Introduction

The relationship between Hezbollah and Israel is a complex one. Both parties have historically been at each other’s throats, with the 2006 Lebanon War being a significant example. Despite the lessons learned in its aftermath, both sides are now engaged in another major confrontation.

The killings of high-ranking Hezbollah leaders by Israel were hailed as significant successes for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and the country’s external intelligence agency. Among the first of those killed in late September strikes was Ibrahim Aqil, the leader of the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s special operations unit, who was wanted by the US for coordinating a series of bomb attacks in the 1980s, and Ahmed Mahmoud Wahby, who was responsible for conducting the Force’s training.

Then, on 27 September, the IDF announced that Hezbollah’s top leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was killed in strikes which targeted the group’s headquarters in southern Beirut. Shortly before he was killed, Nasrallah expressed Hezbollah’s determination to launch attacks against northern Israel, in the hope of drawing the country into a ground offensive in Lebanon. Following his death, Israel did just that, announcing on 1 October that its troops had crossed into Lebanon for what it termed a “limited operation”. The fighting has since grown, and includes air strikes on Beirut.

Hezbollah is now at a critical juncture: It can limit its fight against the IDF —  both sides have been bloodied so far — by withdrawing its forces beyond the Litani River, 30 kilometres north of the Israel–Lebanon border, and comply with the 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1701, or risk all-out war.

Before Israel entered Lebanon, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said on 28 September that the future of the Middle East would be shaped by the forces of resistance, with Hezbollah being a prominent player in this narrative. The statement, which followed the announcement of Nasrallah’s death, raises significant questions regarding the group’s resilience following its substantial leadership losses.

 

Implications for Hezbollah

Internal Dynamics: Tensions are intensifying among Hezbollah members regarding their response to Israel’s decimation of its leadership. Sources knowledgeable about internal discussions within the organisation claim there is a growing sentiment among some members that Hezbollah is being overly cautious about escalating the conflict, while others are pushing for a reorganisation to allow it to pursue an alternative approach, such as  splitting into factions.

These tensions have been evident for the past few months, and reports have suggested that disagreements are especially rife between the group’s remaining commanders and its fighters. The reports indicate that there have been a notable instances of dissent among reserve fighters, who are reportedly refusing to re-engage in combat operations in southern Lebanon. The killing of their leaders, in particular, has left many members with a sense of mistrust of fellow fighters — a report indicating that the successful targeting of Nasrallah was the result of information from  a “human source” has no doubt added to the paranoia.

This atmosphere of dissatisfaction and distrust could result in a heightened risk of factions breaking away from the organisation entirely. There is a possibility that dissatisfied members may seek alternative routes or align with other groups opposing Israel and its allies. Such fragmentation not only threatens the stability of Hezbollah, but also has implications for regional security, as these splinter factions may pursue their own distinct agendas.

Risks of Eroding Support Among Lebanese: While Hezbollah is classified as a terrorist organisation by some nations,  it operates legally as both a political party and a security force within Lebanon, positioning itself as a resistance movement against Israeli occupation of the country. Under Nasrallah’s leadership, Hezbollah transformed from a militant group into a significant political force within Lebanon. The organisation has participated in Lebanese parliamentary elections since 1992, and has secured a substantial number of seats. The group has significant support from the Shia population, particularly in the southern and eastern parts of the country, but is not widely popular across the nation.

Within its own community, Hezbollah’s credibility has been deteriorating due to the ongoing conflict with Israel, which has resulted in over 500 civilian deaths, and more than 1,000 injuries, alongside a significant displacement of individuals from southern Lebanon. According to sources, many Lebanese disapprove of Hezbollah’s actions as they believe this invites conflict.

 

External Support from Allies is in Question

Iran’s Cagey Response:  While Iran has historically supported Hezbollah as part of its “Axis of Resistance”, the informal coalition led by Iran, there is no guarantee Hezbollah will have its support in a potential war against Israel. Reports indicate that prior to Nasrallah’s death, Hezbollah had encouraged Iran to initiate an attack on Israel, but was informed that “the timing was not right” for an assault. Prior to Nasrallah’s death, Iran had chosen restraint even when its own leading figures were killed or attacked. In fact, on 24 Sept, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, while claiming that Israel aimed to provoke a broader conflict in the region, stated Iran’s commitment to peace.

Nasrallah’s death, however, changed the equation considerably. On 1 Oct, Iran launched more than 180 ballistic missiles at the Nevatim, Hazterim, and Tel Nof air bases in Israel, IDF tanks in Netzarim, and gas facilities in Ashkelon in southern Israel. The IRGC subsequently issued a statement asserting that the strikes were a response to the deaths of leaders of its personnel, and those of Hezbollah and Hamas. This included Abbas Nilforoushan, the Deputy of Operations within the IRGC, who was among those present, along with other IRGC members, when the IDF struck Nasrallah. The presence of IRGC personnel alongside the Hezbollah leader indicates deepening military collaboration between the two entities. This may justify Ayatollah Khamenei’s statement after the killings that the dynamics of the Middle East would increasingly be influenced by Hezbollah as a key player within the Axis of Resistance.

But while the IRGC’s statement on 1 October 2024 cautioned that Israel would face “subsequent crushing blows” if it opted to respond to the Iranian missile attack, the next day, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced on his X account that Tehran’s retaliation had come to an end, unless further escalation required action. This suggests that while Iran appears to be committed to Hezbollah’s future, it remains cautious about entering into a direct conflict with Israel. Iran’s backing remains vital for Hezbollah, but whether it will support the group if it is embroiled in an all-out war with Israel remains unclear.

The Limited Role of Yemen’s Houthis: Another factor to consider in this equation is the collaboration between Hezbollah and the Houthis, the Iran–backed Shia Muslim group based in Yemen. This partnership has been marked by strategic military operations aimed at Israeli targets, such as the strike on Haifa port in Israel in June. The collaboration has evolved into a military partnership that also plays a significant role within Iran’s Axis of Resistance. Reports indicate that Hezbollah has provided military training to Houthi fighters. Nevertheless, the Houthis’ reach is limited: They did fire a missile at Tel Aviv on 27 Sept, but this was intercepted. In response, Israel hit back hard, striking the port of Hodeidah. If Israel and Hezbollah enter into a full-scale war, the Houthis may feel compelled to intervene militarily or politically to support its ally, but this intervention would likely be symbolic rather than substantial. The reason for this lies primarily in their dependence on Iranian directives. Nevertheless, given the disruption to global supply chains they have managed to cause with their actions in the Red Sea in the wake of the Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis could yet remain a major player in the current conflict.

 

Hezbollah Is (Mostly) Acting Alone for Now

Despite these factors, Hezbollah seems resilient and is girding for an Israeli escalation. Reports indicate that it is currently withdrawing its forces from key locations in Syria, such as Palmyra, the Badia region, and the rural areas surrounding Homs, and is transferring a significant number of them back to Lebanon. Some personnel have been left behind to secure essential infrastructure, including headquarters buildings, storage facilities, machinery, and medical points, but control over these regions has been transferred to members of the Afghan “Fatemiyoun” brigade militia. Furthermore, Arabic-speaking personnel have taken charge of local weapons depots, indicating a shift in operational control that may suggest preparations for future confrontations.

The current movements and reassignments within Hezbollah’s ranks indicate a strategic recalibration that could be aimed at enhancing its readiness for potential conflicts with Israel. By re-allocating resources and establishing new chains of command through allied militias, Hezbollah appears to be positioning itself for an effective response should the conflict escalate further. In addition, Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), its ally in Iraq, has been an effective player since the start of the conflict. The group has targeted northern Israel using Al’Arqab missiles.

However, Hezbollah lacks an air force, or the ability to conduct airstrikes. This significantly constrains its options against Israel, which has one of the most advanced air forces in the world. Hezbollah has hence adeptly employed guerrilla warfare tactics since its inception in the 1980s, making it one of the most powerful non-state military organisations in the world, equipped with a substantial arsenal that encompasses a diverse array of weapons. Current estimates indicate that it holds between 150,000 and 200,000 rockets and missiles with varying ranges. Although recent intelligence reports have it that Israel’s recent strikes have destroyed half of that of this arsenal, what remains is still enough to do substantial damage.

 

The Contours of an Israel-Hezbollah Showdown

Haifa, a Critical Frontline City for Israel: Haifa’s strategic position along the Mediterranean Sea grants Israel direct access to maritime routes, and establishes it as a key logistical centre. This makes it an enticing target, and on 22 Sept, Hezbollah struck.  Among its targets was Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd — one of Israel’s leading defence companies, specialising in the development and manufacture of missile systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and various other high-tech military applications. Apart from the high signature of companies based in Haifa, the port itself has acquired an outsized importance, given the recent bankruptcy declaration of the Red Sea Eilat port, which created a vacuum in maritime logistics.^[1] If tensions between Israel and Hezbollah escalate, leading to strikes on the city of Haifa and its port, this would likely have severe negative implications for Israel’s economy.

More Extensive Tunnel Warfare: “Tunnel warfare” has been a key part of Hamas’ strategy, allowing it to use its extensive subterranean network to move troops and supplies, launch attacks, and seek shelter, while avoiding detection. The tunnels are also conduits for smuggling arms and supplies into Gaza, effectively bypassing blockades enforced by Israel.

As Israel and Hezbollah lock horns, it is essential to consider the latter’s own tunnel capabilities. Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah benefits from substantial support from Iran and North Korea, which has contributed to the development of an extensive network known as the “Land of Tunnels” following the 2006 Lebanon War. On 16 August, Hezbollah showcased some of the capabilities of its tunnel network: A video showed a rocket launching facility named “Imad 4”, which includes jammers and military installations built within extensive underground tunnels.

Hezbollah’s tunnel network spans multiple regions, and is designed for both offensive operations against Israel, as well as an effective defence against potential strikes. While the details of the confrontation that led to the deaths of eight Israeli soldiers on 3 Oct remain murky, media reports suggest they were ambushed — possibly through the use of tunnels.

If tensions escalate further between Israel and Hezbollah, we can expect tunnel warfare, characterised by advanced tactics supported by Iranian and North Korean technology. This will have serious implications not only for Israel, but also for regional security.

 

What’s in Store for Lebanon?

All-out conflict between Israel and Hezbollah will have severe consequences for Lebanon — previous incidents have resulted in widespread destruction within the country. Already, a significant humanitarian crisis is brewing, with approximately 500,000 Lebanese citizens forced to flee their homes due to ongoing Israeli airstrikes. In Israel itself, the attacks by Hezbollah have led to the evacuation of an estimated 60,000 citizens from the north of the country for almost a year — allowing them to return home has been one of Israel’s key reasons for escalating the fight. If all-out war ensues, this crisis could get worse.

Over and above what is happening currently, Lebanon’s domestic concerns remain a factor. The country’s shaky internal security situation has been shaped by its diverse religious and ethnic groups, including Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, including Hezbollah, and Druze Muslims. The civil war from 1975 to 1990 worsened sectarian divisions and led to the emergence of various militias, including Hezbollah. There are growing hostilities between Salafi factions like Al-Nusra Front, the official Syrian affiliate with Al-Qaeda, which sought to establish a presence in Lebanon, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Over the years, the LAF has carried out numerous operations against jihadist groups, often with assistance from Hezbollah. These military efforts developed into a partnership of interests between the LAF and Hezbollah. Lebanon also hosts the largest number of refugees, with government estimates suggesting there are about 1.5 million Syrians, in addition to approximately 11,238 from other countries, who have sought safe haven in the country. A war between Israel and Hezbollah could result in its classification as a breeding ground for militant groups, posing further challenges to its stability and security.

 

Conclusion

Despite the decimation of Hezbollah’s top leadership, the group appears resilient for now, but internal instability can lead to divisions within the organisation, raising the danger that it may not survive a full-scale war with Israel without support from Iran. However, it will act as if it can, in perhaps a similar vein to Hamas, with profound implications for Israel, Lebanon, and neighbouring countries potentially caught in the crossfire.

The possibility of another proxy war, characterised by more extensive tunnel warfare and guerrilla tactics at the cost of more innocent civilian lives, has grown exponentially because of the events of the past few days.

[1] Eilat Port’s bankruptcy is attributed to the ongoing security threats from the Houthis, the Yemeni armed group, who have been targeting shipping lanes and vessels.