Series Introduction

Israel–Asia Relations: New Trends, Old Challenges?

Much of the scholarship on Israel’s foreign policy focuses on its relations with countries in the West or with its Arab neighbours; the significant rapprochement between Israel and countries in Asia has been largely neglected. There have been many indicators in the past decade pointing to these burgeoning ties – from China’s involvement in Israel’s infrastructure (in particular, Haifa port), the rise of Israel–India economic and security cooperation, and the expanding trade between Israel and Indonesia to the recent establishment of a new quadrilateral forum, the “I2U2”, comprising India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States.

Against the backdrop of these burgeoning relationships, the Middle East Institute at NUS convened a two–day workshop in February 2023 gathering together scholars from across the world – including Israel, China, the United States, Turkey, Indonesia, France and Singapore – to explore the depth of Israel’s partnerships across Asia. The seminar delved into the political and economic drivers of these relationships as well as their scope (and limitations). Particularly, it discussed the evolution of Israel’s policy towards China, India and Japan. It also looked into lesser known areas, such as Israel–Azerbaijan relations and the development of Holocaust studies in China. Altogether, the seminar shed light on a research topic – Israel’s Asia policy – that is likely to expand in the coming years. This is the first of the papers based on the seminar.

 

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By Wang Zhen*

 

Sino-Israeli relations have been at a new crossroads in recent years. With the intensification of concerns in the West over the rise of China, the debate around the future of Sino-Israeli relations has resurfaced. Concerns about the impact that the continued deterioration of US-China relations will have on Sino-Israeli relations are increasing. This article attempts to analyse the main factors that affect the Sino-Israeli relationship and how it is likely to develop in the future.

 

The History of Sino-Israeli Relations and New Worries

The presence of Jews in China can be traced back to the period of the Tang and Song dynasties.[1] When the state of Israel was founded, China was still in the throes of a civil war. Some Jewish communities from Shanghai, Tianjin, Harbin and Hong Kong welcomed the establishment of Israel and migrated to the new state. However, interactions between China and Israel did not take place until after the founding of Communist China in 1949.

Sino-Israeli relations can be broadly divided into two periods. The 1949–1991 period was the first stage in the development of Sino-Israeli relations and can be referred to as the pre–diplomatic relations period or the Cold War period. During the Cold War, China and Israel had some exchanges but did not establish formal diplomatic relations. The 1992–2018 period, which can be referred to as the post–diplomatic relations period or post-Cold War period, marks the second stage in the development of Sino-Israeli relations. After 1992, the development of Sino-Israeli relations entered a fast track, with a significant increase in mutual trust and economic exchanges between the two sides. In early 2017, on the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, the two countries decided to establish a “comprehensive partnership for innovation”, a new positioning that pushed the development of relations between the two countries to a peak.[2]

Since 2018, however, some worrying new signs have begun to emerge in the bilateral relationship. The US-China relationship has entered a period of instability as the United States begins to regard China as a “strategic competitor”, or “near-peer competitor”, and US foreign strategy returns to great power competition.[3] At the end of 2019, the Israeli government established a new oversight panel to review the security implications of foreign investment proposals, with Chinese investment undoubtedly being the most targeted. In June 2021, Israel and several Western countries voted in the UN Human Rights Council to condemn the “human rights violation” in Xinjiang, China, and criticism and accusations of China in the Israeli media began to increase. Simultaneously, at the United Nations and other international venues China stepped up the tone of its support for the Palestinian cause.

The year 2022 marked the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Israel. Although both sides have celebrated this in different ways, their honouring of the anniversary has not dispelled worries in strategic circles in both countries about the future of the bilateral relationship. Some Israeli experts have even asserted that economic cooperation between China and Israel has passed its peak.[4] These views broadly comprise three types. The first one is that the United States and Israel must work together to address the “growing Chinese threat” and not allow China to become a “wedge” in the US-Israeli partnership.[5] The second one involves the belief that Israel and the United States do not share the same views and interests on China, and that “there is no old, negative historical baggage between the two countries [Israel and China] as there is between the United States and China”. Therefore, “it is not wise for Israel to openly join the fight between the two giants now.”[6] The third view is that “surrendering to American dictates will only lead to continued pressure”, so Israel must adopt a foreign policy of “delicate balance”, which involves “developing its economic and technological partnership with China while maintaining a security partnership with the United States.”[7]

 

Key Variables Affecting Sino-Israeli Relations

Yitzhak Shichor argues that the development of Sino-Israeli relations depends on three main variables, namely, China’s economic growth, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Sino-American relations.[8] This paper argues that the international environment, economic interests, geopolitics, third countries and mutual perceptions all play an important role in the development of bilateral relations.

The international environment. Among the features of the current international environment two are most relevant and important here. The first is the resurgence of the cold war mentality. As the strategic competition between China and the United States intensifies, the number of voices in the United States advocating a new cold war against China is increasing. Although the Biden administration has repeatedly told China that the US government does not seek a new cold war with China, the United States is increasingly approaching an economic, technological and military containment of China, similar to its Cold War containment of the Soviet Union. This re-alignment of the international community will inevitably force Israel to choose sides and create new constraints on Israel’s relations with China.

The second feature is the stagnation and retrogression of globalisation, which has been the subject of much debate since the outbreak of the financial crisis in the West in 2008. As some scholars have argued, “the myth of a world without borders has collapsed”, and Western countries that used to advocate free trade and globalisation have started to adopt trade protectionism, while China has become the staunchest defender of globalisation.[9] Under the impact of anti-globalisation, countries have become more concerned with what they consider their national security, geopolitics and industrial autonomy. Traditional international industrial chains are being reorganised and commercial cooperation based on the market mechanism is now facing increasing uncertainty.

Economic interests. At the start of Sino-Israeli diplomatic relations in 1992, trade between the two countries amounted to only US$51.47 million; by 2021 it had increased by more than 400 times to US$22.8 billion, and China is now Israel’s top trading country in Asia and its second largest in the world.[10] The two countries are currently working towards a free trade agreement. Trade between the two countries has three characteristics. First, there have never been any political preconditions for bilateral economic cooperation, and there is no hostility among Chinese citizens towards Israeli citizens and Israeli products arising from anti-Semitism or other prejudices. Second, the two countries’ economies are highly complementary.[11] Many Israeli hi-tech companies are known for their research and development capabilities but need large markets for profitability and sustainability, and the Chinese market is where demand for hi-tech products is largest in the world currently. Third, for Israel, which lacks oil and gas resources, economic cooperation in other areas may provide a lever to influence China’s Middle East policy.

But there are two sources of uncertainty revolving around economic factors that could affect cooperation between the two countries. The first is whether China’s economic growth will continue into the future. The second is whether the future restructuring of international industrial chains will reduce the potential for economic cooperation between the two countries.

Geopolitics. Although China has always stated that it has no intention of getting involved in the geopolitical competition in the Middle East, China’s influence in the region is an undeniable reality. Whether or not China intends to intervene in regional conflicts, its position as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations is crucial in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other Middle East flashpoints where Israeli interests are at stake. Since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Israel’s strategic environment has improved as its relations with the Gulf Arab states have eased considerably. However, with the United States gradually withdrawing from the Middle East, the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, which has been dominated by the United States since the Cold War, is changing, and China is playing an increasing role in the economic development of the region and regional governance. China’s relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia continue to have an indirect impact on Israel. The economic interdependence that has emerged between China and Iran and between China and Saudi Arabia gives Beijing the leverage to intervene in regional affairs, as we have seen in the recent rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Third country or external factors. The interference of third country factors in Sino-Israeli relations is manifested on two levels. For Israel, the third country factor comes mainly from the United States. As a non-NATO ally of the United States, Israel is heavily dependent on the United States for its national security and international strategy, thus Israel’s independence in pursuing a China policy is limited. For China, the external factor that influences its policy towards Israel comes primarily from its policy toward the Arab-Islamic countries. However, unlike the direct US pressure on Israel, China’s policy constraints stem from its own long-standing commitment towards and support for Palestine, on the one hand, and its “balanced diplomacy” in the region, on the other, which involves refusing to support one side against the other in regional affairs. US pressure, which has had a negative impact on Sino-Israeli economic cooperation and investment confidence, has generated debate within Israel about its policy towards China. In contrast, China has not changed its policy of balancing between Israel and the Arab-Islamic countries thus far. However, it is not clear whether China will abandon its existing balanced diplomacy in the future should Israel choose to follow the United States in its containment policy towards China or follow the West on issues such as Taiwan and Xinjiang, which involve China’s core interests.

Historical heritage and mutual perceptions. China is among the few countries that have never in their histories produced home-grown anti-Semitism, so the Chinese have little historical baggage when it comes to Jewish issues. Besides, the discovery of the Jewish community in Kaifeng in modern times, as well as Chinese diplomat Dr. Fengshan Ho’s issuing of life-saving visas for thousands of Jews during the Second World War and rescue of Jewish refugees in Shanghai, has helped to shape a positive image of China among Israeli and global Jewry. However, the Israeli media, which is heavily influenced by Western discourse, has shown a marked increase in negative coverage of China in recent years. Furthermore, some Israeli media have even questioned the historical fact that Jews had taken refuge in Shanghai during the Second World War.[12] For its part, the Chinese media have also shown a serious split in commentary and perceptions of Israel revolving around Israel’s Palestinian policy and other issues.

 

Three Scenarios for the Future of Sino-Israeli Relations

Sino-Israeli relations are at a new crossroads today, in large part because the variables on which the relationship has developed over the previous three decades are changing. By analysing the variables above, we may be able to outline three scenarios for the future development of bilateral relations.

Scenario 1. Maintaining the current positive momentum

According to this scenario, amid the current international environment and geopolitical changes, if China and Israel can continue to deepen the current high level of political trust, they can maintain the existing momentum of expanding trade and economic ties and develop their cooperation based on market rules and economic interests.

However, maintaining this momentum is becoming increasingly difficult. Firstly, with the growing tensions between the United States and China, the Israeli strategic community’s confidence in the development of Sino-Israeli relations has clearly declined and calls for taking sides between the United States and China are on the rise. Secondly, Sino-Israeli cooperation in the hi-tech sector is under pressure as the United States intensifies its siege of China’s hi-tech industries. In fact, Chinese hi-tech investment in Israel has been on a downward trend since 2018. If the United States and Israel intensify their scrutiny of Chinese investments in Israeli infrastructure, investments by Chinese companies in Israel’s major infrastructure may decrease further in the future. Finally, with the United States renewing its great power competition globally, the strategic competition between China and the United States in the Middle East may intensify in the future, and the room for tacit understanding and cooperation between China and Israel on regional issues in the Middle East will be further circumscribed.

Scenario 2. Gradually drifting apart and entering a new lull or even a freeze

Following from scenario 1, political contacts between the two countries will be reduced, but economic contacts will be maintained. If Israel clearly sides with United States, it is bound to adhere to the latter’s approach on issues that concern China’s core interests, so Sino-Israeli bilateral relations will soon enter a period of mutual estrangement and apathy.

In such circumstances, high-level visits and strategic trust will rapidly decline. However, economic contacts between the two sides will remain although trade and investment will probably be stagnant for a long time. This is because, firstly, it is unthinkable for economic contacts to be completely disrupted between the two countries when the process of globalisation has not yet completely disappeared. Secondly, China is now opening up to the outside world with greater vigour, and the opportunities that its huge market presents are too great for any country, including Israel, to ignore. Thirdly, while the United States will continue to put pressure on Israel to fully decouple from China, it can hardly ask an ally to do something that it cannot do itself. Finally, there are a large number of civilian hi-tech areas outside the realm of the so-called dual-use ones that have military potential and draw US concern. Thus, even in the most extreme cases, there is still room for continued cooperation between Israel and China. However, since cooperating in such sectors would entail heavy investment in research and development and long-term commitments, which would be contingent on a high level of political and strategic trust, Chinese investments in Israel and bilateral trade could stagnate if Israel decides to explicitly side with the United States.

Scenario 3. Freezing of relations or even a plunge into a new confrontation

For the time being, the possibility of such a scenario materialising is very limited, but the prospects have not disappeared. While China and Israel have no direct conflict of interests or desire to engage in direct confrontation, one cannot rule out future developments in the international situation that could cause bilateral relations to spiral out of control. There is no shortage of such precedents in their bilateral relationship during the Cold War period. If the United States is determined to launch a new global cold war against China, and if Israel is determined to follow the US lead in efforts to contain and suppress China, the uncertainty in future Sino-Israeli bilateral relations is bound to increase significantly. As the current US policy towards China is characterised by, in the words of Joseph Nye, “exaggerated fear”, “hysteria” and “overreaction”,[13] China may be forced to adopt more realistic responses in the future. And, in the event of a major international conflict or confrontation between the United States and China in a camp-oriented international society, it will become increasingly difficult for Israel to maintain a balanced policy.

How Can China and Israel Maintain Their Bilateral Relations?

Due to the factors mentioned above, there is increasing pressure on China and Israel to maintain the first scenario; the prospects for further deepening bilateral relations in the short term are relatively limited. However, unless there is a major international conflict soon that would change the external environment for both countries, the possibility of the third scenario materialising – i.e., a complete freeze or confrontation between the two countries – is also limited. Thus, bilateral relations are more likely to enter a new period of lull in the foreseeable future, with the two countries maintaining pragmatic economic and political engagement despite increasing friction.

What can the two countries do for the development of bilateral relations in the current environment?

For Israel, the most immediate and realistic question that needs to be answered is: does Israel have to choose sides between China and the United States? Although Israel is heavily dependent on the United States for its security and defence strategy, this does not mean that it must take sides between the United States and China. Firstly, the current US containment policy towards China goes far beyond traditional great power competition. The US restrictions on China in the field of hi-tech are neither consistent with the laws of a market economy nor related to the free trade principles that the United States has always touted; the essence of the policy choices facing Israel is whether the West will allow a non-Western developing country to rise in a peaceful manner. The competition between the United States and China will be a long-lasting strategic competition, and it may not be wise to choose sides prematurely, certainly not only at the expense of Israel’s own interests. Secondly, Israel, together with China, needs to learn from the history of their bilateral relations. There has never been any direct conflict of interests between China and Israel, and the relationship is largely due to the ability of the leaders of both countries to put aside ideology and engage in dialogue and cooperation in a pragmatic manner. Finally, the Israeli strategic community needs to develop a genuine understanding of Chinese traditions and culture and be more strategic and innovative in its approach to China. The Israeli media and strategic community need to move away from total dependence on Western media coverage and information about China, which is highly selective and misleading and does not reflect realities in China. Some scholars have already pointed out that the United States is pursuing a deliberate “coordinated media campaign” against China, which they refer to as “propaganda fog”.[14] In this regard, the Israeli media and strategic community needs more direct access to information in Chinese and a genuine understanding of Chinese society and culture.

For China, it is necessary to address the realistic question of what kind of Middle East policy it is prepared to adopt in the changing international environment. Firstly, China’s Middle East policy, like that of Israel’s, requires more strategic innovation in response to the changing international environment. If China abandons its steady, pragmatic stance under Western siege and pressure and moves away from its traditional balanced diplomacy in this region, some countries will inevitably join the US-led anti-China camp. Secondly, China should not only refrain from standing in the way of Middle Eastern countries taking sides between the United States and itself, if they so desire, but should also respect their strategic autonomy and choices if such choices do not endanger China’s core interests. Finally, China needs to explore more actively how it can turn its existing influence into a positive force for regional affairs. At present, China’s influence in the Middle East is largely confined to the economic sphere, and it still adheres to the principle of non-interference in regional political and security affairs. As expectations of China’s involvement in regional affairs grow, China needs to adopt a more proactive approach to regional affairs, while avoiding the mistakes of Western colonialism and hegemonic ambitions. 

 

*   Dr Wang Zhen, a Research Professor of International Relations at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) and Deputy Dean of the Center for Jewish Studies in Shanghai (CJSS), has conducted research as a visitor at Tel Aviv University in Israel, the Woodrow Wilson Center and Harvard Yenching Institute (HYI) in the United States. He is the author of, among other publications, Nuclear Diplomacy of a Superpower: A Study of US Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Toward Israel, India, and China’s Taiwan (Beijing, 2013) and A New Theory on the Global Counter-terror War (Beijing, 2018), and chief editor of Country Studies of BRI: Israel (Beijing, 2021) .

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the institution to which he is affiliated.

 

Image: The Institute for National Security Studies

 

End Notes

[1] Wang Zhen, ed., Country Studies of BRI: Israel (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2021), pp. 424–425.

[2] “Joint Declaration of the People’s Republic of China and the State of Israel on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Partnership for Innovation”，Xinhua News Agency, 21 March 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-03/21/c_1120668765.htm

[3] The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p. 45; The White House, The National Security Strategy (NSS), October 2022, pp. 11–12, 23–25; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, 9 April 2021; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, 7 February 2022.

[4] Assaf Orion, “No, Israel Isn’t Falling into China’s Orbit”, Mosaic, 6 September 2022; Galia Lavi, “China and National Infrastructure in Israel: Past the Peak”, Strategic Assessment 25, no. 2 (July 2022); Ehud Eilam, “Israel and China: The Bloom Is off the Rose”, Middle East Institute, 1 December 2022. https://www.mei.edu/publications/israel-and-china-bloom-rose.

[5] Yaacov Ayish, “Israel Must Partner with US in Power Competition with China”, The Jerusalem Post, 6 October 2020; Michael Makovsky and Yaacov Ayish, “Israel, US Must Confront China Threat”, The Jerusalem Post, 16 March 2021; Assaf Orion, “No, Israel Isn’t Falling into China’s Orbit”.

[6] Shalom Salomon Wald, “Must Israel ‘Support Washington to Face Down Beijing?’”, The Jerusalem Post, 28 October 2020; Shalom Salomon Wald, “China, the American Challenge and the Implications for Israel and the Jewish People”, The Jewish People Policy Institute, 14 September 2021. https://jppi.org.il/en/article.

[7] Mordechai Chaziza, “Israel-China Relations in an Era of Strategic Rivalry and Great Power Competition”, Strategic Assessment 25, no. 2 (July 2022), pp.34–35.

[8] Yitzhak Shichor, “On Probation: The Open-Ended Future of Sino-Israeli Relations”, Middle East Institute，5 September 2014, https://www.mei.edu/publications/probation-open-ended-future-sino-israeli-relations.

[9] Pankaj Ghemawat, “Globalization in the Age of Trump”, Harvard Business Review, July/August 2017, pp.112–123.

[10] Peng Dawei, “China-Israel trade reaches $22.8 billion by 2021”, China News Agency    (中国新闻社), 24 January 2022, https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cj/2022/01-25/9661006.shtml.

[11] Institute of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce, China, Economic and Commercial Department of the Chinese Embassy in Israel; and Department of Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce, China, Country (Region) Guide to Outward Investment Cooperation: Israel (2021 Edition), January 2020, pp 20–21, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/gbdqzn/upload/yiselie.pdf.

[12] Jerusalem Post Editorial, “China has proven to be a bad actor; we owe them nothing”, The Jerusalem Post, 19 August 2020.

[13] Joseph S. Nye，”What Could Cause a US-China War?” The Project Syndicate, 2 March 2021,

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/what-could-cause-us-china-war-by-joseph-s-nye-2021-03; Joseph S. Nye, “Between Complacency and Hysteria”, The China-US Focus, 18 January 2019, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/between-complacency-and-hysteria.

[14] Shalom Salomon Wald, “Must Israel ‘support Washington to face down Beijing?’”; Shalom Salomon Wald, “China, the American Challenge and the Implications for Israel and the Jewish People”; Graphika, Unheard Voice, Evaluating Five Years of Pro-Western covert Influence Operations, Stanford Internet Observatory, 24 August 2022.