(This event is organised by MEI’s Political Economy Research Cluster, as part of its quarterly public talks series.)

Abstract

The Qatar crisis is the result of the intersection of long-term foreign policy patterns in the Gulf, with more recent shifts at the global and regional levels and that of national decision-making environments. Local rulers have long combined the search for a hegemon-protector with that for complementary relationships. Since the 2^nd world war, regional threat perceptions by the six monarchical states were strategic, ideological and status-related, with the common perceived sources of such threats being Iran and Iraq; and, for the 5 smaller states, Saudi Arabia. Perceptions of and responses to these threats were shaped by the role conceptions of the ruling regimes and particular individual regime figures. The evolution of the GCC reflected both these commonalities and differences: the commonality only really came through at peak threat times. Throughout, channels of communication, recognition of cross-border kinship networks and the common interests of the ruling groups were maintained even at times of crisis. The Qatar crisis comes at a time the regional and domestic environment has seen significant changes – from the Arab Spring and ISIS to a diminished Iraq and resurgent Iran, along with a relative shift in the global and regional role of the US. The common concern about Iraq, Iran and ideological messages is still potent; so is the concern of four of the smaller states about Saudi hegemonic ambition. But the interpretations of what the threats from Iran and ideological movements mean have varied widely. The Qatar crisis must be understood in this context, but up until the Boycott, the long-standing pattern of maintaining avenues for conflict management had been maintained. A key domestic change has been in the decision-making environment in Riyadh and the UAE. Against the context of the Quartet regimes’ fears inspired by the Arab Spring, and the enabling factor of the Trump White House, the role perceptions and inclinations of MBZ and MBS led to an unprecedented redesign of the regional policy posture.