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Editor’s Introduction

Covering a variety of climate zones and natural ecosystems ranging from arid deserts to forests and rivers, the Middle East is one of the world’s most vulnerable regions to the impacts of climate change. Over the past three decades, temperatures in the region have risen by 1.5^oC — twice the global increase of 0.7^oC^[1] — and climate models for the region until the end of the century estimate a continuous rise.^[2] The region has already witnessed some of the world’s highest recorded temperatures: 54^oC in Kuwait and 53.9^oC. in Basra, Iraq, both in the same week in July 2016. Rainfall in the region has become more variable and climate disasters such as droughts and floods more frequent.^[3] Extreme weather events such as cyclones and dust storms have increased in frequency and intensity.^[4] Examples of cyclones include Guno (2007), Chapala (2015), Sagar (2018), Gati (2020) and Shaheen (2021).

Climate change poses serious threats to lives and livelihoods and the prosperity of the region. While cyclones and flash floods have caused death and destruction, dust storms and extreme heat have had health effects. Rising temperatures and extended periods of drought have exacerbated water shortages in a region whose population is fast expanding. Water shortages, the continued desertification of a region that is already characterised by vast deserts, and relentless urbanisation are threatening the viability of the agriculture sector and adding to the region’s food security challenges. Meanwhile, sea-level rises and acidification threaten the fisheries sector and the resilience of coastal settlements.

Many of the impacts of climate change are transboundary in nature — that is, climate impacts in one country could exacerbate risks in others, especially given the variance between Middle East countries in terms of natural resource endowments and socio-economic conditions.[5] Examples of negative transboundary climate effects in the region include:

• Spread of diseases. In a region that already suffers from extreme temperatures, even a small rise in temperature could expand the geographical spread of carriers of malaria, yellow fever, dengue fever, and other vector-borne diseases.[6]
• Desertification. Increases in average temperatures, decreased annual precipitation, recurrent droughts and water stresses are causing additional stress to biodiversity and leading to accelerated desertification, that is, the degradation of land, leading to reduced productivity. The Empty Quarter desert (or Rub’ al Khali), which straddles across Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE and Yemen, is one example of a vast swathe of land that is suffering from expanded desertification. Similar impacts are expected in the Sahara Desert, which covers about 31% of Africa.[7]
• Deforestation. Home to 12% of forests in the Middle East region, Sudan, Somalia, Egypt, and Djibouti are faced with the challenge of forest and biodiversity loss due to a combination of thermal and water stresses.[8]
• Coastal ecosystems. The 22,105 km-long coastlines of the Middle East face high risks from projected sea-level rise, saltwater intrusion and loss of agricultural land and wetlands, which can in turn have negative impacts on the fisheries sector in addition to the human displacement and infrastructural damages arising from floods.[9]
• Forced migration. Climate change is particularly challenging for weak states and countries in conflict as it can worsen conditions on the ground, leading to further instability as well as forced migration.
• Tensions over water and other shared natural resources. The Middle East is the world’s most water-stressed region, possessing only 1% of the world’s total renewable freshwater resources.[10] Over 66% of freshwater resources in the Arab states originate from outside national borders and 14 out of 22 Arab states share a surface–water body.[11] Extreme climate conditions, such as increased heat and evaporation, present additional stresses on shared water resources. Consequently, there is concern that climate change and growing water scarcity may act as a catalyst for conflict within and between nations that share hydrological resources. A notable example involves the Tigris and Euphrates river system, where Turkey and Iran control much of the water flow into Syria and Iraq.[12]

 

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The 27th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will take place in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, from 6 to 18 November 2022. COP 26, held last year in Glasgow under the UK presidency, marked the finalisation and adoption of the Paris Agreement Rulebook, comprising operational guidelines to execute the goals set in the 2015 Paris Agreement, the international treaty on climate change. COP 27 will therefore focus primarily on implementation and show how nations will put the Paris Agreement into practice in light of the growing urgency of the need for climate action. In other words, COP 27 will play a critical role in addressing the gaps in the implementation of the goals of the Paris Agreement by continuing the global stocktake started at the previous COP.

Egypt’s hosting of COP 27 provides an opportunity for Egypt and the wider Middle East region to better convey climate concerns that reflect their unique climate challenges and national circumstances as well as explore the possibility of advancing national, regional and global climate action on all fronts: mitigation, adaptation, finance and dealing with extreme weather events. By the time of writing, 17 Middle East countries had submitted updated or new nationally determined contributions (NDCs),[13] which are a main component of the Paris Agreement through which parties communicate to the UNFCCC their efforts to reduce national emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change. These countries are: Bahrain, Comoros, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia and the UAE. Additionally, four countries in the region have announced a mid-century net-zero target: Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, making pledges is one thing; transforming them into operational policies is another.

The Middle East region has hosted three COPs before: in Morocco (COP 7, in 2001, and COP 22, in 2016) and in Qatar (COP 18, in 2012). Will COP 27 in Egypt and COP 28, which is to be hosted by the UAE in 2023, differ from previous COPs in significantly pushing for tangible climate action in the region?

This volume of Insights aims to address this question by shedding light on key climate threats faced by countries in the region, examining the current state of climate action in mitigating and adapting to climate change, highlighting the implementation gaps in areas such as water, energy, tourism and finance, and offering possible solutions. It also aims to identify avenues for countries of the region to voice their regional climate concerns and interests at COP 27.

 

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Climate Change Adaptation in the GCC

The first article (p. 11), by Tanzeed Alam and Leela Evans, sheds light on the current state of implementing climate adaptation measures in the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — where approximately 90% of the population live in capital cities or other urban areas, most of which are located along the coast. It highlights the importance of identifying and addressing climate risks and opportunities in urban areas and cities characterised by high concentrations of buildings, roads, infrastructure and industry, with high exposure to climate change hazards such as rising temperatures, flooding, water scarcity, and climate-related public health issues.

The article finds that while the GCC countries all mention adaptation in their NDCs, there is little evidence to show that their pledges have been translated into national adaptation planning processes or city-level plans, nor is there evidence of nature-based solutions (NbS) being incorporated into climate change or urban plans. There is also no publicly available information about the status of investment in adaptation measures. This lack of implementation may be a reflection of the low priority accorded to climate change adaptation, compared with mitigation measures and other issues for these countries. The article concludes with some recommendations that policymakers at national, mayoral or municipality levels can consider in trying to bridge identified implementation gaps.

 

Climate Finance in the MENA Region

The second article (p. 27), by Mustafa Bayoumi, examines the current state of climate finance in the Middle East and North Africa region, identifying the financing gaps, barriers and opportunities for countries in the region.

The article notes that the estimated climate finance requirements for the region will range between US$436 billion and US$478 billion by the year 2030. Yet, climate finance flows to the region are estimated at only US$5.1–7.4 billion a year. Further, despite the dire need to invest in climate adaptation projects, it is climate mitigation that has been receiving the lion’s share of climate finance in the region, with 3.5 times more public international climate finance going to projects such as renewable energy. The region receives only 6% of international public finance flows for adaptation measures. Additionally, the paucity of finance flows is not the only challenge that these countries face. Many still face access barriers to climate funds and slow disbursements of approved funds. Finance flows to the region are concentrated in a few countries, although needs are identified across many countries within the region, particularly in the less developed countries (LDCs) and fragile states. Lastly, loans remain the dominant form of climate finance flows, whereas more concessional instruments and grants are what these countries require to meet their adaptation needs.

In light of the widening current account deficits and public debt since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, equivalent to 60% of the region’s GDP, the author suggests two debt instruments that can serve as ideal sources of funding for climate action in the region: (i) debt-for-climate swaps (financial instruments that reduce a developing country’s debt stock or debt service in exchange for commitments on or investments in national climate adaptation and mitigation programmes) and (ii) green bonds (a type of debt financing instrument that is issued by national, regional or multinational public entities as well as private corporations to raise capital specifically to support climate-related or environmental projects) as well as green sukuk, which are similar to green bonds, except that they are shari’a compliant.

 

The Water Sector in the GCC Countries

In the third article (p. 37), Waleed K. Al-Zubari and Suzan M. Alajjawi discuss the impacts of climate change on the water sector in the GCC countries and outline the adaptation measures the various governments have proposed to adopt. The article attempts to identify key gaps in these measures as well as key opportunities for a sustainable water management system in the GCC.

The authors show that climate change is expected to act as an additional stress on the already heavily stressed water sector in the GCC countries due to rapid population and urbanisation growth, agricultural policies, inefficient management and irrational consumption patterns. The main anticipated climate change impacts are the reduction in surface runoff and groundwater recharge due to an overall reduction in precipitation, a deterioration in coastal groundwater quality due to seawater intrusion, increases in water demands in the agricultural and domestic sectors due to temperature increases, and growing frequency of destructive events (mainly flash floods) due to increases in extreme rainfall events.

The authors note that desalination is expected to play an ever-increasing role in the water supply portfolio in the region. But they caution that desalination will add to the costs of producing water as countries will have to increasingly invest in more energy-efficient and renewable forms of desalination technologies in order to meet their emissions targets under the Paris Agreement. The authors conclude by emphasising the importance of shifting focus from the current supply-side approach in managing water needs to a demand-side approach so that the GCC countries can address both the financial and environmental costs of producing water.

Tourist Bubbles and Climate Change

In the fourth article (p. 53), Manuela Gutberlet outlines tourism’s contribution to the GCC economies and analyses its impacts on climate change and local communities. The author argues that the profit motive and aggressive marketing campaigns of tourist destinations in the region have resulted in overtourism, creating tensions with communities who suffer the various consequences of tourism. Mega-tourism developments, in particular, have led to the creation of “tourist bubbles”, which are “enclosed, insular, self-contained spaces that offer exclusive club-like luxury infrastructure for tourists and not only promise an escape from the pressures of their everyday lives but also shield [tourists] from the harsh realities of the host society by creating a constructed authenticity”.

The author cautions that the tourism industry’s long-term costs of increased carbon emissions and their effects on climate change and societies may outweigh the short-term gains from tourism for the inhabitants of the GCC region. Noting that the sustainability of tourist destinations depends highly on the quality of environmental resources, favourable weather conditions and resilient communities, the author calls for developing regenerative tourism and community-based tourism. The article concludes by stressing that the mitigation of, and adaptation to, the impacts of climate change should be considered the top priority for everyone involved in the tourism sector.

 

Towards a “Net Zero” Saudi Arabia

Jim Krane, in the fifth article (p. 65), envisions the steps and challenges involved in Saudi Arabia’s pledged transition from its current state of emissions intensity to net-zero emissions by 2060, which for the hydrocarbons rich state represents a new policy direction.

The author argues that due to overwhelming financial dependence upon oil — oil revenues continue to contribute roughly a quarter of the Saudi GDP and 80% of the national budget — Saudi Arabia seeks to shape its decarbonisation efforts in ways that work towards its competitive advantage. For one, Saudi policymakers predict that human needs in transport and plastics will support oil production over the long term, although at lower levels than today. Second, the kingdom’s emissions from oil production are already among the world’s lowest and Saudi Aramco aims to reduce them further. And, third, Saudi oil should gain a larger share of the future global market due to its cost and emissions advantages.

The article suggests that the carbon intensity of the Saudi economy presents policymakers with a number of inexpensive and effective ways to reduce emissions while improving economic competitiveness. Chief among these is a reduction in oil use, which can begin with increases in energy prices through cuts in subsidies, and subsequent improvements in efficiency, followed by steps to decarbonise the power sector and transport. Decarbonising the industrial sector and oil and gas would require a combination of alternative fuels, carbon capture and storage (CCS), and elimination of methane emissions.

 

Building Resilience to Extreme Weather Events in Oman

The last article (p. 82), by Suad Al-Manji, focuses on the case of Oman as a regional example of how countries deal with extreme weather events.

Being highly vulnerable to extreme weather events and having already lost millions of dollars because of tropical cyclones and dangerous flash floods, Oman began to develop a national emergency management system in 1988. Following several iterations, the system has since evolved into the National Centre for Emergency Management (NCEM), which has working groups that represent various government bodies and non-governmental organisations. However, the author notes that the NCEM is more reactive than proactive, meaning that it has not planned for extreme scenarios and has a higher chance of failure during such events. In addition, as has been the experience with most interagency bodies across the world, the NCEM is saddled with various governance issues, such as lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of its various working groups and insufficient communication among them. Accordingly, the author puts forward suggestions for overcoming some of these shortcomings and enhancing resilience. 

 

 

Aisha Al-Sarihi

Research Fellow

Middle East Institute, NUS

 

 

Image Caption: Haze obscuring the Dubai skyline during a dust storm on 25 May 2022. Giuseppe Cacace/AFP.

 

End Notes

[1] V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, A. Pirani, S.L. Connors, C. Péan, S. Berger, N. Caud, et al., (eds.), IPCC, 2021: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, In Press, 2021).

[2] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) et al., “RICCAR Arab Climate Change Assessment Report — Executive Summary”, 2017, https://www.unescwa.org/publications/riccar-arab-climate-change-assessment-report.

[3] Jihad Azour and Christoph Duenwald, “Without Adaptation, Middle East and Central Asia Face Crippling Climate Losses”, IMF Blog, 2022, https://blogs.imf.org/2022/03/30/without-adaptation-middle-east-and-central-asia-face-crippling-climate-losses/.

[4] See, for example, A. T. Evan, and S. J. Camargo, “A Climatology of Arabian Sea Cyclonic Storms”, Journal of Climate 24 (2011); M. Deshpande, V. K. Singh, M. K. Ganadhi, et al., “Changing Status of Tropical Cyclones over the North Indian Ocean”, Climate Dynamics 57 (2021): 3545–3567, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-021-05880-z; S. Al-Manji, G. Mitchell, and A. A. Ruheili, “Arabian Sea Tropical Cyclones: A Spatio-Temporal Analysis in Support of Natural Hazard Risk Appraisal in Oman”, in Agrometeorology, ed. R. S. Meena (IntechOpen, 2021).

[5] Aisha Al-Sarihi and Mari Luomi,”Climate Change Governance and Cooperation in the Arab Region”, EDA Insight: New Governance for the Environment in the Arab Region Series, Emirates Diplomatic Academy, 2019.

[6] Balgis Osman Elasha, “Mapping of Climate Change Threats and Human Development Impacts in the Arab Region”, UNDP-RBAS, 2010.

[7] Balgis Osman Elasha, “Mapping of Climate Change Threats”.

[8] FAO, “Forests and Climate Change in the Near East Region”, Forests and Climate Change, Working Paper 9, 2010.

[9] Mohamed El-Raey, “Impact of Climate Change: Vulnerability and Adaptation — Coastal Areas”, in Impact of Climate Change on Arab Countries, eds. Mostafa K. Tolba and Najib W. Saab (AFED, 2009).

[10] World Resource Institute, “Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas”, World Resource Institute, 2022, https://www.wri.org/applications/aqueduct/country-rankings/.

[11] ESCWA et al., “RICCAR Arab Climate Change Assessment Report”.

[12] Aisha Al-Sarihi, “Long Ignored, Climate Change Emerges as Potent Threat to Middle East Security”< Middle East Perspectives No. 24, Middle East Institute, NUS, 12 August 2022”, https://mei.nus.edu.sg/publication/mei-perspectives-24-long-ignored-climate-change-emerges-as-potent-threat-to-middle-east-security/

[13] UNFCCC, NDC Registry, https://unfccc.int/NDCREG.