Tumult in Tunisia By Rana B. Khoury

Responding to the abrupt overthrow of the former President of Tunisia, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the Middle East Institute held a “Breaking News Dialogue,” on 21 January 2011. MEI brought together three experts in Middle Eastern politics to address the rapidly evolving “Jasmine Revolution” in Tunisia: Professors Samer Shehata and Noureddine Jebnoun of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University, and Prof Michael C Hudson, Director of MEI. The Institute utilized videoconference technology to bring real-time analysis from Washington, D.C., to the NUS Bukit Timah Campus.

Professor Jebnoun provided insight on an event in the Arab world lacking contemporary precedent, focusing on the domestic political atmosphere that bred the revolution. He speaks from an academic background in political institutions, democratization, and authoritarianism, and also has valuable experience from years of teaching at the Tunisian War College, the Tunisian Command and General Staff College, and the Tunisian National Defense Institute.

The regime of Ben Ali, in place since 1987, had become increasingly reliant on its security forces, according to Jebnoun. This high level of repression was compounded by unsustainable social and economic development. In the eyes of the West, Tunisia has been a model of liberal market policies for decades. Yet, for many ordinary Tunisians this model was actually a Potemkin village belying the reality of a ruling class accumulating immense wealth as the quality of life of most citizens declined. Following the self-immolation of an educated young man reduced to street peddling by the name of Muhammad Bouazizi on 17 December, a psychological wall of fear broke down across the country, culminating in the sustained protest that brought down Ben Ali‟s regime. This, according to Jebnoun, is nothing less than a restoration of Arab democracy.

Professor Samer Shehata offered the lessons learned by political scientists who, like most observers, did not foresee this „restoration of democracy‟ in the authoritarian Arab world. Shehata has taught and researched extensively on comparative, Islamist, and Middle East politics. Explaining the unexpected defeat of authoritarianism, he accounted for differences in regimes‟ exercise of power that range from „semi‟ to „full‟ (Tunisia) authoritarian models. The Tunisian case also demonstrated how quickly regimes can fall (less than one month), despite missing many elements that political scientists have identified in past social movements, such as political opportunity and resource mobilization. Drawing upon his own research in Egypt, he highlighted the “demonstration effect” of the Tunisian tsunami on neighboring Arab societies.

Shehata also contended that this revolution is a counterbalance to common Western approaches and understandings of the Middle East. Demonstrations against high food prices and unemployment dramatically illustrate the consequences of neo-liberal economic reform. Further, the role of political Islam is conspicuously absent from this expression of Arab desires and values. Finally, he cautioned against overstating the role of social media, which has been a precious resource for the Tunisians, but not a cause of the revolution itself.

Professor Michael Hudson, whose work on legitimacy in Arab politics remains as salient as ever, also spoke to the need now for political scientists studying the Middle East to reassess the prevailing theories that stress the “over-determined” causes of “persistent authoritarianism.” He too dwelt upon the impact of the revolution on other regimes in the region whose rule is uncomfortably similar to that of Ben Ali. Their reactions have been tepid, though not oppositional (except for Qaddafi in Tunisia). While not offering free and fair elections, Arab regimes are increasing food subsidies to their grieved populations. But these once-formidable regimes appear impotent in the face of demonstrators in Cairo and elsewhere who are seemingly propelled by the scent of Jasmine in the air.