An academic discussion organised by MEI’s Political Economy Research Cluster.

Abstract: Starting from the 1970s, Kuwaiti Salafis set up an umbrella organization with sophisticated institutional structure (al-Jama‘ al-Salafiyya – JS) according to the template of the Muslim Brotherhood, in order to extend their influence in multiple segments of the society. Besides a charity wing, and multiple cultural and youth organizations, JS included a political arm (Salafi Islamic Gathering – SIG) in order to secure its presence in Kuwait’s parliamentary politics. Yet, as this article shows, unlike the Brotherhood, JS’s organizational structure proved rather inefficient. It’s members often disregarded its rules and the decisions made by its leadership. Furthermore, during the past decades JS went through a number of splits resulting a diverse Salafi landscape in the country. Most of time issues related to participation in Kuwaiti party politics caused the schisms within the ranks of Salafis. This article examines the organizational dynamics of JS and argues that specificities of the Salafi ideology explains its weakness institution building. Salafis are most often suspicious about formal organizations and argue that they lead to hizbiyya (partisanship), which makes Muslims loyal to their hizb (party, faction), and the leader of the hizb, instead of God. Furthermore, Salafis strongly disagree on the legitimacy of participating in parliamentary politics. This ideological stance explains why Salafis frequently split along the lines of opposing discourses and find it difficult to maintain strong and integrated institutional structures.