint Statement on Synergising the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)”, adopted in Bangkok on 3 November 2019, Asean Secretariat, accessed 2 March 2020, https://asean.org/asean-china-joint-statement-synergising-master-plan-asean-connectivity-mpac-2025-belt-road-initiative-bri/.
[28] Mukhtar Tileuberdi, “Kazakhstan’s economic diplomacy: on solid footing and with clear goals in mind”, Astana Times, 26 November 2019; and John Gilbert, “Kazakhstan keen to tap Malaysia’s expertise”, New Straits Times, 10 September 2019.
[29] Gul’rukh Dzhuraeva, “K istoriografii issledovaniia roli ASEAN v mirovoi politike (obzor literatury)” [Towards a historiography of research on the role of ASEAN in world politics (a literature review)], Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia (Tashkent) no. 1, (2016): 57–58.
[30] “Turkmenistan president completes state visit to Singapore”, The Times of Central Asia, 28 August 2019, https://www.timesca.com/index.php/news/21539-turkmenistan-president-completes-state-visit-to-singapore.
[31] Maximilian Hess, “Central Asia’s Force Majeure Fears: Impact of COVID-19 Outbreak on China’s Natural Gas Supply Demands”, FPRI Analysis, 16 March 2020, https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/03/central-asias-force-majeure-fears-impact-of-covid-19-outbreak-on-chinas-natural-gas-supply-demands/.
[32] “Prezident Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov vstretilsia s predstaviteliami krupnogo biznesa Singapura” [President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov met with representatives of big business in Singapore], Turkmenistan Today, 27 August 2019, http://tdh.gov.tm/news/en/articles.aspx&article19316&cat11.
[33] Author’s email correspondences with the Asean Secretariat, 24 October 2019 and 28 April 2020.
[34] The first C5+1 dialogue format established by Japan in 2004 was in fact modelled on the Asean+3 (Japan, South Korea, and China) and reapplied to Central Asia. Timur Dadabaev, Japan in Central Asia: Strategies, Initiatives, and Neighboring Powers (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 15 and 146.
[35] “Vystuplenie Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan N. A. Nazarbaeva na otkrytii ministerskoi vstrechi 63-i sessii ESKATO” [Speech of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev at the opening of the ministerial meeting of the 63rd session of ESCAP], 21 May 2007, https://uchet.kz/news/vystuplenie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-n-a-nazarbaeva-na-otkrytii-ministerskoy-vstrechi-63-y-s/.
[36] Author’s interview with Askar Nursha, Almaty, 17 September 2019; ZhM Amanzholov and EB Akhmetov, “Regional’nyi forum ASEAN po voprosam bezopasnosti i perspektivy ego razvitiia v kontekste pozitsii kazakhstana na integratsiiu” [The ASEAN Regional Forum on security issues and the prospects for its development in the context of Kazakhstan’s position on integration], KazNU Bulletin, International Relations and International Law Series 70, no. 2 (2015): 8; and B Syrgabaev, “Kyrgyzstan i ASEAN – vozmozhnye puti sotrudnichestva” [Kyrgyzstan and ASEAN — Possible Ways of Cooperation], 24 October 2016, http://old.kabar.kg/rus/MID/full/112878.
[37] The author thanks Ms Lim Wei Chean, Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore, for this information. Author’s email correspondence, 29 June 2020.
[38] “Kak Kyrgyzstanu otkryt’ okean na primere ASEAN?” [How can the ocean open up for Kyrgyzstan as in the ASEAN example?], 24 June 2019, https://stanradar.com/news/full/35082-kak-kyrgyzstanu-otkryt-okean-na-primere-asean.html.
[39] “ASEAN as a model of regional integration discussed in Bishkek”, 21 May 2019, http://www.ibc.kg/en/news/members/4386_asean_as_a_model_of_regional_integration_discussed_in_bishkek; and “Uroki ASEAN. Stanovlenie modeli ekonomicheskogo regional’nogo soiuza” [Lessons of ASEAN. Formation of a model of an economic regional union], 19 May 2019, https://auca.kg/ru/auca_news/3745/.
[40] Author’s email correspondence with the Asean Secretariat, 28 April 2020.
[41] Makhmud Kassymbekov, “Nazarbayev in Perspective. The Presidency – Nazarbayev begins Constructing his Legacy and Kazakhstan Reborn”, The Astana Times, June 26, 2020; and Gul’rukh Dzhuraeva, “Singapur v sisteme sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii” [Singapore in the System of Contemporary International Relations], Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia [International Relations] (Tashkent), no. 2, (2017): 72–73 and 81.
[42] Dzhuraeva, “Singapur v sisteme”, 78–81.
[43] Laura Tusupbekova, “Singapore company to build educational center for ongoing training in Kazakhstan,” Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 14 March 2019, www.kazpravda.kz/en/news/society/singapore-company-to-build-educational-center-for-ongoing-training-in-kazakhstan; and Dilshat Zhussupova, “Singaporean investors hope to invest $200 million in constructing Nur-Sultan educational institutes”, Astana Times, 28 August 2019.
[44] “Central Asia”, Foreign Ministry of Singapore, accessed 5 July 2020, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/SINGAPORES-FOREIGN-POLICY/Countries-and-Regions/Central-Asia.
[45] Zulkifli Baharudin, “What’s there in Kazakhstan? Plenty for Singapore businesses in a post-COVID world”, The Astana Times, 4 June 2020.
