By Gyorgy Busztin

Iraq went to the polls on 10 October 2021, the country’s fifth parliamentary election since the fall of Saddam Hussein. Unlike the previous four, this election was forced on the government: A huge protest movement sparked by multiple crises – a crumbling economy, widespread unemployment, breakdown of essential services, and endemic corruption – forced it to call a snap poll.

Initially, the government resorted to tried and trusted tactics to keep a lid on the protests – violent repression. When that failed, Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi stepped down, and Mustafa Al Kadhimi took over, promising reforms. But this failed to quell the protests, and violence again followed, this time from pro-Iranian militias which the authorities had no power over. With things threatening to spiral out of control, and Iraqis now finding a new target for their ire in Iranian interests and symbols, a snap election was the only choice left. Paradoxically, those pushing for reform were so decimated by the violent crackdown – over 600 dead, thousands injured, and many more forced to go underground – that they could not muster a strong showing at the election they had triggered.

With the polls now over and the results in, it is fair to ask, “what will change?” The short answer is: “Nothing much.” The populist cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr was the biggest winner, while pro-reform parties also picking up some seats. Iran-backed parties suffered a body blow, losing ground as Iraqis tired of Tehran’s interference. But with voter turnout at a record-low 41 per cent, the only certain signal sent by this election is that Iraqis have turned their backs on the process. In effect, the polls consolidated the very political forces the protest movement wanted to oust. With no serious reformist challengers, they can now continue their decades-long game of musical chairs.

As is traditional in Iraqi politics, the composition of the new government will be decided by inter-party compromises, no matter what the election results were. The new PM will be designated by the party winning the largest number of votes, in this case, the Sadrists.

But despite this moribund state of affairs, there are some hopeful signs. Thanks to a new electoral law, the playing field in this election was more level than before, and allowed the entry of a small but vocal group of reform-minded independent candidates who can form the beginnings of an important movement for change. President Barham Salih, in remarks made on election day, called the vote “pivotal”, and the “starting point towards reform”. That may sound like a paltry sop to those who want immediate, sweeping changes – and those numbers are growing – but it is a realistic goal. The alternative to incremental change is more violence.

Another important outcome of the elections is that the political bloc championing Iranian influence suffered a sound beating, despite the low turnout. The Fatah Alliance will have much fewer representatives in Parliament than before – just 14, compared to 48 at the last election – and this is clear proof of the failure of Tehran to push its agenda among a populace that has become more and more vocal against Iranian meddling. The alliance of Iranian-backed militias sought to drum up support by evoking the memory of former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Major-General Qassem Soleimani and his Iraqi acolyte, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who were both killed by an American drone strike in January 2020, but voters did not buy it. Predictably, Fatah rejected the outcome of the elections, calling them “fabricated”.

Elections with the potential for change are not commonplace in a region where they mostly serve to rubber-stamp the legitimacy of ruling strongmen. Hereditary monarchies have even less appetite to conduct them, though that is slowly changing (Qatar held its first legislative election on 2 October 2021). In such an environment, Iraq’s regular elections are a welcome exception, despite their shortcomings. They provide an alternative to violent upheaval, and, more importantly, are testament to the strength of Iraq’s pluralist political process, which has weathered many storms since its inception in 2003. The latest election was widely endorsed by the international community and supervised by the United Nations at the request of Baghdad.

To be sure, Iraq’s political system is still beset by sectarianism and tribalism, but a growing civic conscience is pushing an Iraqi identity agenda. The protesters who sparked the election saw themselves as Iraqis first, and Shi’a or Sunnis second. It was this break with sectarianism that sets them apart from the previous generation, which conformed to the ethno-sectarian narrative in the years following 2003 – and suffered the consequences.

For now, the big parties still garner their support mainly from their respective religious and ethnic grassroots communities. The Kurdish and Sunni political parties were largely reliant on their own ethno-sectarian constituencies for votes, though both expressed openness to entering into alliances with their Shi’a counterparts once the bargaining over a government begins in earnest. However, this is changing. Some Iraqi analysts say this may lead to a redrawing of the Iraqi political map in the coming years, with more people voting outside sectarian lines.

It remains to be seen if Iraq will have a government with a clear opposition in the legislature, something that has not happened since 2003. The norm has been the division of the spoils of power to give each major political party its own fiefdom in the form of a government ministry or public institution with a budget – the system of unprincipled power-grabbing and patronage the protesters wanted to do away with.

Moqtada al-Sadr, the big winner of the elections as his disciplined constituency defied calls to boycott the election, may be the driving force in shaping the new government. It is quite the turnaround for a man seen as a turncoat by the protesters for deserting them – he may now emerge as the leader who can champion their aspirations for an Iraq free of foreign interference. For the first time, a turbaned politician will call the shots in Iraq, but not in the way Iran wants.

As for the future PM of Iraq, Mr Al Kadhimi, a compromise figure since his entry into office, still figures as a potential candidate, thanks to his skilled balancing act between the Unites States and Iran.

The stability of Iraq remains essential for easing tensions in its complicated neighbourhood, particularly given the country’s recent role as a bridge between Iran and Saudi Arabia of late, where it provided a venue for direct talks. In its reaction to the results, the Iranian Foreign Ministry – for want of a more substantial statement – only said “Iraq is on the right road to democracy”. But few missed the irony of a statement coming from a country that recently disqualified most position candidates from its own presidential election.

Iraq’s political process is imperfect, and its recent election showed that the cleavages in its society still exist. But while the polls did not bring wholesale change, the process is miles ahead of anything else in its neighbourhood, Israel aside, and can be an inspiration to others.

Image caption: Supporters of Iraq’s influential Shi’i cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr celebrate in Baghdad’s Tahrir square on 11 October 2021. His political movement said it had retained the biggest share of seats in the country’s parliament, after elections with a record-low voter turnout. Photo by AHMAD AL-RUBAYE / AFP.

About the Author

Dr Gyorgy Busztin is Visiting Research Professor at the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore.

A career diplomat and an academic, he served, between 2001 and 2011, as Hungary’s ambassador to Indonesia and subsequently, Iran. In 2011, Dr Busztin was appointed deputy envoy of the United Nations in Iraq, responsible for the political, analytical, electoral and constitutional support components of the UN’s mission in Iraq. He served at the level of assistant secretary-general until October 2017.

Dr Busztin holds a degree in Arabic history from Damascus University, Syria and a Doctorate in Arabic language and Semitic philology from Lorand Eotvos University in Hungary. In addition to his native Hungarian, he speaks English, French, Arabic, Farsi/Dari (Persian), Malay (Indonesian) and Russian. He believes strongly in political and intercultural dialogue and has engaged leading politicians, intellectuals, religious leaders and representatives of civil society.