Abstract

In this episode, Ms Meia Nouwens discusses artificial intelligence and boots on the ground. Are the Chinese private security companies the new ambassador for Chinese surveillance technologies?

This podcast series is presented by Dr Alessandro Arduino, Principal Research Fellow at the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore.

Listen to the full podcast here:

Full Transcript:

[Alessandro Arduino]: Welcome to the 27th episode of the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute’s podcast series Boots Off the Ground: Security in Transition from the Middle East and Beyond. In this series, we look at the future of warfare which will see uniformed soldiers, or boots on the ground, being replaced by private military companies, autonomous weapon systems and cyber weapons. I am Alessandro Arduino, your host, and we are very glad to have with us today Meia Nouwens Senior Fellow for Chinese Defence Policy and Military Modernisation at IISS.

Meia’s expertise lies in Chinese cross-service defence analysis, China’s defence industry and innovation, as well as China’s regional strategic affairs and international relations. She is a co-lead of the China Security Project with the Mercator Institute for China Studies and leads IISS research on China’s Digital Silk Road. Thank you for joining us today, Meia!

[Meia Nouwens]: Thanks. It’s great to be here.

[Alessandro Arduino]: You are wearing several hats regarding China’s security today. I would love to concentrate on two parts. First I’m talking about private security and secondly about China Digital Silk Road. Starting with DSR can you present to our audience the evolution of the DSR, especially in the MENA region.

[Meia Nouwens]: The Digital Silk Road is often seen as a sub-branch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative Project. I argue, however, that it’s something quite separate from it. That it’s almost taken on a life of its own. If you think of the Belt and Road initiative that started around 2012 – 2013 and is expanded since, the digital Silk Road is something that came online quite late. 2015 is the first time that we see this really formalized in any official policy speech. And actually, when we think about, the way that the Belt and Road initiative is structured in terms of policy documents and visions, and strategies, actually, when it comes to the Digital Silk Road, we don’t have any of that type of documentation is basically just a rollout of Chinese digital infrastructure services and companies globally. It across all different layers of the technology stack from the hardwire: think of telecommunications networks in countries, submarine cables all the way through platforms and services to the top think of things like data centers. Think of things like FinTech solutions, ecommerce solutions, but also of course, notably security related platforms and services. These are anything that ties data and networks to law enforcement services that governments would normally be in control of. So, we have an expanse of this throughout the digital Silk Road. Firstly, it started in China’s own neighborhood. After, Southeast Asia was as a prime location, and then it expanded outwards to the Middle East Africa or even Latin America and of course, also predominantly in Europe as well. Therefore, there’s this entanglement of Chinese technology and Chinese companies in our digital economies around the world. And this is, of course, no exception for the Middle East where we’ve seen this proliferation of Chinese activity in the digital sphere. ranging across the tech stack, as I said, countries looking to China in the Middle East for 5G Network Solutions, and notably, they have not pushed back to the integration of always 5G networks and national networks in the Middle East or North Africa. Also, we see some real sensitive areas of the digital economy being led by Chinese companies in the Middle East, North Africa, things that have to do with personal data with Smart City platforms that link cameras. And sensors to national government or company hubs. And all of this, I think, is really integrating China into the digital networks of these countries.

[Alessandro Arduino]: Well, I agree with you, as you mentioned, especially within the smart city data center and China proliferation in the digital sphere. Definitely the digital Silk Road is not just the Belt and Road Initiative with 5G. A few months ago, we had our guest in the BOTG Professor Zhou Zhanghui he is a Chinese expert on private security and we discussed extensively how the expansion of the Chinese private security industry along the Belt and Road is also linked with the Chinese commercial expansion through the Digital Silk Road. In your personal opinion is there or what will be the interaction between Chinese private security companies (PSCs) and the Digital Silk Road just as we mentioned, that big data flow of information, facial recognition and so on?

[Meia Nouwens]: It is a really interesting prospect for further research and one that you and I have discussed quite deeply Alex, I think what we’ve seen in terms of the Digital Silk Road, in and of itself is an evolution right? We’ve seen an evolution from the dominantly focusing on relatively simple, low tech, integration of national telecommunications networks and cable. So really the hard, technical, physical aspects of the digital economy towards a proliferation of companies in the services space, that build on those initial investments in hard wired technology in these countries. What I think we’re seeing now in the area of Chinese private security companies, it’s a similar evolution. Moving from relatively low-tech activity in the provision of security services and consulting towards perhaps in some areas, access to weapons or a more predominantly weaponized role, though, that is still very limited. And I think ultimately, what we’ll see is a development and a move towards the involvement of greater high-tech capabilities in the private security space. I think that mirrors what we see of course, as the understanding of security within China, where digital and more traditional aspects of security are highly linked. And so that that is reflected in the non in the private security space abroad, I think makes sense. We already see some examples of that. We see some Chinese private security companies such as HXZA, already advertise and market the fact that they’re a high tech partner in the private security space. For example, using things like augmented reality applications, or having their own fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to provide additional assistance. Similarly, China’s security and protection group states that it provides overseas security management software security risk monitoring and early warning software. We are witnessing a gradual integration of these different technologies that almost mirror what we see in the private security space in China happening abroad.

[Alessandro Arduino]: This point is quite important, but it also clash with some security issues both in China and in the  Belt and Road initiative. In my opinion, first and foremost, there is a gap in common control in Chinese PSC talking with the PLA or even with peacekeeping mission at UN level. As you mention there is a mirroring from the internal function of security to the external one. Not long ago I was talking with a manager for a Chinese private security company, and I was asking him if they are going to use drone or sophisticated jamming systems. He mentioned that some of his people on board on vessels in anti-piracy capacity have issue opening an email, figure it out, when is their time to manage this kind of very sophisticated equipment. Definitely you need talents and that carry a substantial price increase, and that’s sure can be an issue but looking with the lens of this technological revolution that is going on with the Chinese private security sector. Do you think that PSC are going in the future not so far, to feel more the security vacuum gap and to interact in a better way, with PLA or with Chinese peacekeeping mission abroad?

[Meia Nouwens]: Maybe I can talk to their interaction perhaps with central government or the PLA in terms of, this informatization process that we’ve seen within the People’s Liberation Army, what you just stated about not being able to open or having troubles opening a simple email document is that there is an issue of recruiting the right high skilled talent, both within the PLA and considering the fact that Chinese PSCs do recruit from PLA veterans, I would imagine that they’re not necessarily in that sense, recruiting the most highly skilled high tech workers for private security services. So that’s going to be mirrored and I think that will be a steep learning curve. And if, as you said, recruiting higher talent, higher skilled talent also comes with a higher cost and the price tag that of course, will as you as you argued, rightly, be a problem for private security. For the Chinese private security companies one of their main marketing strategies is one being Chinese but second being a whole lot more cost effective and affordable than Western alternatives. On the one hand, yes, there’s an interesting prospect for them to fill that gap and to leverage data that is collected through potentially the digital Silk Road and to share that between different services and different government organizations. I would say that though, in the digital Silk Road, there is a concern about the collection of big data collection of sensitive data. That espionage I think role and intelligence gathering goal is something that has been documented anecdotally, in terms of collecting Big Data and gathering that and perhaps siphoning that back to China for sure training of algorithms. I think that is something that’s a little bit more theoretical. And I’m not sure that we’ve necessarily proven that to you know, as great an extent but theoretically speaking, you know, that coordination of being able to leverage different data sources and share that between different Chinese actors. That that is, I think, something to watch moving forward. And as you said, if there’s a command and control question within Chinese private security companies at the moment that would, in theory, help them professionalise.

[Alessandro Arduino]: Now, you underline a concern that in some respects is a perception. But at the end is something that has been discussed and is going to be discussed for a long time at the end this big data where is going to end and the issue that you mentioned about training. Veteran from PLA are the not most high tech talented in terms of capability. Also, it’s quite interesting, because we just discussed in the previous BOTG postcard with Omri Lavi. He is the founder of Orchestra AI and you were just discussing how his company that is leveraging AI for cybersecurity, one of the first problems is to finding the right person, the right talent, because everybody in the world now is looking for the same very scarce pool of human resources in high tech. And this is also something that China it’s already facing. So, getting back to perception, perception is quite difficult to deal with. But there is this perception that Big Data in the hands of private security with high tech capability is going to create an issue, not only intelligence issue, but let’s say just a very basic issue in terms of crowd control, management privacy issue and so on. So moving from the normal friction between China, United States, United Kingdom or Western partner and likeminded country, and move into regions for example, let’s say like Africa, how in your opinion, this company are going to be perceived and how big data collection can impact in country where there are not many options, the option is Chinese technology or not technology.

[Meia Nouwens]: The way that the digital Silk Road has been received in different countries in the last few years, of course, has varied widely, and I would say that when it comes to the perceptions and receptiveness for Chinese technology and digital ecosystems, there’s a pull factor as much as a push factor in large parts of the world. We think of the pushback to 5G the pushback to Chinese companies like Huawei, but really that’s limited to the US, US allied countries, even then we see within Europe, for example, a real foot dragging in the last few years by some countries to actually take a clear stance on their position with regards to 5G and Huawei some implementing very quickly legal precautions others, leaving it to telecommunications companies themselves to make that difficult choice. I think we shouldn’t overestimate the push back to the Digital Silk Road and I think there is still very much room to grow for Chinese companies in the digital sphere globally. What might hamper that of course and what might hamper the ability of Chinese private security companies to take advantage of that also, and to become integrated in that is China’s ability to gain access to advanced semiconductor chips and core components which are now sanctioned by the United States that I think will have an impact on this rollout. And depending on how quickly the Chinese semiconductor industry for example, can catch up is really going to be a determining factor.

But in terms of the perceptions locally, with regards to Chinese technologies, there is very little alternative here perhaps for governments and companies who are not able to afford the differences of the world and you know, who perhaps have different needs that Chinese private security companies can fill in the short term? I would say that for the moment, Chinese private security companies serve mainly a Chinese market of Chinese companies rather than necessarily host governments. And in some cases, they serve Chinese companies because host governments have failed in providing security guarantees for Chinese projects abroad, along the Belt and Road initiative, for example, but to say that there is a push back in Africa or the Middle East to Chinese technology, I think is a huge overstatement. In the west of course, we view data privacy. We have different regulations, such as GDPR and the European Union, that really seek to limit the control of companies within the digital space and protect consumers and private individuals. We of course, have strict I think, regulations on things like facial recognition and crowd control management when it comes to the leveraging of technology. That’s not necessarily going to be the case in the majority of countries where the digital Silk Road and Chinese digital companies operate. Think for example of cases of leveraging facial recognition systems for access to personal health data in certain countries in the Gulf by Chinese companies. That is something that we’re a lot more wary of in the West, but in other countries in the world is seen as an opportunity. It’s seen as an opportunity not to, to not just enhance digital economy, but to become more competitive in relation to other countries in the region to become the foremost digital economy or high-tech economy in the region. Moreover, these are different considerations that perhaps drive other countries in how they interact or consider Chinese technology companies and their role in their economies than we have in the West.

[Alessandro Arduino]: I assume, when you just mentioned the host government, requesting the service of a private military company not been the case in Africa for Chinese private security company but it is just jumping into my mind, the case of Mali requesting the Wagner group as a support while at the same time they were pushing out the French military and part of the counterterrorism operation in in that area. Moving from boots on off the ground to boots on the ground, now, unfortunately, all the attention is focused on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and it comes to the fore the Wagner model. This Wagner group that my opinion wrongly defined as private military but it is a quasi-private military, just an umbrella definition for a paramilitary actor. But it’s something that we have been discussing extensively here in BOTG. Looking at this definition as a very convenient umbrella term for Moscow public deniability. Now that the friction between Beijing and Washington is increasing by the day, and I already witnessed that several Chinese private security companies are limited in their cooperation with the West. In your opinion, there is going to be more room for cooperation with Russian PMCs and I don’t say necessary, Wagner in this respect, or China will go in in another direction for development of their own private security companies.

[Meia Nouwens]: It is really an interesting question and the answer is: I don’t know. I would say that what we’re seeing at the moment with the relationship the triangular relationship between China and Russia and China in the West, you know, procurement predominantly led by or within the framework of China in the US is that yes, Chinese private security companies might be limiting the role with the West, having learned of course in some cases very keenly from Western private security companies. But on the other hand, I wonder whether Russia’s performance in Ukraine, as we discussed, you know, the lessons learned by PLA Russian military cooperation following the performance of Russian armed forces in Ukraine will have a similar will similarly, be reflected in in Chinese PSC and Russian PMC cooperation. I mean, what I would see here is predominantly an opportunity for learning for a Chinese PSC force that is perhaps stepping into a more active conflict role rather than necessarily, you know, the safer security services consulting role that they’ve played in the past. There might be an opportunity for learning here but on the other hand, is the reflection that we’ve seen where of how these services or at least the Russian Armed Forces have operated in Ukraine so far, similarly raising doubts within the Chinese PSCs community about what they could be learning from Russian PMCs. That’s a hypothetical question. I have nothing to back that up. But that is something where my mind goes instantly of what exactly would they be learning? Or is it the case actually, that if we look at how Chinese PCs are becoming more high-tech, is this an opportunity where Chinese PCs can actually set themselves apart and provide a niche service that actually others potentially could learn from? So which way is that is that relationship going to go if it does evolve at all?

[Alessandro Arduino]: I agree, in my opinion it’s quite difficult to just look and forecast in the future quite near probably is a question that I’m already trying to ask to Mr Erik Prince, since he found FSG group in Hong Kong with Citic, but up to now, I didn’t have much luck in having the chance to have it on the record. And unfortunately, our time is running out and we just have time for the latest question for our today podcast. And we just end with a question that we are asking to all of our guests. And, again, I’m asking you to gaze at the crystal ball and to give me a prediction for the future. It is the same question that I asked her in the before podcast to Omri Lavi. He basically refused to answer because being an expert in technology, he said that technology changes so fast, that even three year will be quite difficult to make prediction. But I’m not asking you to make a prediction on three year I’m asking you what in your opinion, will be the future of security management in a complex environment in the coming 30 years from the perspective especially of Chinese PSC operating along the digital Silk Road.

[Meia Nouwens]: So my question is, if the Chinese private security companies have started to evolve to operate more in, a quasi-combat role or to be armed to be able to provide the protection services looking more and more like traditional private military companies, but less like private security consulting companies, you know, taking into consideration the potential for a technological revolution within the Chinese privacy security companies. Do they even need to evolve to become armed? Do they even need to evolve to be prepared to play a role in a more conflict, active conflict zone? If they’re able to harness data hard link into national networks, collaborate or coordinate with national governments? Perhaps there is a role whereby they can provide security services without necessarily putting themselves in danger or playing the traditional role that we’ve seen them try to play in certain cases, maybe they can just skip that, that that part of their evolution altogether and go straight into becoming a digital security force, rather than a private military company in and of itself.

[Alessandro Arduino]: Thank you very much for being with us today. Thanks to our audience too and we look forward to having all of you in our next podcast. Have great day.