CLICK HERE FOR THE PDF
Editor’s Introduction
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has absorbed all media attention since 24 February 2022. It has relegated to near ancient history the botched retreat of US forces from Kabul international airport barely a year ago and the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan — events that were considered a watershed moment for regional stability in South and Central Asia. The world may have forgotten about Afghanistan’s fate but its neighbours are growing increasingly anxious about the prospect of terrorists finding safe haven in the country once again while migrants, drugs and weapons from Afghanistan spill across their porous borders.
Filippo Grandi, chief of the UN’s refugee agency, the UNHCR, warned recently that the Russian invasion of Ukraine must not allow the world to forget Afghanistan, underlining that ignoring the country’s continuing humanitarian needs could be highly risky. Some 3.4 million people are said to be internally displaced in Afghanistan, 24 million are experiencing acute poverty, the rise of global food and energy prices are taking their toll on the cost of living, key workers in vital sectors like schools and hospitals have not been paid, and the healthcare system is facing severe shortages amid the Covid-19 pandemic.[1] A donor summit co-hosted by the United Kingdom, Qatar and Germany to raise humanitarian funds for Afghanistan in April ended up US$2 billion short of the US$4.4 billion target set by the United Nations to meet humanitarian needs.[2] Meanwhile, the new Afghan government’s first national budget, laid out in May, envisages a deficit of US$500 million this financial year; spending is to be financed by cuts to institutions deemed “unnecessary”, such as the country’s Human Rights Commission.[3] The new regime has already broken some of the promises made when it seized power, starting with the need for government to be inclusive and ensuring women’s access to education.
While the world is fixated on the carnage and destruction of cities in Ukraine, violence is on the rise in Afghanistan, from the insurgency festering in the Panjshir valley to the expansion of terrorist attacks by the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K), the so-called Islamic State’s Central and South Asian affiliate. IS-K’s activities are particularly salient. Its barrage of attacks against Shi’a communities in the country as well as incursions into neighbouring countries are intended to undermine the Taliban’s rule. The October 2021 IS-K attack on a Shi’a mosque in Kunduz in Afghanistan, which killed and injured hundreds of worshippers, was said to be carried out by a Uighur and Baloch supporters of IS-K, a clear hint of the terrorist movement’s backing for separatist groups struggling against Beijing and Islamabad.[4] In the cyber sphere, IS-K’s propaganda targets the Taliban regime’s credibility by criticising its relations with China, Russia, Pakistan and Iran.
**********
This volume of Insights examines the implications of the US disengagement from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power, ranging from strategic openings in interstate relations and the roles and security concerns of Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries.
The Taliban as a Counterterrorism Partner?
The Taliban’s ability and willingness to keep the promise it made to the United States in 2020 to prevent jihadist groups such as Al Qaida from using Afghanistan as a springboard for international attacks is emerging as the key to the international community’s recognition of the group’s rule in Afghanistan. In the debate on how to coax the Taliban into controlling militants on its soil, China, Russia, Qatar and Turkey as well as Iran favour lifting sanctions and maintaining relations even if they are not about to unconditionally recognise the Taliban government; the United States and Europe, on the other hand, have opted for a more coercive approach involving sanctions and international isolation, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates hedging their bets and taking their lead from the United States.
But, from the West to China, doubts are growing over the Taliban’s reliability as a counterterrorism partner. According to James M. Dorsey (page 10), these doubts are fuelled in part by the composition of the Taliban’s interim government, the Taliban’s adoption of a governance model built on an alliance between the state and the clergy, as well as its emerging attitude towards human, women’s and minority rights and freedom of the press. He finds it difficult to envisage the Taliban taking action against militant groups or extraditing them to appease neighbours like China owing to the widespread sense of solidarity it shares with such groups, many of which had fought alongside the Taliban for a long time. Citing counterterrorism experts, he suggests that if forced the Taliban would quietly let foreign militants leave the country rather than extradite them.
Gyorgy Busztin (page 74), for his part, notes that the Taliban’s concept of jihad, just like that of Al Qaida’s and the Islamic State’s, is not just founded on the premise of fighting an invading non-Muslim state but also on the assumption that righteous Muslims everywhere will stand up and fight to rid themselves of regimes seen as tyrannical and un-Islamic. This is why it is unlikely that the Taliban will forcibly curtail the movements of jihadists on Afghan soil who are struggling against their home countries. But he also suggests that the need to rely on foreign, mainly Western, largesse to keep the country’s struggling economy afloat and stave off the looming threat of famine could have a sobering effect on the Taliban, who will be intent on not repeating their past mistake of harbouring Osama bin Laden. Busztin believes that internal power struggles within the Taliban will almost certainly influence whether or not the Taliban condones the activities of foreign militants on its soil.
An Opening for Iran?
James M. Dorsey (page 32) notes that the US withdrawal from Afghanistan has created an opening for Iran to enhance its geopolitical influence in Central Asia, an opportunity that has been enhanced by Russia’s preoccupation with the war against Ukraine. Although Iran, like much of the rest of the world, has refused to formally recognise the Taliban as long as the regime does not demonstrate inclusivity, it has continued trading with Afghanistan, which hosts multiple land routes to landlocked Central Asia, and that trade is expected to pick up, he notes. The trade potential may have been among the reasons behind Iran’s efforts to downplay the recent anti-Shi’a and anti-Iranian protests in Herat and Kabul as the handiwork of “rogue elements”.
Delving deeper into Iran’s perception of and relations with Afghanistan, Asif Shuja (page 44) highlights some of the issues of contention between Iran and Afghanistan, notably the smuggling of drugs from Afghanistan into Iran and conflicts over water sharing. He notes that notwithstanding past sectarian and other differences with the Taliban, Iran’s deteriorating relationship with the United States has compelled Tehran to see the Islamist movement as a lesser evil than the continued presence of US troops in Afghanistan. Thus, Iran’s ties with sections of the Taliban had improved even before the group’s recent return to power. Given that the IS-K movement serves as a common enemy to both Tehran and the Taliban — the IS operates in the Khorasan region encompassing northern Afghanistan and northeastern Iran — Shuja speculates that a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan could conceivably become a part of Iran’s extended “axis of resistance” against the US-led Western bloc.
Concerns and Approaches of Afghanistan’s Other Neighbours
China’s approach to the Taliban’s return to power differs substantially from its approach when the Islamist group first came to power in 1996 (Alessandro Arduino, page 62). At that time China not only refused to recognise the Taliban but also closed the Chinese embassy in the Afghan capital. Only in late 1998 did Beijing start to engage the Taliban. This time round, Beijing has kept communication channels open, with Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi even meeting with the Taliban’s deputy leader Mullah Baradar in Tianjin just before the group captured power. Beijing’s pragmatic approach reflects its concerns over Afghanistan’s continuing instability and the rise of Islamist terrorism and increased narcotics trafficking. Since the Tianjin meeting China has formalised what was previously debated during closed-door meetings in Doha: Beijing will recognise the Taliban’s status in return for the latter promising that they would not train, fund or allow militant Uighurs from the Turkestan Islamic Party to carry out operations against China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. China’s pragmatic approach could also be a product of its growing concerns that any spillover from the instability in Afghanistan could affect the security of its investments in neighbouring Pakistan, notably the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), considered one of the most ambitious projects in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. China maintains a little-known military base in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan province, near the Wakhan corridor, the 92 kilometres of the border that China shares with Afghanistan, but it has no intention to step into the “graveyard of empires”.
As for the Central Asian states that share borders with Afghanistan, they will be increasingly concerned about the activities of IS-K in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s ability to contain the group. In April and May 2022, IS-K claimed the launching of several rockets into neighbouring Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, attempting to cripple the already fragile relations between the Taliban government and its Central Asian neighbours. Both Dushanbe and Tashkent denied that their border cities had been under attack.
Writing before the recent IS-K attacks, Gyorgy Busztin (page 74) noted that notwithstanding the cross-border ethnic tensions and water-sharing disputes that divided the Central Asian states in the past they have a shared interest in preserving regional security and stability amid a revived threat of Islamist radicalism emanating from the Taliban’s return to power. In the past, militants from these states had found refuge in Afghanistan and had sporadically infiltrated into their home countries. Among the “stans”, Busztin notes that Turkmenistan is reluctant to join an openly anti-Taliban front because this would go against its concept of permanent neutrality and also complicate its long-time dream of building a transnational pipeline via Afghanistan to transport gas supplies to Pakistan, a project that would depend on Taliban goodwill. Tajikistan, for its part, has eschewed a transactional approach to the Taliban for it has had to consider the ethnic ties that bind its people with their Tajik brethren in Afghanistan. It has declared that it would not recognise a Taliban government unless such a government includes the country’s minorities (read the Tajiks). While Uzbekistan has had to consider similar ethnic ties between its Uzbek citizens and the Uzbeks of Afghanistan, it seems keen to maintain some form of cooperation with a country that for long served as a refuge for the ferocious Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Thus, it has even hinted at dialogue with the Taliban, notes Busztin.
Considering that Pakistan has contributed to the destabilisation of Afghanistan, questions on interpreting its role have been reopened with the dramatic changes since the return of the Taliban regime. Ameem Lutfi (page 85) presents a historical analysis of how repeated migrations and historically patterned political ties inextricably tie the fates of Pakistan and Afghanistan. While highlighting how Pakistan’s covert support for the Islamists in Afghanistan, including the Taliban, has served to strengthen the Pakistani military, he contends that presenting Pakistan as the force that sustained the Taliban following the US-led invasion is an attempt by the United States and its allies to shift blame. Lutfi attributes the Taliban’s ability to survive as a movement largely to the prolonged US presence in the country and its war against suspected jihadists in Afghanistan. He says the war fanned popular support for groups resisting Washington and the US-backed government in Kabul although he acknowledges that Pakistan too participated in the war. Lutfi ends on a cautionary note, pointing out that as long as international pressure on the Taliban regime continues to decimate the economy, it is not hard to imagine the direction towards which the Afghan people might turn when faced with the dilemma of choosing between famine and a neighbour who might offer support, open or covert.
Discussing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Clemens Chay (page 105) notes that their primary concern since the withdrawal of US troops — which they see as a part of a wider US withdrawal from the Middle East — revolves around regional stability, considering that Afghanistan “is situated within the orbit of potential (in)security spillover”. The Gulf monarchies will be wary of how governance under the Taliban evolves and whether the country will slip into the list of “failed states”. Related to this is their concern over Afghanistan’s potential rebirth as a safe haven for terrorists and the prospect of Al Qaida reconstituting, which, according to top Pentagon officials, is possible within two years. Chay believes Saudi Arabia is likely to maintain its distance from Taliban 2.0, in contrast to its role in nurturing the Taliban at one time and its support for the first Taliban government. The kingdom would not want the “moderate Islam” project championed by Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, as well as its efforts to control extremist preachers and money transfers abroad, to be tainted by association with the Taliban government. Qatar, on the other hand, has actively played a mediatory role in Afghanistan as part of its “hyperactive diplomacy”. It has acted as an interlocutor between the United States and the Taliban. But Chay points out that the stakes for Doha are high should negotiations break.
Has NATO learnt its Afghanistan Lessons?
In the final article in this volume, written before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Jean-Loup Samaan (page 128) points out that NATO’s assumptions behind its intervention in Afghanistan — the demonstration of transatlantic solidarity and NATO military cooperation outside of its traditional sphere — have been shattered by the catastrophic withdrawal of allied forces in 2021. While the fallout from NATO’s departure from Afghanistan signals the end of an era, it also highlights the shortcomings of Western military interventions in the broader Middle East in the past two decades.
Meanwhile, the ongoing war in Ukraine has given NATO a new lease of life. Whether or not the lessons learnt in Afghanistan have been taken into consideration in NATO’s response to the Russian invasion remains to be seen.
Alessandro Arduino
Principal Research Fellow
Middle East Institute, NUS
Image caption: Women wait for free bread in front of a bakery in Kabul, 21 January 2022. Mohd Rasfan/AFP.
End Notes
[1] UNHCR, “UN High Commissioner for Refugees appeals for global engagement to address Afghanistan’s needs”, 17 March 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/news/press/2022/3/6232e0e84/un-high-commissioner-refugees-appeals-global-engagement-address-afghanistans.html.
[2] Reliefweb, “Donor summit co-hosted by UK for Afghanistan humanitarian crisis falls $2billion short of target — NGO umbrella group reacts”, 1 April 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/donor-summit-co-hosted-uk-afghanistan-humanitarian-crisis-falls-2billion-short#:~:text=Just%20%242.4%20billion%20was%20raised,the%20United%20States%20%24204%20million.
[3] NBC News, “Taliban dissolve Afghanistan’s Human Rights Commission”, 17 May 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/afghanistan-taliban-dissolve-human-rights-commission-rcna29146.
[4]Robert Delaney, “China faces an increase in extremist threats in central Asia, US panel is told”, South China Morning Post, 13 May 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3177557/china-faces-increase-extremist-threats-central-asia-us-panel
