By Peter Sluglett
On 20 July, there is to be what has been billed rather misleadingly as a ‘final’ meeting in Geneva between Iran and representatives of Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the US, where the disagreements between the two sides are supposed to be resolved. In fact, there are substantial safety nets surrounding the date, which is by no means as ‘last ditch’ as it has been made out to be. How rocky a road all this has been, or will be, is not particularly clear, since most of the negotiations are secret, but bilateral negotiations have been taking place for many years, and are currently taking place. A senior US official told Reuters early in June: ‘In order to test seriously whether we can reach a diplomatic solution with Iran on its nuclear program, we believe we need to engage in very active and very aggressive diplomacy’.[1]
I should say at the beginning that I’m a historian; I have no expertise on, for example, how much weapons grade uranium is needed to make a nuclear missile, or what is needed in the way of delivery systems to make such a missile operational. So I know something about the history of the activities of the major powers in the Middle East, and various aspects of the history of the region itself. This is why I will devote quite a lot of space to the period prior to the Iranian revolution of 1979, when the Middle East, and of course the world as a whole, was a very different place from what it is now.
In brief, Britain and Russia were meddling in Iran’s political and economic affairs for most of the 19th century, and their influence was disliked and feared in equal measure. Within this tradition of economic exploitation, William Knox d’Arcy, a British adventurer, offered the Shah of Iran 20,000 for a sixty year oil concession in 1901 that covered all or most of the country. In 1908, the first major oil discovery in the Middle East took place at Masjid-i-Sulaiman in south-western Iran. The first oil exports from the Middle East left the port of Abadan in 1913, and a few months later, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which had discovered the oil, was purchased by the British government. The British government’s 51 per cent share of Anglo-Persian was managed by a company whose initials are very familiar: BP, British Petroleum.
By purchasing a majority of the company’s shares in 1914, the British government gained direct control of the Iranian oil industry, which it maintained for 37 years. At that stage, the known distribution of oil in the ‘world as a whole’, was as follows: in Baku, in what is now Azerbaijan; in the Romanian part of the Black Sea, and in Mexico, Venezuela and the United States, mostly in Texas and California. Although the motor-car would feature significantly in the future, it was not yet a major factor, and the main use to which oil was put at this time, in the run-up to the First World War, was fuelling naval and merchant naval vessels, since oil was cheaper, cleaner and more efficient than coal. Singapore and Hong Kong were (and of course long remained, since the process of conversion from coal to oil took many years) the principal British imperial coaling stations in Southeast Asia.
Iran’s relationship with Anglo-Persian was often stormy, since there was no Iranian ownership in the company. An agreement signed in 1933 established a flat payment to Iran of 4 for every ton of crude oil exported, but denied Iran any right to control oil production of exports. By 1950, growing popular demand prompted a vote in the Iranian parliament to nationalize the oil industry, and over the next three years there was a confrontation between the forces of Iranian nationalism and the British. In 1953, after the Shah had fled the country, the Prime Minister, Mohammed Mosaddeq, was overthrown by a coup engineered by the CIA and MI6, and in 1954 a new agreement divided the profits equally between the renamed National Iranian Oil Company and a multinational consortium. Needless to say, there was still no Iranian ownership of the company, and very little Iranian say in the direction of its affairs.
But even more significantly, the US and Britain had plotted to overthrow, and had succeeded in overthrowing, a widely popular democratically elected government. This action did not bode well for American pretensions to be supporting democracy in Iran and elsewhere in the region, and in the decolonizing world in general, during the period of the Cold War. In addition, the Shah had aligned himself clearly on the side of American and British imperialism, which created a strong bedrock of opposition to his rule that would never go away. It is difficult to re-imagine the atmosphere of the deeply polarized world of the time, with Iran, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states firmly allied to the United States and, if more tacitly with each other, and with Iran supplying Israel with most of its oil. At that time, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria were thought of as potentially ‘progressive’, with friendly if not quite enthusiastically cordial relations with the Soviet Union.
An example of the atmosphere of the time was the destruction, in 1981, by Israeli bombers, of a nuclear reactor under construction in Iraq that had been purchased from France five years earlier. In an interesting echo of more recent events, both Iraq and France maintained that the reactor was intended for peaceful scientific research. For their part the Israelis viewed the reactor with suspicion, and said that it was designed to make nuclear weapons; hence Israel claimed it acted in self-defence. In Iran, the United States helped Iran launch a nuclear program in the 1950s as part of the ‘Atoms for Peace‘ programme, and the participation of the United States and Western European governments continued right up until the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
In 1978, Iran was the second-largest producer and exporter of crude oil in OPEC, and the fourth-largest producer in the world, and was thus extremely crucial to the world oil economy at the time. Although no opposition to the Shah’s rule was permitted, and the Shah’s political opponents, who were generally seeking the kind of parliamentary democracy and administrative accountability enjoyed by the citizens of Western Europe and the United States, were routinely exiled, imprisoned and sometimes executed, Iran and the US were extremely close allies. US interests in the Middle East were symbolized by the evocation of the notion of a tripod whose three feet stood in Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia.
This cosy relationship came to an abrupt and largely unanticipated end with a massive protest movement against the Shah’s government, which began in 1978 and came to fruition on 17 January 1979, when the Shah left the country. I say ‘largely unanticipated’ because in 28 September 1978 the US Defense Intelligence Agency reported that ‘the Shah is expected to remain actively in power over the next ten years.’[2] The Shah went first to Egypt, and then, after stays in various other countries including Mexico, to the United States, where, after many discussions over the advisability of admitting him, he was allowed in on 22 October for medical treatment ÔÇô in addition to his long-standing lymphoma, he needed an operation to remove an obstruction in his bile duct. [3] He stayed in the US until 16 December, when he left for Panama. In March 1980, President Sadat invited him to Egypt, where he died on 27 July.
The regime that came to power in Iran early in 1979 was composed originally of a variety of elements representing a broad spectrum of the Iranian opposition. But the element that became dominant was composed of Islamic activists who wanted to turn the country away from the secular course it had been pursuing under Reza Shah (1925-41) and Muhammad Reza Shah (1941-79) and to produce a Shi’i state. What emerged was an Islamic Republic, run essentially, by Shi’i clerics assisted by technocrats, based on what they claimed were Islamic principles. The country was led first by the Ayatullah Khomeini until his death in June 1989, and since then by Ayatullah Khamene’i, who is now nearly 75. I do not want to go into too much detail, but nearly 90 per cent of Iranians are Shi’is; most Muslims in the world are Sunnis. In the Middle East, that is, in Iran’s immediately neighbourhood, about 40 per cent of Lebanese, 62 per cent of Iraqis and perhaps 15 per cent of Afghans are Shi’is. In addition, most of the holiest Shi’i shrines (places of pilgrimage for all Shi’is) are in Iraq. Finally, senior Shi’i clerics have not hesitated to play a role in politics, questioning the legitimacy of the ruler or his actions, at least since the end of the 19th century.
The first years of the Iranian revolution saw the regime taking its revenge against supporters of the Shah, and then against the opposition that it had itself created in the 1980s. By the mid-1980s as many as 8,000 people had been executed. Shaul Bakhash, the author of The Reign of the Ayatollahs (1984), dedicated it ‘To my friends who loved the revolution, not knowing it would not love them back.’ Whatever else the largely uncategorisable new regime may have beenÔÇôand there have been no other historical examples of theocratic regimes where ‘the clergy must rule’ÔÇôit was profoundly anti-imperialist, and at the same time equally profoundly anti-left. But while the Communists gradually transitioned from allies to opponents of the Islamic republic, the regime’s real hostility was and long remained directed towards the United StatesÔÇôbecause of its blind support of the Shah and of Israel, because of the oil policies which it had pursued (needless to say, the NIOC took control of Iran’s petroleum industry after the Revolution, and cancelled all the country’s international oil agreements), and subsequently because of US’ support of Iraq in the Iran/Iraq war which lasted from 1980-88.
One event which has always stuck ‘in the craw’ of ordinary Americans and successive American administrations was the siege of the US Embassy in Teheran, which began at the end of 1979. Sixty-six American diplomats and citizens were held hostage for 444 days (November 4, 1979, to January 20, 1981), after a group of students who were supporting theRevolution took over the US Embassy in Tehran. A connection which is not often made was that these events coincided with the efforts of the Shah to obtain asylum in the United States, which was of course anathema to the young people on the streets who were shoring up the shaky foundations of the new Iranian regime. From any point of view, the ill-treatment of a country’s diplomats is, to say the least, extremely ill-advised, since it encourages tit for tat retaliation as well as considerable reluctance on the part of other countries to send their own diplomats there. My guess is that Khomeini, some nine months into the revolution, felt that the regime was not yet secure enough to be able to survive his ordering the students to leave the embassy. In any case, the long-term consequences for US/Iranian relations have been little short of disastrous; they have never officially recovered from the incident.[4] Another more indirect effect has been that few aspiring US diplomats have been inclined to learn PersianÔÇôa posting to Dushanbe in Persian-speaking Tajikistan is hardly the dream of any career diplomat ÔÇôand official Washington has remained almost obstinately ignorant about Iran.
One of the first instincts of revolutionaries is to try to export their revolutions, to make them as universal as possible. Post-revolutionary Iran was no exception, using its media to pillory complaisant and/or hypocritical pro-American regimes in the Gulf and the Arabian peninsula. Here of course, the activities and life styles of members of the Saudi and other Gulf royal families were and are easy targets. As time went on, however, the regime in Iran became something of an inspiration to Shi’is elsewhere in the region, especially in Iraq, where religious parties funded or supported by Iran were regarded by the regime as posing the most extreme threats to its survival. In a major error of judgment, Saddam Husayn thought he could take advantage of what he saw as the chaos in Iran to launch an invasion in the summer of 1980, precipitating a war which he could only ‘win’ with US and Soviet help. In Lebanon, Iranian assistance helped to create first Amal and its militias and then Hizbullah, which enjoyed a fair amount of kudos in the Arab world until its support for the Asad regime in Syria. On a lesser scale, Iran has provided assistance of various kinds to the much down-trodden Shi’is of the Eastern Province of Sa’udi Arabia, and of Bahrain. Given the numerical importance of the Shi’i populations in the states surrounding Iran,[5] what may be described as a kind of Shi’i international has come into being over the last few decades, effectively moving important political goal-posts in the region. This has terrified Saudi Arabia, the GCC states, who cannot take care of their own defence, and it has provided Israel with almost endless opportunities to secure resources from the United States to fortify itself against Iran.
In terms of global firepower,[6] Iran ranks 22nd in the world, Israel is 11th and Egypt 13th. On the other hand, in terms of defence spending as a percentage of GDP, Iran is quite low, 1.8 per cent, down there with Australia at 1.7 per cent. In contrast, Israel spends 6.8 per cent of GDP on defence, Saudi Arabia 8.9 per cent. Iran’s military numbers half a million, but its artillery and air force equipment is outdated and very much needs replacing, which of course the sanctions have prevented.
The ‘Iranian nuclear threat’ has developed as follows: in the 1990’s Iran began pursuing an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capability by developing a uranium-mining infrastructure and experimenting with uranium conversion and enrichment. In addition, much of Iran’s nuclear talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution. This loss resulted in the near disintegration of its nuclear program post-1979. The work on nuclear projects that had started under the Shah, such as the construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactors, was suspended. However, in 1984 Khomeini expressed interest in nuclear power, seeking the assistance of international partners to complete construction of the nuclear reactor at Bushehr. Although one might instinctively wonder why an oil rich country should show so much interest in nuclear energy, this is to forget the major difficulties Iran has faced (because of the sanctions) had in maintaining its oil infrastructure, and of course in obtaining foreign investment, which it did not in fact seek for many years. It is not, frankly, unambiguously clear how much progress Iran has made towards the production of nuclear weapons, although as far as I can tell it certainly does not have the capability of delivering a nuclear warhead.
There have been negotiations on the nuclear issue since 2004, but these have so far proved inconclusive. The election of Hasan Rouhani in June 2013 signalled a sea change in Iranian nuclear negotiations. In his first press conference, Rouhani, who had served as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005, indicated his desire to ease tensions between Iran and the international community and increase the transparency of the nuclear program. In his inaugural address, President Rouhani put priority on ‘elevating Iran’s position based on national interest and lifting of the oppressive sanctions,’ further signaling his intent to resume negotiations with the P5+1. On 27 September 2013, President Obama and President Rouhani held the first direct talks between U.S. and Iranian leaders since the 1979 revolution. Following the phone call, Obama said the ‘discussion with [President] Rouhani had shown the basis for resolution of the dispute over the Iran nuclear program,’ although he realized the extent of the obstacles ahead.
A first round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 was held in Geneva on 15 and 16 October 2013. The US. Department of State issued a background briefing on the negotiations on October 16, which described the talks as having encompassed ‘detailed technical discussions at a level [they had] not had before.’ [7] On 23 November 2013, the parties announced that they had reached an agreement on a joint plan of action, including interim steps over the next six months and elements of a longer-term, comprehensive solution. The interim phase places significant limitations on Iran’s enrichment program: Iran agreed to suspend enrichment over 5 per cent and not to install new centrifuges at any of the enrichment facilities, except where they replace the damaged ones. Iran also committed not to make any further advances at the IR-40 research reactor under construction at Arak: no fuel or heavy water is to be transferred to the reactor site, and the reactor will not be commissioned in the next six months.[8] The interim agreement also contains enhanced verification measures. In return, the P5+1 would provide limited sanctions relief: the United States and EU would suspend sanctions on Iran’s petrochemicals exports and trade in gold and precious metals; on Iran’s auto industry; license the supply of spare parts for Iran’s civilian aviation, and ‘establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran’s domestic needs.’
It is, frankly, anyone’s guess what will happen over the next few weeks. There is a deep vein of anti-Americanism in ruling circles in Iran, and the holders of such views would be only too delighted if the talks should fail. On the other hand, the Iranians’ interlocutors include China and Russia as well as the US, and thus the discussions are not so deeply polarized. A comprehensive agreement would effectively come to the rescue of the Iranian economy, on the verge of collapse in the last years of Ahmad-i Nejad’s tenure because of a combination of domestic incompetence and international sanctions. The national currency, which had lost 70 per cent of its value in 2012, together with the annual inflation rate, which had reached some 40 per cent, have both been stabilized, and there seems a good chance that economic growth will move from -5 to around zero in the relatively near future. The Ministry of Oil is inviting the major oil companies back, extending invitations to American companies, and offering better deals than the Iraqis. Most sanctions on petrochemical exports have been removed; this is an industry with a potential annual value of US$40 billion each year, even more if given the opportunity for further development.
There are several important aspects to the successful conclusion of an agreement, both as far as the US is concerned, and in the Middle Eastern context. Most European powers have had largely continuous, if often rocky, diplomatic relations with IranÔÇôBritain, for example, announced a gradual restoration of full relations in mid-JuneÔÇôso the effects for Europe are somewhat less dramatic than for the US. Also, the US has evidently decided that its own interests have greater priority than the fears of Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Furthermore, the US seems gradually to be coming to the conclusion that there is increasingly little to be gained from treating Iran as an international pariah. Like it or not, the Islamic Republic has been in existence for some 35 years, and is evidently ‘here to stay’. Finally, one of the more bizarre consequences of the increasingly desperate security situation in Iraq is that the US and Iran increasingly ‘need each other’ to assist in the restoration of regional stability. Many factors seem to be converging in US-Iranian relations in what appear to be generally positive ways.
Peter Sluglett is s Director of the Middle East Insitute at the National University of Singapore. He has taught Middle Eastern History at the University of Durham (1974-1994) and at the University of Utah, Salt Lake City (1994-2011), where he was Director of the University’s Middle East Center. He has published widely on the modern history of Iraq, including Iraq since 1958: from Revolution to Dictatorship, 3rd edn., (2001, with Marion Farouk-Sluglett), and Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country (2007). He has also edited and contributed to The Urban Social History of the Middle East 1750-1950 (2008), Syria and Bilad al-Sham under Ottoman Rule: Essays in Honour of Abdul-Karim Rafeq, (2010, with Stefan Weber), and Writing the Modern History of Iraq: Historiographical and Political Challenges(2012). He is currently co-authoring a book on the modern history of Syria.
[1] http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/07/us-iran-usa-nuclear-diplomacy-idUSKBN0EI0IM20140607
[2] House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Evaluation, Staff Report,Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelliegnce Performance Prior to November 1978 Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 6, quoted James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: the Tragedy of American- Iranian Relations, New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 1988, p. 258.
[3] The Shah’s cancer had been diagnosed in 1974, but the exact nature of his illness was not widely known even to his close family. See Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Fateful Encounter with Iran, London, I.B. Tauris, 1985, pp. 176-86.
[4] In April 2014, Hamid Abutalebi, who had been appointed Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, was refused the US visa that he needed in order to take up his position on the grounds that he had .acted as an interpreter between the hostages and their captors in 1979-80.
[5] Including Syria, with its long history of support for those who became part of the new regime in Iran, however far theologically Syria’s ‘Alawi Shi’is are from Iranian Shi’is.
[6] http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp)
[7] Senior Administration Official, ‘Background Briefing on P5+1 Negotiations,’ U.S. Department of State Background Brief, October 16, 2013, www.state.gov.
[8] http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/24/world/meast/iran-deal-text
