Series Introduction

Israel–Asia Relations: New Trends, Old Challenges?

Much of the scholarship on Israel’s foreign policy focuses on its relations with countries in the West or with its Arab neighbours; the significant rapprochement between Israel and countries in Asia has been largely neglected. There have been many indicators in the past decade pointing to these burgeoning ties – from China’s involvement in Israel’s infrastructure (in particular, Haifa port), the rise of Israel-India economic and security cooperation, and the expanding trade between Israel and Indonesia to the recent establishment of a new quadrilateral forum, the “I2U2”, comprising India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States.

Against the backdrop of these burgeoning relationships, the Middle East Institute at NUS convened a two-day workshop in February 2023 gathering together scholars from across the world – including Israel, China, the United States, Turkey, Indonesia, France and Singapore – to explore the depth of Israel’s partnerships across Asia. The seminar delved into the political and economic drivers of these relationships as well as their scope (and limitations). Particularly, it discussed the evolution of Israel’s policy towards China, India and Japan. It also looked into lesser known areas, such as Israel-Azerbaijan relations and the development of Holocaust studies in China. Altogether, the seminar shed light on a research topic – Israel’s Asia policy – that is likely to expand in the coming years. This is one of the papers based on the seminar.

 

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By Christopher K. Colley* and Jean-Loup Samaan**

 

At first sight, Israel and Taiwan share several similarities: both face a security environment shaped by permanent threats (from the Arab states and Iran for Israel and from China for Taiwan). Both rely on a form of protection from the United States – though the degree of that support greatly differs – while maintaining a strong national defence industry. However, a comparative analysis reveals more differences than similarities in their national defence strategies. This paper examines those differences by looking at the evolution of the security environment in both Israel and Taiwan, their budgetary allocations for defence, and finally the ability of their armed forces to adopt new strategies.

 

 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 reminded European countries of ancient disputes between Moscow and the West, but it also revived the age-old predicament of small states confronting bigger threats at their borders. In other words, how do small states respond to overwhelming threats that may jeopardise their very survival? Such existential concerns lie at the heart of the defence policies of many countries, but in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it may be worth looking at two specific cases: Israel in the Middle East and Taiwan in East Asia. At first sight, both share several similarities: they face a security environment shaped by permanent threats (from Arab states and Iran for Israel and from China for Taiwan). Both rely on a form of protection from the United States – though the degree of that support greatly differs – while maintaining a strong national defence industry.

Those commonalities would suggest a convergence in their military postures. In fact, Israel’s defence structure has long acted as a model for small states in Africa and Asia.[1] However, a comparative analysis of Israel and Taiwan reveals more differences than similarities in their national defence strategies. This paper examines those differences by looking at the evolution of the security environment in both Israel and Taiwan, their budgetary allocations for defence, and finally the ability of their armed forces to adopt new strategies.

 

Facing an Evolving Security Environment

Although both Israel and Taiwan may have initially faced somewhat similar threats – conventional armed forces that were superior in quantity but inferior in quality – those threats have greatly changed.

Israel’s guiding principles on national defence largely derive from speeches and decisions made by its founding fathers, particularly its first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, in the early years of the state. There is no written document amounting to a permanent (or regularly updated) national security strategy. From the late 1940s, Israel’s defence policy was driven by fear of the country’s total destruction. Back then, the rejection of Israel’s very existence by all its Arab neighbours implied that all wars would be fought for its survival.[2] Israel’s size also meant that an invasion by neighbouring countries could jeopardise its very existence. Therefore, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have been historically trained to avoid fighting on Israel’s soil and instead project any conflict onto the territory of its adversaries. This meant a strong inclination towards offensive and preventive doctrines that relied on swift campaigns of short duration.[3]

After several decades focusing on scenarios that involve invasions by one or several Arab neighbouring states, Israel progressively revised its threat assessment. First, the country achieved military superiority vis-à-vis the Arab states after the 1967 war, and the subsequent annual military aid provided by the United States consolidated that advantage. More important perhaps, the threat of an all-out conventional conflict decreased. After the signing of peace treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), the IDF found itself much less confronted by the prospect of a conventional war than with asymmetrical conflicts involving non-state groups (primarily Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hizballah in Lebanon). Major shifts then occurred. In the years after the second Lebanon war of 2006, the IDF revised its doctrine to consider fighting Hizballah and other non-state groups not as terrorist networks but as proto-armies. Following that 33-day conflict, the IDF went through a major bottom-up review forced by the Winograd Commission. It was then considered that the IDF had been ill-prepared to fight against the Lebanese organisation because of an emphasis on policing missions, as had been the case in the Palestinian territories in previous years.[4]

The response to the evolution of non-state threats was to be based on an offensive doctrine emphasising stand-off fire, strategic bombing focused on the enemy’s command centres, and preparation for ground invasion of short duration. This was initially coined the “Dahya doctrine”, a reference to the suburbs of Beirut where Hizballah headquarters were located, and which had been the target of the Israeli Air Force campaign in 2006.[5]

The political objectives of such campaigns were meant to be limited: as the 2015 IDF doctrine acknowledges, these operations cannot achieve the destruction of the enemy, only the weakening of its capacities. Hence the idea of a “campaign between wars”, or, as colloquially described by IDF officers, operations aimed at “mowing the grass”.[6]

In the case of Taiwan, its threat environment also has significantly changed in the past decades, but that change did not trigger the necessary adaptation of its military model. For much of the past several decades, Taipei’s defence strategy was more geared towards a conventional battle with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and more focused on big (and costly) platforms such as main battle tanks, large surface warships and squadrons of relatively advanced American fighter jets. Such hardware may have been a necessary deterrent until the early 2000s. However, in light of the rapid modernisation of China’s military forces and the increasing imbalance between both sides, such a strategy is out of date.^[7] In the event of a war with China, many, if not most of Taiwan’s high-tech and expensive capabilities would be destroyed.^[8]

Given the rapidly increasing sophistication of the PLA, in 2017, Taiwan’s former chief of General Staff, Admiral Lee Hsi-ming, proposed the “Overall Defence Concept”. This defence concept recognised the asymmetric nature of the security situation and called for targeting the PLA at its weakest points. This acknowledgement that Taipei cannot and should not compete with the PLA but needs to enhance its asymmetrical capabilities was welcome news to Taiwan’s American supporters.^[9]

However, reports surfaced that shortly after Lee’s retirement, the new defence concept was jettisoned and there were rumours that officers were banned from even using the term.^[10] Notably the concept does not appear in the 2021 Taiwanese Quadrennial Defence Review.^[11]

National Defence Expenditures and US Security Assistance

A state’s defence budget is a critical indicator of its commitment to defence as well as a good measure of how the government assesses its immediate security environment. Given that Beijing sees unification with Taipei as its number one national priority, one would expect to see at the very least a sustained level of government funding for the Taiwanese military. Furthermore, considering the sustained military build-up by the PLA with the goal of taking Taiwan, one would expect to see increases in the Taiwanese defence budget.

However, as the data in Figure 1 (See Figure 1 in attached PDF) demonstrate, the percentage of the Taiwanese defence budget as a share of Taiwan’s GDP has surprisingly decreased since the mid-1990s, including during and after the 1995/96 Taiwan crisis when the PLA effectively blockaded the island with missile drills, prompting the Clinton administration to send three carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan.[1] Of equal importance, the military budget, which at one time was about 5% of GDP, has been hovering at under 2.5% since 2001, whereas the PLA has undergone rapid development since the turn of the century. Figure 2 demonstrates a similar downward trajectory in the Taiwanese defence budget in terms of the share of overall government spending.

From a purely budgetary perspective, the military has been a decreasing priority for the Taiwanese government. But, considering the constant (and likely increasing) threat of an invasion from the mainland, one would expect to find an upward trajectory in defence spending. Overall, based on the available empirical data, it is clear over the past several decades that Taipei does not prioritise military spending as a pressing national security issue.

The evolution of Taiwanese defence spending is all the more striking when compared with the Israeli case. Figure 3 represents the trajectory of Israel’s defence budget as a percentage of GDP during the same period. The first and most obvious difference relates to the fact that the IDF constantly received a bigger share of GDP than its counterpart in Taipei (16% in 1988 against 5% that same year for the Taiwanese military and 5.1% in 2021 versus barely 2% in 2021). Admittedly, Israeli military expenditure decreased sharply in the early 1990s. This decrease can be attributed to the decline of Arab state threat, especially as the fall of the Soviet Union triggered a reduction in Moscow’s military aid to states like Syria. Since then, the defence share of GDP has remained stable and reflects rather accurately the needs of Israel’s security environment.

Furthermore, whereas Israel benefits from the highest military aid package provided by the United States to any foreign country, American support for Taiwan has been much more uneven.[13] Since the passing of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, Washington maintains “unofficial” relations with the government in Taipei and although it provides armaments support to the Republic of China Armed Forces (ROCAF), such support is rendered under the framework of foreign military sales, not foreign aid.[14] Even the most ambitious proposals currently under discussion in the US Congress to increase military support to Taiwan do not consider the type of assistance provided to Israel.[15]

Resistance to the Adoption of Military Reforms

When it comes to military reforms, both the IDF and the ROCAF have experienced resistance from within their ranks. Although Israel succeeded in adapting to non-state threats from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, its officers increasingly express frustration over the feeling that the military campaigns directed at these threats are no longer decisive, being limited in design, and do not bring about any sense of victory. In fact, prompted by this concern, then Chief of Defence Aviv Kochavi introduced a new military concept in 2019 called “Decisive Victory”.

The concept was aimed at driving vast reform of the IDF and had ramifications in terms of training, inter-operability among the services, weapons procurement and civil-military relations. It involved swift offensive operations relying on the use of smaller units supported by massive firepower. In his speeches, LG Kochavi explained that “at the heart of the multi-year concept is increasing lethality in quantity and precision”. To undertake such increases, the IDF would rely on “greatly enhanced ability to expose the enemy, greatly enhanced ability to destroy the enemy, and multi-branch operations”.^[16]

In the same vein, Brigadier-General Eran Ortal, head of the Dado Center – the IDF’s internal body for developing military concepts – explained that the new strategy involved the ability “to attack deep into enemy territory to conquer main nerve centers and inflict a decisive defeat, while suppressing enemy rockets and missiles launched nearby toward Israeli forces and toward the home front”.^[17] In other words, the strategy was aimed at escalating very early and very quickly.

Meanwhile, after years of political complacency, Taiwan came to terms with the need for a genuine change in its strategy against the overwhelming force of the PRC. Specifically, this translated into a debate over the introduction of a so-called Porcupine Strategy. While the Overall Defence Concept may not be in vogue in certain sectors of power in Taipei, Taiwan’s American backers are pushing the island to adapt to the new strategic reality in the Taiwan Strait. The concept of a Porcupine Strategy, where Taiwan would adopt an asymmetric war strategy vis-à-vis the mainland, has entered the military lexicon. At the core of this strategy is the belief that Taiwan’s military needs to be nimbler and lighter in order to fend off, or at least hold off, the PLA until American forces arrive in the vicinity of Taiwan. Instead of purchasing destroyers, main battle tanks and F-16 fighter jets, Taiwan would acquire smaller asymmetrical capabilities such as through stockpiles of Stinger hand-held anti-aircraft missiles, Javelin anti-tank missiles and sea mines.[18]

Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the Biden administration has prioritised sending Kiev hardware designed for asymmetric warfare and has also begun pushing Taipei to adopt a strategy more in line with the Porcupine Strategy. American officials are reportedly telling their Taiwanese counterparts that they will reject requests for large weapons systems and will instead push for supplying a greater number of more agile mobile weapons. For example, in September 2022, 60 Harpoon coastal anti-ship missiles were included in a US$1.1 billion arms deal with Taiwan.[19] This contrasts with Taiwanese requests for M1A2 tanks and MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, which Washington has discouraged.[20]

Both the Porcupine Strategy and the Decisive Victory concepts have been met with considerable pushback in Taipei and Tel Aviv. Given the accelerating pace of China’s military modernisation and the relative stagnation of Taiwan’s forces, pushback in Taipei seems puzzling. Raymond Kuo, a researcher with the Rand Corporation, argues that Taiwan continues to pursue “prestige capabilities” for political reasons. He says, “scrapping its fighter aircraft and submarines forces means that Taipei must accept a higher risk of a successful Chinese amphibious landing. It must also expend significant political capital and effort to convince its population to fight a prolonged war of attrition.”[21] President Biden’s assertion that the United States will defend Taiwan if China were to carry out an “unprecedented attack” – a perceived shift from Washington’s previous concept of “strategic ambiguity” – may partially alleviate Taipei’s concerns, but it still leaves open the question of how committed the United States is to Taiwan’s security. Importantly, the White House has stated that the American policy is unchanged and that the Biden Administration still adheres to the “One China Policy.”[22]

Meanwhile in Israel, the Decisive Victory concept may have been branded as a shift in the IDF strategy but it looked more like the prolongation of previous trends. It relies on a military philosophy that is not new and has its roots in the US armed forces’ “Revolution in Military Affairs” of the 1990s and its assimilation by the IDF.^[23] At operational level, it emphasises manoeuvrability stand-off fire, joint operations, and heavy reliance on new technology to accelerate the decision-making process. Eventually, the level of continuity in the Israeli military strategy was evidenced in the way the IDF has fought against Palestinian organisations since 2019 – be it against Hamas in May 2021 or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in August 2022. Consequently, a significant number of Israeli commentators dismiss the Decisive Victory concept as a “PR stunt” that has “no direct relevance for the battleground”.[24]

Both the Israeli and Taiwanese cases reveal common challenges facing armed forces in the adoption of a new strategy, but the implications of those difficulties differ greatly: whereas the IDF is trying to extract itself from the cycle of endless low-intensity campaigns against Palestinian groups, the ROCAF must urgently reform itself to remain credible vis-à-vis the PLA. Only then can it impress upon the PLA that the costs of an invasion of Taiwan would be costly for China.

Conclusion

The comparative analysis of the defence policies pursued by Israel and Taiwan shows the distinct trajectory each has followed in the past decades. While both face existential threats, Israel has proved more effective at adapting to the evolution of its security environment. For the most part of its existence, Taiwan’s armed forces have adhered to an offensive posture vis-à-vis China that has increasingly proven untenable as the PLA increases its military superiority in the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan’s defence strategy lacks a coherent asymmetric approach to the increasing threat from the mainland. Considering that the PRC’s most recent White Paper on Taiwan made it clear that “resolving the Taiwan question … is indispensable for the realisation of China’s rejuvenation”,[25] it is striking that Taiwan not only lacks a well-planned strategy, but has also allowed the defence budget to decline as a share of GDP for several decades. Although there have been recent proposals for defence spending increases of roughly 15%,[26] this modest amount does not reflect a sense of urgency or concern for the island’s political survival. The announcement that compulsory military service will be extended from four months to one year starting in 2024 shows an increase in commitment,[27] but it pales in comparison with the Israeli case. Israel has an enormous military advantage over its Arab rivals and has soundly defeated them on the battlefield numerous times over the past 75 years. Yet, the Israeli state still requires compulsory military service from its citizens in order to ensure its national survival. While both Taiwan and Israel are located in hostile neighborhoods, Israel has taken more drastic measures to address those challenges than Taiwan.

This does not mean that the IDF is immune to failure: its inability to decisively win wars against Hizballah (2006) or Hamas (2008; 2012; 2014; 2021) calls for a sobering assessment of its performance. But, despite its shortcomings, the IDF has been able to reinvent itself (several times). Although the ROCAF cannot – and should not – consider the Israeli model as a mere recipe to apply, there are aspects of the Israeli military transformation that could prove useful, be it the cultivation of closer civil-military relations, the development of its military-industrial complex, or the dissemination of new military concepts within the armed forces.

 

Image Caption: Israel’s air defence system intercepts rockets launched from Gaza on 10 May 2023. Mahmud Hams/AFP

*Dr Christopher K. Colley is an independent researcher specialised in Asian security issues.

* *Dr Jean-Loup Samaan is a Senior Research Fellow at the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore.

 

End Notes

[1] See Jean-Loup Samaan, Israel’s Foreign Policy Beyond the Arab World: Engaging the Periphery (London: Routledge, 2017); Richard A. Bitzinger, “Military-technological Innovation in Small States: The Cases of Israel and Singapore”, Journal of Strategic Studies 44, No.6 (2021), p. 873–900.

[2] Michael Handel, “The Evolution of Israeli Strategy: The Psychology of Insecurity and the Quest for Absolute Security” in: Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, Alvin Bernstein, eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 534-578.

[3] Ariel Levite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine (Westview Press, 1989).

[4] Raphael Marcus, Israel’s Long War with Hezbollah: Military Innovation and Adaptation Under Fire (Georgetown University Press, 2018); Daniel Sobelman, “Learning to Deter: Deterrence Failure and Success in the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict, 2006–16”, International Security 41, No. 3 (Winter 2016/17), pp. 151–196.

[5] Jean-Loup Samaan, “The ‘Dahya Concept’ and Israeli Military Posture vis-à-vis Hezbollah since 2006”, Comparative Strategy 32, No.2, 2013, pp.146–159.

[6] Efraim Inbar, Eitan Shamir, “Mowing the Grass’: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict”, Journal of Strategic Studies 37, No.1, 2014, pp. 65–90.

[7] Tanner Greer, “Taiwan’s Defense Strategy Does not Make Military Sense”, Foreign Affairs, 17 September 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/taiwan/2019-09-17/taiwans-defense-strategy-doesnt-make-military-sense

[8] Raymond Kuo, “The Counter-Intuitive Sensibility of Taiwan’s New Defense Strategy”, War on the Rocks, 6 December 2021,  https://warontherocks.com/2021/12/the-counter-intuitive-sensibility-of-taiwans-new-defense-strategy/

[9] Drew Thompson, “Hope on the Horizon: Taiwan’s Radical New Defense Concept”, War on the Rocks, 2 October 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/hope-on-the-horizon-taiwans-radical-new-defense-concept/#:~:text=Taiwan’s%20new%20defense%20concept%20employs,it%20is%20at%20its%20weakest.

[10] Michael Hunzeker, “Taiwan’s Defense Plans Are Going off the Rails”, War On The Rocks, 18 November 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/taiwans-defense-plans-are-going-off-the-rails/

[11] Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China, “2021 Quadrennial Defense Review”, https://bit.ly/3pUcWNU

[12] Christopher K. Colley, The Nexus of Naval Modernization in India and China (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

[13] Jeremy Sharp, “US Foreign Aid to Israel”, Congressional Research Service, 18 February 2022, p. 2.

[14] Susan Larence and Caitlin Campbell, “Taiwan: Political and Security Issues”, Congressional Research Service, 10 January 2023, p. 2.

[15] Bryant Harris and Joe Gould, “Senate to Add $10 billion in Taiwan aid, Scale Back Arms Sale Reform”, Defense News, 17 October 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/congress/budget/2022/10/17/senate-to-add-10-billion-in-taiwan-aid-scale-back-arms-sale-reform/

[16] Amiram Barkat, “Chief of Staff Launches Plan for ‘More Lethal’ IDF”, Globes, 13 February 2020.

[17] Eran Ortal, “Turn on the Light, Extinguish the Fire: Israel’s New Way of War”, War on the Rocks, 19 January 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/turn-on-the-light-extinguish-the-fire-israels-new-way-of-war/

[18] “What is Taiwan’s Porcupine Defence Strategy?” The Economist, 10 May 2022.

[19] Edward Wong and John Ismay, “US Aims to Turn Taiwan Into Giant Weapons Depot”, The New York Times, 22 October 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/05/us/politics/taiwan-biden-weapons-china.html

[20] Edward Wong and Eric Schmitt, “US Speeds Up Reshaping of Taiwan’s Defenses to Deter China”, The New York Times, 24 May 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/us/politics/china-taiwan-military.html

[21] Raymond Kuo, “The Counter-Intuitive Sensibility of Taiwan’s New Defense Strategy”.

[22] Michael Schuman, ” No More ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ on Taiwan”, The Atlantic, 22 September 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/09/joe-biden-taiwan-china-strategic-ambiguity/671512/

[23] Eliot Cohen, Michael Eisenstadt and Andrew Bacevich, Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel’s Security Revolution, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998; Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel (Stanford University Press, 2010).

[24] Authors’ interviews with Israeli military analysts, October 2021.

[25] The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and the State Council Information Office, People’s Republic of China, “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era”, 10 August 2022, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202208/10/content_WS62f34f46c6d02e533532f0ac.html

[26] Suisheng Zhao, “Is Beijing’s Long Game on Taiwan About to End? Peaceful Unification, Brinksmanship, and Military Takeover”, Journal of Contemporary China, 28 September 2022.

[27] “Taiwan Increases its Compulsory Military Service as it Faces Pressure from China”, The Associated Press, 27 December  2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/12/27/1145594497/taiwan-compulsory-military-service-china