On Ashura — a significant Shia holy day that in contemporary Iran represents both Islamic ideology and political resistance against oppression — Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made an unexpected public appearance. His presence at a religious ceremony held in a prominent mosque caused a frisson of excitement among attendees: It was his first public appearance since the outbreak of war with Israel on 13 June. Since Israel began striking targets in Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei had only released three brief video statements, and remained hidden amid threats that he was a target. His appearance after a ceasefire between both sides was meant to show personal resolve, as well as send a calculated political message to both supporters and opponents: The Iranian regime remained intact and unshaken. By publicly participating in a major religious event, the Supreme Leader aimed to project strength, stability, and fearlessness in the face of threats, including assassination, from both Israel and the United States.
Ayatollah Khamenei’s appearance was also calculated to capitalise on the strong sense of nationalism that emerged among Iranians during the 12-day conflict with Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s direct address to Iranians, in which he exhorted them to rise up against what he called an “evil regime”, was met instead with an unexpected display of unity and solidarity. Even opposition figures — some of whom had previously advocated for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic, or were forced into exile due to their political beliefs — came together to condemn Israel’s attacks and oppose statements made by Mr Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump regarding regime change in Iran. Notably, when Reza Pahlavi, the son of the last Shah of Iran and an opposition leader, called on Iranians to seize what he called “our Berlin Wall moment”, he was rebuffed — not a single demonstration took place.
These events have demonstrated that when faced with a choice between rallying around the flag and foreign threats or interference in domestic affairs, the majority of people would side with the existing regime, even though they disagree with its policies. Despite Mr Netanyahu’s repeated claims that Israel’s strikes were directed against the regime, and not the Iranian people, the public felt the exact opposite.
This response is particularly notable since it was the first time since the 1980-1988 war with Iraq that Iranians were facing a direct foreign threat. After that war, Iran’s strategy of forming an “Axis of Resistance” largely kept conflict far from its borders. But while it kept itself safe from external threats, the country was roiled by a series of major domestic disturbances, from widespread protests against economic hardship in the early 1990s, to the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement inspired by the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini while in the custody of the morality police. Violent putdowns of these popular movements, along with deepening economic hardship, gave rise to widespread disaffection among Iranians against the regime — in the first round of presidential elections in 2024, just 39 per cent of eligible voters turned out, a record low.
However, Israel appeared to have overreached when it began striking Iran on 13 June. While the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) initial attacks were aimed at military, command and control, and Iranian nuclear programme targets, subsequent warnings for citizens of Tehran to evacuate, and the striking of civilian infrastructure such as residential buildings, provoked widespread anger among the population. This anger, directed at Israel rather than the government, was further intensified when President Trump warned residents of Tehran to evacuate the capital on 16 June, forcing an estimated 10 million people to try and flee hurriedly.
The fury soon turned into a sense of nationalism that manifested itself in various forms. One of the most notable expressions occurred after the war, coinciding with the beginning of the month of Muharram — one of the most significant periods in Shia Islam, marked by mourning rituals leading up to the commemorations of Tasu’a and Ashura. A remarkable shift was observed in this year’s rituals, particularly in the content of maddahi, the ceremonial recitation of eulogies and religious poetry, which emphasised patriotic and nationalistic themes instead. Notably, the term “Iran” featured prominently, often standing alone without reference to broader concepts such as the ummah (the global Muslim community), which have traditionally been central to these religious narratives.
Officials were quick to recognise the unexpected nationalistic response, and moved to express solidarity with the people, particularly via state television. Based on BBC Farsi’s analysis of the three video messages broadcast by Ayatollah Khamenei during the 12-Day War, he referred directly to “the people”, “the nation”, “the country”, and “Iran” 13 times in the first; in the second, “the nation” and “Iran” were used 47 times, while the third contained 41 references to “people”, “nation”, and “Iran”. Another notable development was the Supreme Leader’s direct request — following his first public appearance after the war — for a maddah (religious eulogist) to recite a poem specifically about Iran. This marked the first time he had publicly called for a performance centred on Iranian national identity, rather than purely Islamic themes.
Despite these developments, a critical question remains: Will Ayatollah Khamenei leverage this moment of unity to pursue meaningful reform? His request for a nationally-themed poem may signal an early shift in narrative, from one centred exclusively on religious identity to one that increasingly embraces a broader nationalism. Another hint that the sands may be shifting is the fact that Iran has not clearly rejected negotiations with the Trump Administration even after the US attacks on its nuclear facilities. This stands in contrast to its position in 2019, when Ayatollah Khamenei dismissed a letter delivered by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on behalf of President Trump as “not worthy” of a reply.
The inclusion of diverse viewpoints on state television to analyse the 12-Day War suggests a modest opening in public discourse. In one instance, the political activist Mohammadreza Jalaeipour, who has been detained several times, was allowed to say his piece. In another, former minister Ata’ollah Mohajerani, who served under reformist President Mohammed Khatami before being fired, and who now lives in exile abroad, made an appearance. But while significant in the Iranian context, such limited efforts are unlikely to restore public trust — meaningful and tangible reforms are essential for rebuilding confidence. The current wave of national unity may prove short-lived if the public does not witness any changes, particularly its growing demand for the release of political prisoners, which has so far been ignored.
One of the key obstacles to change is the prevailing security environment in Iran. Concerns about Ayatollah Khamenei’s personal safety, particularly the risk of assassination, may prevent him from addressing the public directly, or meeting officials to initiate and guide meaningful change, soon. Additionally, the regime has been staggered by the level of Israeli penetration within the country. In recent weeks, it has been consumed with rooting out collaborators with Israel, arresting and executing many suspects, as well as expelling 800,000 Afghan refugees, a prime target of suspicion, in a spasm of reactive action.
For now, the Islamic Republic is sticking to its declaration of “victory” over Israel and the US. But whether the vulnerabilities exposed by the war could lead it to adopt a more restrictive approach, rather than one addressing Iranians’ existing discontent — which has been papered over by the outpouring of nationalism — remains up in the air. An analysis of the Supreme Leader’s past behaviour offers few clues: Ayatollah Khamanei has had many opportunities to initiate changes in the past, but has consistently refused to. That said, there are also indications that he is willing to exercise some flexibility, particularly when he senses the country is at an inflection point. For instance, in the 2024 presidential election, with public discontent threatening to boil over, the reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian was allowed to stand, and was subsequently elected president. This was a stark change from the 2021 election, when only hardliners made it past the Guardian Council’s vetting process, resulting in the election of the widely-unpopular Ebrahim Raisi, whose death last year gave rise to a range of public reactions, including calls for a shift in governance.
Image Caption: Shiite Muslim mourners hold portraits of Iran’s Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during a religious procession held to mark Ashura, on the tenth day of the Islamic holy month of Muharram in Karachi on 6 July 2025. Photo: AFP
About the Author
Dr Zeynab Malakouti is a Visiting Fellow at the Middle East Institute-NUS. She holds an LLM in Human Rights from the University of Reading, UK, and a PhD in International Law from the University of Leeds, UK.
