Abstract

In this new series of monthly podcasts, Dr Alessandro Arduino and Dr Ameem Lutfi invite eminent speakers to share what they see in the future of warfare, as well as the transformation and transition of security architecture in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. Through these podcasts, we will observe how uniformed soldiers, or boots on the ground, are being replaced by private military companies and automated weapons, and will also notice a shift in the theatres of war, from territorial borderlands to shared oceans, air and cyberspace.

In this second podcast, Mr Jamie Williamson, Executive Director of International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA), joins us to examine the role of the ICoCA in promoting transparency and accountability for the private security sector.

Listen to the full podcast here:

Full Transcript:

Alex: Welcome to the second episode of the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute’s podcast series “Boots Off the Ground. Security in Transition from the Middle East and Beyond”. In this series, we look at the future of warfare which will see uniformed soldiers, or boots on the ground, being replaced by private military companies, autonomous weapon systems and cyber weapons. My name is Alessandro Arduino and I will be the co-host for the series along with my colleague Ameem Lutfi.

Ameem: Hello, everyone. We’re glad to have with us today Mr Jamie Williamson, executive director of the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA). As head of the Secretariat of ICoCA, Mr Williamson brings to the association a wealth of international, legal, military and security experience. He joined the ICoCA in October 2017 after several years as the head of relations of the Arms Carriers Unit at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Alex: Jamie, thank you again for being with us today. Let’s start with the first question. In our first podcast, Dr Sean McFate argued that we are entering the age of “durable disorder” where legal norms will become redundant. But at ICoCA, you believe that the private sector can follow codes of conduct even without state oversight. Can you tell us more about ICoCA’s role in promoting greater transparency and accountability in the private military and security sector?

Jamie: Good morning, Alex and Ameem — well, good morning from Geneva. First of all, thank you very much for inviting me to be part of your podcast series. I hope you’re doing well. These are particularly interesting times. Now, thank you very much for the first question about the International Code of Conduct Association and its International Code of Conduct. If you allow me, I’ll take you through a bit of the history of the association, how it was established, and I think the raison d’être for the code of conduct.

We need to cast our mind back to the Second Gulf War in Iraq in 2004, 2005 or thereabouts. At that time, we saw an increasing number of security companies and military contractors operating in a conflict environment. There were quite a few unsavoury scenes — a number of human rights allegations, and a number of clear abuses of international humanitarian law in those contexts. A number of well-known private military as well as security companies were accused of many wrongful acts. As a result of that, during the same period, in 2007 or thereabouts, the International Committee of the Red Cross as well as the Swiss government pushed for an initiative, which ultimately led to the creation or the drafting of the Montreux Document, named after the city of Montreux in Switzerland.

The idea behind the Montreux Document was effectively a re-statement of existing international law with regard to the regulation and oversight of activities as well as enforcement and accountability of private military and security companies and contractors, specifically in armed conflict environments. So, you will see it was a fairly wide-ranging document, covering many elements of the Geneva Conventions, human rights treaties and the like. From that Montreux Document, in parallel with discussions on the UN guiding principles on businesses of security and human rights, the International Code of Conduct was developed by governments, civil society organisations, the security industry and a number of clients as a code of conduct for security companies operating in complex — not necessarily conflict — environments.

This code of conduct is wide-ranging particularly in terms of human rights obligations and international humanitarian law standards. The code of conduct is effectively a document to guide the operations of private security companies. The code of conduct was adopted in 2010 as part of this multi-stakeholder process, and then the International Code of Conduct Association was established in 2013, also as a multi-stakeholder organisation, to oversee the implementation of the code of conduct. It brings together governments, private security companies, civil society organisations, as well as observers, clients, academics in the corporate world and so on to work together through an integrated process of monitoring, certifying and dealing with complaints to ensure that security companies apply the code of conduct and that security companies are also held accountable for any shortcomings.

Ameem: Jamie, I’m glad that you brought up the Montreux Document. In the end, you said it was framed through negotiations of different stakeholders. My question is that ultimately, the code of conduct is a system of self-regulation that the companies have to sign and follow. Do you think in the long term, something like this system of self-regulation is sustainable? Or do you think that we need stronger enforcement mechanisms at the international level? Do we still need an international body, let’s say like the UN, to enforce these mechanisms? Or in other words, does just having the carrot work, or do we also need the stick?

Jamie: This is quite a complex question which potentially has a number of different elements for us to look at here. I think the first point I need to sort of clarify is, of course, that the code of conduct itself and the work of the association are not driven through the lens of self-regulation. I think part of the process that led to the drafting of the code of conduct was a recognition that you need to bring in the different stakeholders to the group. So, we have governments in place to play a pivotal role with regards to the oversight of private security companies as part of the association. We have civil society organisations that can play quite an important role both in terms of capacity building as well as monitoring of private security companies. And of course, we have the private security companies that are sort of bound by the code of conduct and the system that the association has developed.

The question in terms of the sort of enforcement mechanism and the potential of having an international treaty to deal with matters, I think, has been part of the discussions in this field for at least a decade. The UN Working Group of Mercenaries which pushed out the draft convention, I think it was in 2005 or 2006 — I stand to be corrected on the date, but a few years ago. And there’s, I think, further discussion being led by the UN Working Group of Mercenaries on whether we should have an international treaty. As someone who’s worked in international law and public international law for the best part of the past two decades, I think that one of the major shortcomings of international law and the multilateral system today is a lack of clear implementation and enforcement mechanisms. And I do not believe that the addition of an additional international treaty or an international norm or convention of any sort will necessarily add much to the panoply of existing instruments that we have.

Let me break that down. If you look at the international legal order presently, which doesn’t necessarily focus on security companies and military contractors but nonetheless cover them, you have the UN Mercenary Convention, the Geneva Conventions, a wide range of human rights treaties, national laws and regulations and licensing regimes in place. There’s already a very strong regulatory framework in place and the simple stick of an international instrument will be insufficient without the appropriate level of implementation at the pragmatic level, at the grassroots level. And I think to have a much better system in place, you need to create the necessary incentives for security companies, for those in the supply chain, to raise their standards. You need to have a great level of transparency within the system as well in many of these so-called complex environments which lack good governance, [but] still have a security industry operating. So how do we shed more light on the activities? How do we shed more light in terms of the oversight and the complaints and the shortcomings of the industry? I think it’s a combination of both the carrot and the stick. Given the present state of multilateral discussions and treaty-making bodies and their potential going forward, I would caution against developing an international instrument at this stage. However, I would certainly call for greater grassroots level pragmatic implementation in-country with regards to regulating security companies.

Alex: To follow up on what you just said, you mentioned the need to have a better system in place. What is the association’s growth strategy? Do you mainly lobby the demand side, or do you market [yourself] to the supply side of the importance of abiding by a particular code of conduct?

Jamie: Thank you, Alex. Again, it’s a tough question in terms of the objectives that we have set for ourselves. Bouncing off Ameem’s earlier question, ultimately the question has to be: how do we influence the behaviour of those in the supply chain? How do we influence their behaviour for the betterment of security contractors and to improve oversight of the security industry? So, the approach that the association has taken is to recognise that without demand for security services, there won’t be supply. It’s a commercial venture, a commercial entity, a commercial world that we’re looking at, even in complex environments and even in conflict situations. So, the association has naturally been looking at an array of actors along the supply chain that can positively influence the behaviour of the security industry and those that use security providers.

To give you a handful of examples here. [Firstly,] clients … Ultimately, where does the responsibility lie? Clients. Those that use the services of private security companies, those that hire contractors to look after their security in different environments, what attitudes have clients taken with regard to duty of care, their approach to due diligence? Because without their oversight, without their strong procurement processes, without them imposing ongoing monitoring of their security providers in their procurement chains, security companies will potentially operate below standard.

[Secondly,] donors. Donors like major governments are the ones financing the operations of humanitarian agencies and NGOs in complex environments. They, likewise, have a duty of care to the beneficiaries along that finance trail. [Thirdly], the NGO community. Humanitarian actors are, likewise, quite often users of security providers in complex environments. They have responsibilities. How do we ensure that they know what they should be looking at when they hire security companies? [Fourthly], investors. We are seeing in many environments, capital venture, venture capitalists firms investing in security companies, or we have major international, transnational corporation with investors as well as shareholders using security companies in complex environments. So likewise, investors should act responsibly through ethical investments with regard to protection of the environment, for instance. So potentially, there could also be more ethical investments with regard to protection of human rights and operations of security companies.

So, there are all these different target groups that we have to look at along the entire chain, both on the demand or supply side. For the growth strategy, we also need to come back to recognising that the security industry is a very international business with very localised footprints in many environments. So, it’s no longer simply a monopoly by a handful of large international security-type companies from the UK and the US, for example, but we are seeing proliferation naturally of many small local security providers in different parts of the world.

Ameem: Okay, how hopeful are you in bringing some of these smaller companies that you’ve said have recently been proliferating? How hopeful are you of bringing them on-board this code of conduct? Because to me, I can see why a large corporatised private military company in the United States might see it to be in their interest to follow this code of conduct and to deal with its formalities. What about the smaller mom-and-pop companies? What about these companies that are playing in conflict zones like Syria, or even for that matter, private companies that are coming out of Russia, out of China? How hopeful are you that you could convince them to come on board as well? Would they not see something like this code of conduct, as, you know, just unnecessary restrictions on them?

Jamie: A fair question. I remain very hopeful. If I wasn’t hopeful, I wouldn’t be here. I think one has to be pragmatic and hopeful and look also to the membership base of the association. If you look at the number of security companies operating that are part of the association, the vast majority are local security providers — not necessarily the large international security providers, of which there are not that many. And, hopeful I am, quite simply from my own experience of having worked alongside some of these local security providers in the past couple of years in some quite remote areas in different parts of Africa, for instance, or in Iraq, and so on. The reaction you’ll see quite often on the part of … I will say the good local security providers … is a positive one. There’s very much this will and wish to learn more from us in terms of what the code of conduct can bring to the operations to strengthen their culture, management, oversight and leadership qualities that the security providers offer. But I also think there is recognition on the part of many of the local security providers that there’s a business case for them. By improving their own services, by improving their own standards and operating to internationally recognised standards, they also have a greater chance of picking up larger contracts from international clients, because ultimately, it’s the international clients who are going to drive much of this market environment and they are looking for international standards.

My experiences the past few months in northern Kenya with a very small local security company that had just been established was very positive to the extent that I was literally walking hand in hand with the managers and the guards to each of their duty posts, looking at how they’re applying the code of conduct in practice, noting how they were reacting to that and implementing some of the recommendations we wanted them to take on board. And there was a certain level of pride as well. They felt that they were now part of the international community, and not simply a small local security company. As hopeful and optimistic as I am, I also recognise there is still quite a lot more work to be done to ensure that the International Code of Conduct is known in more places than those that we see today and that there’s a greater appreciation of what the code of conduct, and the association, can offer for local security companies. This is  easier said than done, but not impossible.

Alex: I quite like the pragmatic optimism that you just mentioned. And thank you for bringing up a best practice in Kenya. Please allow me to bring the conversation to a part of the world that we mainly work with at the MEI. The Middle East is teeming with all sorts of non-state military personnel, including proxy and terrorist groups. How does the association in this regard step in this, shall we say, kind of muddled space and carve out a space for regulated private security? Also, do we have a kind of Kenyan experience that you just mentioned for the Middle East?

Jamie: Thank you very much, Alex. I like the use of the word “muddled” in your question. I think what the International Code of Conduct and the association can bring to the table is help in unravelling this confusion. I think one of the most important aspects of our work here has to be not only bringing greater transparency to the issues, but certainly also bringing more precision to the debate, more understanding as to who these actors are. Too often, when we speak about private actors in conflict zones, either local or international, and if one looks at the media reports and quite a few other academic writing out there, the vast majority would refer quite easily to the term mercenaries. You referred to Sean McFate’s quotes at the beginning of the interview — I know Sean pretty well — and you know his latest book in terms of trying to label everything mercenaries, I can see where he’s coming from, but that doesn’t necessarily, I think, add much in terms of the nuance that we need to see in these environments.

What does the code of conduct do? It can break down and clarify specifically what kind of actors the ICoCA is interested in. We can say, look, these security providers that provide a certain type of service in those environments are part of our catchment area. Then when we unravel the rest of the landscape — if we have proxies, militias, military companies and mercenaries — we have to use the honest debate that the association can deliver. We have to use the drive of the media and the public, and even for instance this podcast, to have a much more comprehensive discussion as to who exactly these various actors in these different zones are. How do we actually access these actors? Who do they report to? Where does the attribution of responsibility lie with regard to these actors? And what body of law applies to those individuals? To me, it’s that honest debate.

In my time with association, in the past two to three years, I have seen the discussion evolve. I have seen a greater understanding on the part of those looking at these environments with regard to identification: those are military contractors, they fall within a kind of department of defence contract, there’s an oversight mechanism there; these are security providers, they fall within this particular regime. And then you have the grey area, which I think you alluded to in your question of those military type actors that not everyone knows about, who they report to and how do they act in order to operate in those environments. Do they report to the state or do they report to an international enterprise? What are the nationalities of the individuals on the part of their company? And I think with the presence of the code of conduct, with the drive from the Montreux Document, you have this potential of greater understanding being developed. But I don’t think we’re quite yet out of the woods yet.

Ameem: Is there a genuine system, a kind of feedback loop on these organisations, as they evolve, as they change, as they adapt, to reassess the situation? Because this is a revolving door as you said, a group can go from being a private military contractor to being a militia in a matter of months. So, is there some kind of like active feedback loop that you guys are also plugged into?

Jamie: Our focus, as I mentioned earlier, is very much on the kind of security contract in peace. So, the range of services that security contractors may offer will be quite limited in terms of traditional security enterprise. You may see some of the security companies, those that have the ability to do so, moving into the military contracting world as well. And that brings a different set of issues that needs to be assessed and falls a little bit outside of our remit.

The question I would like to look at is the situation of non-state armed groups and some of these conflict environments that for various reasons, be it for security reasons, commercial benefits, peace talks, etc, can themselves start morphing into security contractors. Yet most of the individuals who are part of those non-state armed groups are military types, in other words, they were combatants a few months previously, now they provide a security role. The question I would have for those individuals is: do they have the necessary understanding or training or protocols in place to have made that transition from being an armed non-state group in a conflict situation to now becoming, and wanting to become, a legitimate private security company.

Another thing where the biggest discussion is the militia-military transition and the feedback loop that you alluded to in your question. That’s a bit more complicated because most of those entities will naturally stay out of the limelight; there will be a lot less transparency in terms of their set-up, in terms of where their money is coming from. There will be certainly very little visibility into the type of contracts that they’re running, and ultimately, who’s issuing those contracts. I think today, that is where much of the focus needs to be as well as how you unravel that world. How do you assess what the so-called militias or proxy militaries are actually up to? And how do you assume a level of responsibility along contracts or with states to ensure that those companies as entities are properly controlled and the right level of accountability and responsibility is introduced.

Ameem: If I can move the conversation a little bit further east to part of the world where we’re sitting in right now — Singapore. Here you have a very different situation from what you see in the Middle East. As opposed to the Middle East, where Alex talked about this muddled situation, in Singapore very specifically, the state ultimately hold the monopoly of violence and the monopoly over also instruments of violence. Do you still see that ICoCA, or private military companies in general, have a role to play in security provision in a country like Singapore? Maybe here, I am thinking particularly about the maritime sector.

Jamie: Thanks, Ameem. Looking at, South-east Asia, Singapore, the Malacca Strait and so on, yes, I think there is still a role for ICoCA, with a particular focus on maritime security. . And we have, as part of the association, about 20 or so maritime security companies, including a couple that operate out of Singapore; we have a couple of Chinese security companies as well, at least one of them provides maritime security services too. There is interest among our members from the maritime security perspective, and I think it’s an interest which should not be limited in any way whatsoever, because there’s a lack of understanding on what happens on the high seas and on ships with regards to security. It’s much easier to monitor land security operations. You can fly there when the lockdown finishes, see the concessions, understand how the guards operate, rotate, look at the SOPs, etc. The bigger question is: how do you monitor maritime security services? How do you ensure they can get on board ships and see how the company is operating? How do you have visibility of the operations of the guards, be they armed or unarmed guards, aboard the ships? What’s the protection of the seafarers that goes with that? And if I look again at the stats in your part of the world, clearly, there are incidents of piracy which haven’t disappeared, which are potentially on the rise. We’ll also see, of course, an interest in the Belt and Road Initiative and what does that mean from a maritime security perspective? There would also be, I think, some interest on the part of shipping owners, in particular those that have international operations. If they’re travelling through the Gulf of Guinea or coming off the coast of Somalia and the Mozambique Channel or Gulf of Aiden, there will be maritime security elements there as well. So, I think, for inland Singapore, that’s not an issue. It’s not a complex environment. But many of the shipping lanes clearly offer some complexity in terms of their operating environments. So naturally, there’ll be a role there for maritime security and a role for the International Code of Conduct.

Alex: Thank you for this answer. Basically, you have given us inspiration for a new podcast which will probably focus on the complex issue of maritime security, especially given the current perception that piracy is dwindling in East Africa but is increasing in West Africa. Now, please allow me to end with an easy question. That’s a question that we are asking all our guests and it is: what will the future of warfare and security management in complex environment look like in the coming 30 years?

Jamie: Thank you very much, Alex. I presume we have another half an hour in this podcast to answer this particular question. Interesting that you should ask this question. So, we, the association, at the end of last year organised our first workshop to look at future security trends with regards to the provision of security in different environments, and we looked 30 years down the road. On many levels, of course, we’re in speculative mode, not necessarily knowing what we’re going to see in 30 years from now. But we’re able to identify two or three key trends in terms of the major dynamics and the potential risks that should be considered.

I think the first trend is that a number of major western militaries as well as Nato have recognised that there’s going to be growth in the use of private security contractors in the foreseeable future. It’s not something that’s going to disappear. This is not simply a post Iraq blip; it is a trend in terms of growth, in terms of alliance and we can see private security stepping in where public security forces are unable to commit and apply their own responsibilities.

Two or three broader trends that we looked at in terms of how this would affect security are the recognition in terms of urbanisation. We’re seeing of course, a major trend in urbanisation, the growth of mega cities; the question is how do you police these mega cities. How do you manage security in highly urbanised environments? And how do you manage security in ungoverned spaces if most people have moved to urbanised environments? Another trend, of course, is what will be the impact of climate change and resource on security and the creation of insecurity; what will security look like there? And what will that give rise to in terms of problematics, in terms of provision security and insurance security for local communities?

There is also the issue of the positive as well as negative impact of technology. As most countries have gone into lockdown [due to the coronavirus pandemic], we’re seeing how technologies are being used right now to allow individuals to operate, to communicate and so on. [Even as we face the fallout of the lockdown on the economy and other areas, we are witnessing] the potential that technology offers — that technology could be a very positive tool, or range of tools, that can be made available to security providers. And the question then would be, you know, how does one use that technology? How does one ensure that human rights are naturally protected? What would that technology look like? Would it be drones? Would it be other forms, and so on, so forth?

So, urbanisation, climate change and technology are three major trends that we need to think about which are going to make the environment a bit more complex. And I think the last piece, which we’re looking to have some discussions on as well, is exactly what we’re living right now — a major health crisis. A Covid-19 type of situation occurring again, combine the pandemic with technology and urbanisation. And if we believe everything that [expert] individuals tell us, that this is the first of many such pandemics, and you overlay that with existing trends that we saw last year, and we project ourselves 30 years from now, there will be some major questions in terms of how do you effectively deliver security in those environments, given that there could be a different range of security threats and issues confronting any one of us.

Ameem: Thank you so much, Jamie, for being with us today and bringing a very fresh perspective into this topic. Normally, when people think of this world of private military, they think, you know, that “might is right”, [they think] of a lawless world. But what you bring into the system is that there is a way in which order can be brought in, even in this state and there is a set of code of conduct. A lot of work that ICoCA has been doing is bringing that kind of order into this world. So again, thank you, Jamie, for being with us and sharing your thoughts with us today.

I want to end this podcast by also thanking the people behind the podcast team. In particular, I want to thank Eugene Lim, Alastair Loh and Lim Wei Chean from the MEI Events and Communication team, with special thanks to MEI Associate Director Carl Skadiang, for their support. And also, thank you to all the listeners who are listening to us today and even sending us your comments. Please keep on following us on our social media platforms and our website, and continue sending us your feedback.

I want to end [this podcast] by plugging our upcoming [episode] with Mr Doug Brooks, who is President Emeritus of International Stability Operations Association or ISOA, with whom we will continue this discussion about private military sector and bringing in order and rules into this world. Thank you everyone for being with us today.

This transcript was prepared by Alastair Low, Intern, Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore.