Since 16 March 2025, the US military has conducted strikes against the Houthis, the Iran-backed terrorist group, to destroy its ability to launch attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, and Israel. While these operations have successfully targeted and eliminated several Houthi leaders and served as a warning to Iran, they have had limited impact on the group’s activities. In fact, a series of events has served as an early warning that, if anything, the Houthis are evolving into a more dangerous threat to both regional and international security.
On 4 April 2025, security sources in Yemen reported that the Houthis freed several members of the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to bolster their fighting forces following American airstrikes that caused numerous fatalities and injuries.
Additionally, the group has an alliance with Al-Shabaab, the Sunni Somali terrorist group affiliated with the broader Al-Qaeda (AQ) network, to provide them with weapons and missiles. This collaboration aims to increase their proxies and expand territorial influence, bringing them within closer range of Israel. By putting aside their ideological differences, the Houthi alliances with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Shabaab are a tactical shift that makes these groups more dangerous, with implications for the Middle East and the wider international community.
What We Know about the Houthis
The Houthis, a Zaydi Shia movement, rose as a political entity following the Arab Spring in 2011 in response to the perceived marginalisation of their community within Yemen’s predominantly Sunni population. They gained international prominence during their takeover of the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, in September 2014. The group’s ideology combines elements of nationalism with religious beliefs rooted in Zaydi Shia Islam. With Iran’s support, the Houthis have secured territory in the northwestern regions of Yemen, and have taken control over key areas, such as the capital, and parts of the northern governorates, Saada and Amran. Their territorial gains have allowed them to establish a quasi-governmental structure, providing services and governance in areas under their control. This territorial consolidation has made them a major force within Yemen’s complex landscape.
Houthi Alliances To Expand Influence
The Houthi Alliance with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): The ongoing connection between the Houthis and AQAP cannot be overlooked. On 3 April 2025, the armed group freed six members of AQAP, including a leader referred to as Abu Musab al-Radie, from al-Bayda, another individual named Abu Mohsen al-Awlaki, from Shabwah in Yemen, and three others who were part of a battalion led by Hamza al-Mashdali, a senior AQAP figure who died in June 2024. This was part of an agreement between both factions that includes mutual non-aggression, prisoner exchanges, and arms transfers. The newly-appointed AQAP leader in Yemen since last March, Saad al-Awlaki, is keen on preserving the so-called “significant ties and agreements” with the Houthis. Awlaki succeeded Khaled Batarfi, who was killed in March 2024, and is perceived as an influential figure within extremist circles. He is wanted by US authorities for his involvement in attacks against American interests, and there is a US$6 million bounty for any information that can lead to his capture.
The Houthis and Al-Shabaab in Somalia: In addition to their alliance with AQAP, there is an increasing connection between the Houthis and Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, the Salafist group commonly referred to as Al-Shabaab in Somalia. A United Nations Security Council report on Yemen, released on 11 October 2024, highlighted the strengthening ties between the Houthis and the Somali terrorist group. This relationship appears to be developing despite their ideological differences, as both groups aim to establish themselves as cross-border entities. Reports indicate that Al-Shabaab maintains connections with Al-Qaeda in East Africa, and also has links to the Islamic State in Iraq (ISIL). Recent reports, including those from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), indicate that in 2024, Al-Shabaab held a few meetings in Somalia with representatives of the Houthis and sought weapons and training support. Both groups are keen on trading advanced systems, such as surface-to-air missiles and attack drones, which are not commonly available from the Gulf of Aden’s smuggling network. Despite their sectarian differences, both groups are linked through Iran’s Axis of Resistance and connections to AQ, a collaboration aided by their shared anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments.
The ongoing conflict and fragmentation within Somalia, which transformed the state into several administrative territories -—Puntland, Somaliland, and South-Central Somalia, where each area functions with its own governance systems — paved the way for numerous factions, including Al-Shabaab, to compete for dominance in the absence of a central governing body. This instability allows the Houthis to broaden their influence or operations in the country.
Iran’s Support for the Houthis
A crucial factor in the Houthis’ evolution from a local guerrilla faction into a more sophisticated military force capable of targeting both land and maritime sites throughout the region is their partnership with Iran. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the current Houthi leader, admitted this himself on 3 January 2025, in a video where he described “Iran’s backing for resistance fronts”. Tehran has provided military, financial and logistical support to the group since 2014, when they took control of Yemen’s capital. However, it recently directed its military forces to exit Yemen, leaving the Houthis to handle their affairs independently to avoid a direct clash with the US, so it can continue to pursue its nuclear talks with the latter, which began in Oman on 12 April 2025.
Since the beginning of the conflict in Gaza, Tehran has taken advantage of the situation to further its own interests by providing the Houthis with boats equipped with explosives and sea mines to establish a foothold in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. On 6 May 2024, Iran constructed arms production facilities within the mountainous regions of Yemen. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has also intensified its military support for the Houthis by deploying additional military advisers to the country. In May 2024, a group of 100 Houthi engineering officers returned from Tehran after completing training on the manufacture of drones and missiles.
The Houthis’ operational capabilities may be affected if Iranian support is withdrawn, particularly in the areas of weaponry, military expertise, and technology. However, the Houthi collaboration with Al Shabaab has been protected by Iran: This allows Tehran to exert control over the Bab al-Mandeb and expand it in the southern Red Sea, Yemen, and the Horn of Africa to offset its military and political setbacks in Syria and Lebanon. It is important for Iran to support the Somali terrorist group and provide it with the training and intelligence needed for conducting operations beyond the Gulf of Aden and into the western Indian Ocean alongside Houthi attacks. It is thus unlikely that Tehran would sever ties with the Houthis.
Building Resilience and Expanding Horizons
The Houthis have taken advantage of the conflict between Israel and Hamas to reposition themselves as an anti-Western entity. This shift has allowed the group to establish itself as a collaborator with various regional and international players that oppose the US and its European allies, and thus broaden their network of smuggling and financing partners while solidifying military alliances. On 6 June 2024, the Houthis declared two collaborative operations with Iranian-backed Shia Islamist armed groups, briefly known as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), at the port of Haifa, a strategic Israeli target. Reports also suggest that the Houthis have established an office in Iraq since July 2024 to enhance their collaborative efforts with Hezbollah in Iraq and secure financial resources there.
However, to diversify its revenue stream and to become less dependent on Iran, the Houthis have started building up domestic economic resources, including customs duties and taxes, and weapons sales. This provides them with a degree of financial independence.
The relationship between Russia and the Houthis has also evolved significantly, particularly following their leaders’ visit to Moscow in January 2024. According to US intelligence, Russian military intelligence operatives have been sent to Yemen in an advisory capacity to help the Houthis target commercial ships in the Red Sea. Russia had even intended to supply arms and military gear to the Houthis, but these plans were abandoned following pressure from the US and Saudi Arabia.
Houthi Weapons Advancements
The Houthis have made significant technological advancements in the arms sector, notably establishing a large-scale drone production facility in 2018. They possess a vast arsenal of armed drones, short-range ballistic missiles, and anti-ship mines and missiles. Since October 2023, the group’s tactics have progressed to incorporate drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance purposes, as well as unilateral explosive attacks and the deployment of anti-ship ballistic missiles and ground attack missiles. The group has also incorporated sea drones into their operations in the Red Sea.
Conflict Armament Research (CAR), a weapons tracking group, has reported that Houthis are attempting to use hydrogen fuel cells in drone technology. This represents a significant advancement, allowing the terrorist group to potentially triple the operational range of their drones compared to traditionally powered systems. This will enable the Houthis to hit targets that were previously out of reach.
Taking Security Up a Notch
Following the US airstrikes in March 2025, the Houthis have moved to hide their leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, and other key figures such as Yahya Saree and Mahdi al-Mashat, their spokesman and chairman of the supreme council, respectively. They have done this by increasing their security protocols, decentralising leadership structures, and utilising safe houses. Abdul-Malik has been prohibited from meeting key Houthi figures over concerns that any of these individuals or others might be communicating with foreign intelligence services.
With Iranian support, the Houthis have also strengthened their internal security framework. According to sources in Sana’a, the group has established a dedicated security unit tasked with safeguarding its leadership. This includes measures such as limiting public appearances. The Houthis have also a relocated key leaders to various “emergency tunnels”. These tunnels, which extend across the northern, southern, and eastern regions of Sana’a, serve both as a secure refuge for leadership figures as well as weapons storage depots. What is uncertain is whether the US strikes have been effective in disrupting these networks.
What Does This Mean?
Increasing Violence In and Beyond Yemen: As the Houthis gain recognition and support, they have become an enduring symbol of resistance against Israel and the West. However, their collaboration with other terrorist groups comes at a significant cost to the Yemeni population. The assistance that AQAP provides the Houthis in the form of drones and other explosive materials intensifies the threat in southern Yemen and the wider area. An example of this was demonstrated on 16 August 2024, when an AQAP suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle at a location occupied by forces aligned with the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen’s Abyan province. The attack killed 16 and injured 18 others. This threat could extend to other countries in the region, particularly in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, where there is a Yemeni community.
Territorial Influence, Proxy Warfare and Growing Proximity to Israel: The Houthis’ collaboration with AQAP and Al-Shabaab mirrors Iran’s attempts to expand its territorial influence. Iran has successfully used proxy groups to extend its influence without risking direct military engagement. Similarly, the Houthis could supply AQAP and Al-Shabaab with weapons to allow them to carry out attacks. This strategy reduces the group’s vulnerability should Iranian support wane or become less reliable due to US pressure.
This intensified collaboration poses a significant security threat to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and other parts of the world, including South-east Asia. It can inspire regional extremist factions, which could employ similar tactics or spread their ideologies. This could lead to an increase in radicalisation among certain communities that feel marginalised or disenfranchised. For instance, since the beginning of the Gaza conflict, the Houthis have managed to recruit thousands of Yemeni jihadists through their campaign of “Promised Conquest and Holy Jihad”. This dynamic creates a troubling cycle where violence begets more violence, leading to heightened instability both within the Middle East and around the world
Greater Instability In an Already Troubled Region: The Houthi partnerships with AQAP and Al-Shabaab could also cause problems in the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab has already committed to intensifying piracy activities that create disorder in the Gulf of Aden by targeting commercial vessels and obstructing freedom of navigation. The transfer of Houthi technology would enable Al-Shabaab to conduct more sophisticated attacks against military targets.[1]
This collaboration has enhanced their recruitment capabilities and improved their access to sophisticated weaponry and training from Iran. The Houthis have continued to demonstrate their operational capabilities, despite the US airstrikes, making it increasingly clear that such actions alone are insufficient to effectively neutralise their activities.
Increased Threat to Maritime Security: Since the onset of the Gaza conflict, the Houthis have demonstrated their capability for wreaking havoc, conducting more than 100 attacks against shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden using missiles and drones despite the efforts of the US and others. This has had a significant impact on maritime trade in the Middle East, affecting key shipping routes and ports. Traffic through the Bab al-Mandeb has decreased by 70 per cent, with many shippers opting for longer maritime routes around the Cape of Good Hope, resulting in increased freight costs. Furthermore, the threat to energy supplies is significant, as the Bab al-Mandeb serves as a crucial corridor for transporting oil from the Gulf to Europe and America. Any disruption in this area could potentially impact global oil prices.
Egypt, which derives a significant amount of revenue from Suez Canal operations, has been badly affected. But it is not the only casualty: Israel’s Eilat Port has also suffered dramatically. On 16 July 2024, the port was officially declared bankrupt because of the significant drop in commercial operations and revenue resulting from a blockade enforced by Houthi forces on cargo ships associated with Israel.
Conclusion
The widening threat of the Houthis and the overall political environment in Yemen reveals the ineffective governance of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which was formed on 7 April 2022 to unify anti-Houthi factions under a single governance framework and receives support from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The geopolitical context adds further complexity, as Gulf states, already stung by their ineffective earlier attempts to roll back the Houthis, are distancing themselves from the issue — a stance adopted in response to fatigue over earlier military misadventures, changing domestic priorities, and rapprochement with Iran, among other reasons. This explains their lack of enthusiasm for participating in anti-Houthi efforts such as Operation Prosperity Guardian — only Bahrain joined the US-led naval coalition — despite the persistent threat to their interests in their own backyard.
Meanwhile, the US has diminished its influence and operational capacity in Africa, particularly through its withdrawal from Niger and Chad, which has significantly limited its ability to regain a substantial presence in Yemen. This withdrawal reflects a broader reluctance for military intervention in Yemen and effectively rules out ground operations.
The interplay of ineffective local governance, cautious international responses, and diminished US involvement fosters an environment in which the Houthis can continue to thrive unchecked. What is needed to stem the tide is an international response, sparked by a thorough understanding of the threat that the Houthis pose not just in the Middle East, but globally, if the status quo is maintained.
Image Caption: Armed Yemenis chant slogans during a rally in solidarity with Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and in condemnation of US strikes, in the Huthi-controlled capital Sanaa on 18 April 2025. US strikes on a Yemeni fuel port killed at least 74 people, Houthi rebels said on 18 April, in the deadliest attack of Washington’s 15-month campaign against the Iran-backed group. Photo: AFP
About the Author
Dr Ghada Farag Sayed Soliman is a Research Fellow in the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Her research focuses on extremism in the Middle East and North Africa region.
