Abstract

The United States has long been regarded as the pivotal power player in the Middle East — leaving its mark in war and in peace for half a century. If President Donald Trump wins a second term, will he double down on his “maximum pressure” against Iran — and will it yield the better-than-JCPOA grand bargain he has promised? Will his Israeli–Palestinian “Vision for Peace” gain traction and wider Arab–Israeli peace achieve momentum? If Vice President Joe Biden assumes the presidency, will American diplomacy take a different tack in the region — asking more of traditional allies and also seeking convergence with now-disaffected European partners? And how is America’s Middle East policy likely to factor into the US election? We’ll look at the two candidates’ records, and domestic and regional factors.

This public talk will be conducted online via Zoom on 7 October (Wednesday), from 9.00am to 10.30am (SGT). All are welcome to participate. An e-invite will be sent to you closer to the event date.

This event is free, however, registration is compulsory.

Photo caption: This combination of pictures created on September 24, 2019 shows US President Donald Trump at UN Headquarters in New York, September 24, 2019 and Democratic presidential hopeful former Vice President Joe Biden at Texas Southern University in Houston, Texas on September 12, 2019.  Photo: SAUL LOEB and Robyn BECK / AFP

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By Fauzan Arif Roslee
Research Associate, Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore

How would President Donald Trump’s second term or a Joe Biden presidency look like for American foreign policy in the Middle East? In answering this question, Mr Jason Isaacson drew upon his extensive work of advising US policymakers on the Middle East.

He began by giving an overview of the approaches undertaken by past US presidents towards the Middle East since 1991 during the George H W Bush administration at the end of the first Gulf War. At the time, President Bush had established a coalition of 35 countries, led by the United States, with support from the United Nations, to push Iraq out of Kuwait. In the course of assembling the coalition, which included several Arab states, the US had developed closer diplomatic ties in the Middle East than ever before in economic and military cooperation. At the same time, due to the delicate situation at the time, Israel — despite being attacked by Iraq — had agreed with the US to not take part in the coalition so as not to upset the participating Arab states. Due to America’s active involvement in the Middle East then, the Madrid Peace Conference was convened in October of 1991 to facilitate the Israeli– Palestinian peace process. This was then followed by the multilateral phase of the peace conference in Moscow in 1992, which saw Russia and the United States become active partners in moving the process forward.

Later, when Mr Bill Clinton was elected president in 1993, the US continued to take an active interest in the Middle East, and facilitated the signing of the Oslo Accords, an initiative undertaken by the Israelis and Palestinians together. However, in President Clinton’s second term, the Israeli– Palestinian peace negotiations broke down and saw the outbreak of the Second Intifada in late 2000. Nevertheless, Mr Bush and Mr Clinton had successfully developed a set of relationships in the Middle East with Arab states as well as with Israel throughout the 1990s. During the same period around the mid-1990s, some Arab states such as Qatar, Oman, Morocco and Tunisia had also begun to develop low-level relationships with Israel.

When Mr George W Bush became President in 2001 and the September 11 terror attacks on US happened, the US began to have a completely different outlook towards the Middle East as it launched the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. The turns of events meant that the Bush administration had taken a different kind of involvement in the Middle East from its predecessors. Meanwhile, the US and Israel continued to enjoy close relations, despite the former’s reasonable criticism against the Israeli settlement policy.

Afterwards, during the Obama administration, during his first few months in office, Mr Barack Obama made state visits to Turkey followed by Egypt, where he delivered a major speech in Cairo promising a very different approach to the Arab world than what had existed under President Bush. The speech was delivered against the background of antagonism from Arab leaders and the Arab public towards the United States. Despite that, President Obama had promised to move the Israeli– Palestinian peace process forward and alter the perception of the United States across the Arab world.

When the Arab Spring broke out across the Middle East in 2011, Arab autocracies saw how President Obama spoke out against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak — well-regarded as a long-time ally of the US and probably the most important Arab leader in the Middle East at the time — as he was besieged by his people in Tahrir Square. The support that the Obama administration had lent to the Arab Spring had earned the US discredit amongst Arab leaders. Later on, the administration’s attempt to advance the Israeli–Palestinian peace process did not materialise. In fact, towards the end of Mr Obama’s second term, the United States did not — as it typically would — veto a UN Security Council resolution that was critical of Israel and its settlement policy. As such, the Obama administration was despised by many in the Arab World as well as the Israeli leadership.

When President Donald Trump took office, it was clear that his administration was going to take on a different approach towards the Arab world. From the onset, President Trump and his advisors had been meeting with the Israeli and Palestinian representatives to discuss the peace negotiations. More importantly, his first foreign trip as the president was to Saudi Arabia, before visiting Israel. The message of that foreign trip was to highlight the strong alliance between the US and Israel. This was evidenced by the Trump administration’s lack of criticism towards Israel on its illegal settlements, while being more critical of the Palestinian leadership.

It was clear that the Trump administration was keen on working directly with Israel, but not necessarily in direct partnership with Palestine as the previous administrations had done. This led to the move of the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, which had not resulted in a massive uproar across the Arab world as anticipated by many observers. Mr Isaacson also pointed out that the defunding of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) which had been providing aid to Palestinian refugees was a clear signal from the Trump administration to the Palestinian leadership to come to the negotiating table on the terms set by the US and Israel. This had resulted in Palestine shunning the peace plan negotiations due to the Trump administration’s offensive stance.

At the same time, the Trump administration had also been working on an economic and political plan for the Israel–Palestinian negotiations that was announced in June 2019 and January 2020 respectively. However, those plans had been drawn up by only US and Israel, without any input from Palestine. Despite that, the plan was not vigorously objected to by many Arab leaders. This is simply because President Trump has overhauled the approaches taken by President Obama towards Arab autocracies. Under President Trump, the US did not criticise human rights records of Arab states, refused to work with the Iranian regime which is viewed as a regional threat in the Middle East, and maximised weapons trade with Arab states. Therefore, President Trump had regained friendship with Israel and earned the loyalty of the Arab leaders. Against the backdrop of this political climate, the Abraham Accords were signed as Israel and the Arab states gained support from the United States.

Despite America’s exit from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the “maximum pressure” campaign that the Trump administration has applied against Iran to stop it from redeveloping a nuclear programme, many critics have voiced out that Iran is still causing trouble in the region by providing weapons to the Houthis in Yemen, assisting the Assad regime in Syria, as well as keeping Lebanon destabilised.

According to Mr Isaacson, a Biden administration would take a different approach is some respect, but maintain some consistency in the existing US foreign policy in the Middle East. For instance, if the Biden administration intends to reinstate the JCPOA, it would have to review the conditions under which the original agreement was laid out in 2015 since Iran has begun to increase its uranium stockpile after the US withdrew itself from the plan in 2018. At the same time, the US under the Biden administration will also need to call Iran out on its support for the Houthis and Syrians so as not to destabilise the region. Mr Isaacson said he expects the Biden administration would possibly gradually lift the economic sanctions against Iran if it agrees to the JCPOA agreement again, and possibly establish a long-term plan to ensure that Iran will not support any acts of terror in the region and beyond.

Mr Isaacson added that a Biden administration can be expected to advance a wider Arab–Israeli peace and build on the Abraham Accords for other Arab states to normalise relations with Israel, while at the same time corralling the Palestinians to come to the negotiating table for the two-state solution. In sum, a Biden administration would see the US returning to a more traditional formula in its Middle East foreign policy.

Highlights from the Q&A

During the Q&A, a question was raised about a Biden administration’s energy policy. Mr Isaacson pointed out that Mr Biden has been on both sides of the Green New Deal and has not been forthright about his stance on fracking. However, Mr Isaacson said he anticipates a Biden administration to take on a more pragmatic approach, yet more restrictive than the Trump administration with regards to its energy policy.

Another question was about what a second Trump administration or a Biden administration could mean for Yemen. Mr Isaacson said that a Biden administration would probably be strong critique of human rights records in the Middle East, and thus would not be complicit with the Saudis in their campaign in Yemen. A Biden administration will also seek to de-escalate the situation further after the Emiratis have pulled back their troops from the campaign as well.

One question was also posed about whether there is a possibility of ongoing negotiations to get Iran to normalise ties with Israel. Mr Isaacson maintained that the simple answer is that it could not be possibly happening at the moment. However, historically, Iran and Israel had enjoyed close relations prior to the 1979 revolutions. This could mean that there can be a possibility of Iran normalising its ties with Israel, but Mr Isaacson added he doubts that it will happen anytime soon.