Immediately after the Israeli attacks on Iran, the Kuwaiti government condemned the strikes, describing them as a violation of Iran’s sovereignty and international law. Kuwait’s Foreign Minister, Abdallah Alyahya, even held a phone call with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, during which he affirmed Kuwait’s solidarity with Iran.

This Kuwaiti stance has two dimensions: The first relates to its position on Israel, and the second to its relationship with Iran. Kuwait might be the only member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that has had no direct or indirect contact with Israel. This opposition is not solely official — it is also deeply rooted in Kuwaiti society. Historically, Kuwaitis have been among the strongest supporters of the Palestinian cause in the region, dating back to the 1930s, and continuing even after the Palestinian Liberation Organisation supported Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

Kuwait’s relationship with Iran, however, has experienced fluctuations. The two countries enjoyed close ties from 1961 — when Kuwait gained independence — until 1979, when the Islamic Revolution overthrew the Shah. Tehran was a key supporter of Kuwait in the face of Iraqi claims and threats during that period. Although Kuwait quickly recognised the new Iranian regime after 1979, bilateral relations between both countries deteriorated as a result of the eruption of the war between Iran and Iraq in 1980. Initially, Kuwait offered to mediate between Tehran and Baghdad, but it gradually shifted its support to Iraq. This shift was largely prompted by Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric, and its leaders’ efforts to export their revolution to the Arab monarchies of the Gulf.

Kuwait went on to provide Iraq with billions of dollars in assistance during the war. This fostered an unstable relationship with Iran, and triggered internal unrest, including terrorist attacks by groups opposed to Kuwaiti support for Iraq. Societal divisions also emerged: Sunni Islamists and Arab nationalists largely supported Iraq, while many Shia Kuwaitis favoured Iran.

Today, the situation is different. While some Kuwaitis still hold negative views of Iran — due to its ideological orientation, its Shi’ism, or its regional behaviour, particularly its support for the former Ba’athist regime in Syria — the current conflict is not against a Sunni, Arab, or Muslim country, but rather against Israel. Although public opinion on social media is varied and difficult to quantify, posts on X (formerly Twitter) show that people from across the political spectrum, despite their hesitation to openly support Iran, acknowledge the significance of its attacks on Israel. Some even celebrated the strikes on Tel Aviv.

In addition to their opposition to Israel, many Kuwaitis are concerned about the potential consequences of an escalating conflict. Iran has demonstrated its capacity to strike deep into Israeli territory. If such attacks continue and result in significant Israeli casualties, the United States may be drawn into the conflict. In response, Iran could retaliate by targeting US military forces in the region — including those in Kuwait. The air distance between Kuwait and the Iranian city of Abadan is less than 150 kilometres, much shorter than the more than 1,300 km between Iran’s Ahvaz province and Tel Aviv — yet Iranian missiles have successfully reached the latter. In fact, by dawn on 16 June, Kuwaitis witnessed Iranian missiles flying overhead en route to Israel.

Iran also has the option of closing the Strait of Hormuz, which would severely impact Kuwait’s economy. Oil exports account for approximately 90 per cent of Kuwait’s export revenue, and the country depends on the Strait to transport its crude. Alternative routes exist, but they are limited. For instance, in October 2024, the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation signed an agreement with the Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC) to store four million barrels of crude in KNOC facilities. The first shipment was launched in April 2025. Another potential route is via Saudi Arabia. However, these alternatives may not suffice if the Strait is closed.

Another major concern in Kuwait is the potential targeting of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, located across the Gulf in Iran. An attack on the facility could lead to environmental pollution, affecting both the air and the sea — the latter being Kuwait’s primary source of water.

In sum, Kuwaitis have expressed conflicting emotions regarding the ongoing war. But there is a growing recognition that if the conflict is not contained, its consequences could extend far beyond Iran and Israel — and that prospect is deeply worrying to many in Kuwait.

 

 

 

 

 

Image Caption: People stand on a rooftop amidst billowing smoke following an overinght Israeli strike in Tehran on 17 June 2025. Photo: AFP

 

 

 

 

 

About the Author

Hamad H. Albloshi is Associate Professor of Political Science, Kuwait University