SUCCESSION & SECESSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Interview with Prof. Ahmed Ibrahim Abushouk December 9th, 2010

1. I understand that you have visited Singapore a few times. What do you find most surprising or enjoyable about this city-state? What is one example to illustrate the contrast between Singapore and your home country, the Sudan?

Singapore is a lovely city. As for comparisons between the Sudan and Singapore, it is important to remember the Sudan is the largest nation in Africa while Singapore is a small city-state in Southeast Asia. The differences are very pronounced, especially in human development. Singapore‟s human resources development reflects the development of the nation as a whole, something which the Sudan lacks. The Sudan‟s political elite fail to utilize the expanse of human capital in Sudan. Finally, the Sudan is comprised of 65 ethnic groups and over 100 local languages while Singapore‟s main ethnic groups are few and united by a common language – English.

2. You are here to discuss the referendum on southern Sudan‟s independence (taking place Jan. 9, 2011). What is the political environment on the ground? Are people excited/nervous/scared/apathetic?

The referendum stems from a very complicated political situation on the ground. Of course, there is a spectrum of emotions running through the various regions. Especially for ethnic northerners in the south and ethnic southerners in the north, the implications are rife.

3. This referendum may split the country in two, north and south, after over half a century of violence and intermittent civil war. Egypt has pushed for a “confederate” Sudan in which the north and south are independent states yet lie under an umbrella of common currency and foreign policy. The United States has urged the south to secede from the north and gain full independence. What solution or outcome do you view to be both probable and sustainable?

It is my belief that the country should not be split in two as it would only serve to provide precedence for further splintering of the Sudan. At the moment, the South has its own president and legislative system within the Sudan. Yet, the infrastructure is lacking in the South – it is not ready to be fully independent.

4. If the south secedes, the citizens of the oil-rich region of Abyei (in central Sudan) will vote whether to join the north or the south. Given the significant value of Abyei‟s oil, do you predict that there will be fighting and perhaps war regardless of the outcome of the vote?

The secession of the South will not put an end to the fighting in the Sudan; in fact, it may cause more fighting. The region of Abyei is indeed very oil-rich and is governed above the legislative system, directly under the president of the Sudan. The secession will only cause for further instability and insecurity of the nation and region.

5. Many people around the world are familiar with the Darfur genocide of the 1990s. Geographically, Darfur stretches along the western border of the Sudan. What will happen to Darfur if the south succeeds in its secession movement? Could we potentially see more violence or attempts at independence from the west?

There are many factors to consider with this secession movement. Though Darfur is considered part of the North, many of Darfur‟s refugees fled to the South, where they currently reside. If the South secedes, Darfur‟s rebels will have a new bargaining chip when negotiating with the national („Northern‟) government. There is a rebel area in the east which may also pursue secession if the South succeeds in seceding from the North.

6. The National Congress Party has been accused of „fear campaigning‟, intimidating citizens of the south to vote for unity. Can you provide an example of such tactics, if true, that are used to intimidate. What repercussions on the Sudan do such tactics have? Do you think it is plausible for southern citizens to be intimidated into voting for unity and if they are, what might the next few years look like?

The situation is very complicated, especially for southerners living in the North. If they do not register to vote in favor of the North and the North wins (ie the Sudan remains intact), their status will be unaffected and they will become citizens of North Sudan.

On the other hand, if the southerners, living in the North, vote in favor of the South and the North wins, these people will be denied citizenship and the rights that accompany that status. As you can see, it is a “lose-lose” situation.

7. If the south does prove successful in its secession movement, what might the next few years look like with two Sudans?

If the South secedes smoothly, it would create problems for many reasons. There are many nomadic tribes that roam the lands of the would-be border. Borders in eight areas of the country are not yet settled. The treatment of natural resources, namely the export of oil, would be contentious and incite fighting. The future existence of southerners in the North and northerners in the South, as discussed earlier, would be another point of contention.

The secession would set precedence for the heterogeneous Sudan – many tribes may seize the opportunity to branch off and create many small, fighting nations of what is currently the Sudan. The lack of infrastructure and human resource development in the South would become more evident and hamper the success of a Southern Sudan if they choose to secede now.

Mary E. Stonaker may be contacted at marystonaker@nus.edu.sg. The views expressed here are those of Dr. Ibrahim Ahmed Abushouk and may not reflect those of the Institute.

Interview with Prof. Mustapha Kemal Al-Sayyid December 10th, 2010

1. Is this your first time in Singapore? What do you find most surprising or enjoyable about this city-state?

This is my fifth time visiting Singapore but I am still impressed with many aspects of Singapore including the order; aspects of city planning – injecting green spaces almost everywhere; and the high quality of the education system. I also notice the unique nature of architecture and the healthy, happy-looking population.

2. You have quite an impressive background in Political Science. Are democratic transitions a major focus of your work?

You are very kind. Yes, I have published much on the process of political representation & civil society amongst other similar topics.

3. Why is this current round of elections in Egypt (parliamentary 2010 and presidential 2011) of such significance?

These elections are of high significance because they serve as a turning point in the trajectory of political liberalization in Egypt. In light of the deepening of political liberalization in the country, the government is tightening control due to the fear that such liberalization may get out of hand. If freedom of expression is allowed, the government questions, ‘Might it lead to change in governance structures?’ This is a risk they are unwilling to take and are therefore utilizing many methods to ‘steer’ the election and government.

4. What are some techniques used by governments, such as Pres. Hosny Mubarak’s, to ensure “stability” and succession of ideas, if not the office itself?

There are many techniques used by the incumbent government to ensure elections produce favorable responses. Without being exhaustive, some techniques include: removing television anchors, banning live feeds from polling stations on Election Day, pulling whole television channels off the air, removing newspaper editors and closing entire newspapers. Polling stations may open late while the morning hours are used for stuffing the ballot boxes. Polling stations may also be moved away from communities with strong opposition support to deter voters.

5. The parliamentary elections, which took place on November 28th (and December 5th) yielded results which caused quite a reaction. How, or does, this change your perception of the upcoming presidential elections?

The general trend of the parliamentary elections was expected; the margin by which the NDP [National Democratic Party; led by Pres. Hosny Mubarak] won was not. In 2005, the NDP won a majority of around two-thirds of the seats. In 2010, they won ninety-seven percent (97%). The results were clearly much higher than expected. The NDP, in attempts to rectify the first round of results, ‘helped’ on behalf of the opposition parties.

6. The turnout for the recent elections was astonishingly low, whether it was no more than 15% as contended by the opposition or 35% as reported by the government. What, in your opinion, caused this and how should the society respond to it?

The majority of citizens view the elections with apathy because of the electoral system has lost its legitimacy and with it, the citizens’ investment of time and thoughts. The State of Emergency has been renewed every three years. That combined with the new restrictions on freedom of expression have lead people to conclude that they will have no impact on society by going to the polls.

7. Finally, how is your work dictated by the government in Egypt? Are there times when it is best to remain quiet or are those trying times when it is most imperative to speak out? I personally have not had any trouble with freedom of expression in the academic community of Egypt. I tend to keep my analyses direct and free of aggressive language. I also have no political desires. Colleagues of mine, however, have run into trouble because of the choice of language and their attempts to directly engage the government. As an academic, I find I can be honest about the government in my writing without being outright critical.

Mary E. Stonaker may be contacted at marystonaker@nus.edu.sg. The views expressed here are those of Dr. Mustapha Kemal Al-Sayyid and may not reflect those of the Institute.

About the Speakers
Prof Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, Prof Ahmed Ibrahim Abushouk

Event Details

Faculty of Laws, NUS

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