President Donald Trump’s recent visit to the Gulf has sparked much speculation about his views towards Israel, with many seizing on the fact that he did not visit the country to question whether the United States was putting some distance between itself and its closest ally in the region. When Vice-President J.D. Vance also shelved what was reportedly a planned visit to Israel, it drove speculation to fever pitch.

The tongue-wagging should not come as a surprise: After taking power in 2017, Mr Trump also made Saudi Arabia the first stop on his maiden overseas trip — but Israel was part of a swing through several countries after he left Riyadh. For decades, the American engagement in the Middle East has been Israel-centric, anchored by defence cooperation, but branching out to trade and investment, buttressed by ideological and political alignment.

But in the eight years since Mr Trump’s first visit and his most recent one, the Gulf has changed dramatically. The massive capital surplus in the region, and the ambitious outward investment strategies of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, have transformed their economic diversification agendas — which were initially seen as ambitious, but beset by challenges — into a magnet for businesses, not least the American President, who prides himself on his “dealmaker” label.

The Gulf states’ interest in artificial intelligence (AI), sports, and financial services offers more attractive opportunities for Mr Trump’s business-first worldview. The reported haul from his recent trip was eye-watering: He walked away with a fistful of deals, which included a Saudi pledge of US$600 billion in investments, a US$96 billion Qatari deal for 210 American-made Boeing aircraft, and a 5-gigawatt mega-complex in the United Arab Emirates.

But with the war in Gaza continuing to dominate the regional landscape, Mr Trump had little choice but to give Israel a wide berth this time around: It was a bid to de-link US interests with its wealthy Arab partners from its ideological commitment to Israel. This should not be misconstrued as abandonment; rather, it echoes the so-called “de-hyphenation” policy the US pursued in South Asia from the mid-2000s. Back then, Washington’s Cold War calculus had alienated India for decades, in favour of Pakistan’s utility against Soviet expansionism, extending to the Moscow’s invasion of Afghanistan. But as India’s economic rise accelerated its emergence as a potential counterweight to China, Washington was compelled to re-evaluate its strategy, and engage both countries on their own merits. Shifting away from a zero-sum game, the US reached a civil nuclear deal with India, a first building block  the broader strategic partnership that exists today, while preserving security cooperation with Pakistan.

In the Gulf, the growing economic significance of Arab partners and their own diplomatic agency are similarly driving “de-hyphenation”. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have taken notably different paths, but both are reshaping their ties with Washington based on mutual benefit and strategic independence.

 

 

The UAE: The Abraham Accords and AI Diplomacy

 By signing on to the Abraham Accords, Abu Dhabi earned Washington’s confidence that its US partnerships would not be wielded against Israeli interests. Deepening Israeli-Emirati ties, combined with a forward-leaning AI strategy, enabled the UAE to secure a multi-billion-dollar deal in April 2024 — the US$1.4 billion agreement between G42 and Microsoft — brokered under the Biden Administration. Notably, the long statement by the White House following President Mohamed bin Zayed’s meeting with President Joe Biden in Washington relegated Gaza and regional security issues to a minor mention to the very end, signalling an implicit shift from the traditional focus on counter-terrorism and energy.

The UAE also anchored itself in the broader geopolitical arena by aligning with the US-led Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), challenging China’s influence through its strategic port network. These achievements occurred despite Mr Biden’s previously skeptical stance towards Gulf monarchies, and reached new heights thanks to Mr Trump’s “love-fest”.

This cooperation, however, comes with caveats. The UAE’s ambition to acquire F-35 jets — presented in an official White Paper as “Frontline Defense for the UAE, US, and Partners” — was ultimately blocked. Congressional approval was denied in adherence to the US’ legal commitment to Israel’s Qualitative Military Advantage (QMA), enshrined in a 2008 amendment to the Arms Export Control Act.

 

 

Saudi Arabia’s Beijing Card

While the UAE pursued “de-hyphenation” via engagement with Israel and the tech corridors of Silicon Valley, Saudi Arabia charted a course anchored in strategic autonomy, and leveraged through its growing partnership with China. Over the past two years, Riyadh has recalibrated its alliances, signalling to Washington that it will not predicate American relations on normalization with Israel.

The most illustrative example of this shift was the China-brokered rapprochement with Iran in March 2023. The move not only reshaped the Gulf security architecture, but also challenged the long-held US monopoly over mediation in the Middle East. For the first time, a major breakthrough in Arab-Iranian relations occurred without American involvement, with Riyadh and Tehran jointly signalling the limits of Pax Americana.

Saudi Arabia’s growing economic interdependence with China has further reinforced this trajectory. Energy remains a cornerstone of Sino-Saudi relations. The Kingdom continues to be a key crude oil supplier to China, with exports averaging around 1.75 million barrels per day. On the investment front, China has emerged as Saudi Arabia’s leading source of greenfield foreign direct investment (FDI), with investments totaling US$21.6 billion from 2021 to October 2024. Approximately one-third of these investments are focused on clean technologies such as solar, wind, and batteries. Notably, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Riyadh in December 2022, Saudi and Chinese firms signed 34 deals worth US$30 billion, targeting investments in green energy, information technology, cloud services, transport, and construction.

Unsurprisingly, Mr Trump explicitly acknowledged this trajectory, citing Gulf-Chinese relations as a reason for prioritising the region for his trip, remarking that “they will no longer turn to China. They love us, and we love them”.

 

 

A Compelling Idea, But an Uncertain Future

While Mr Trump’s Gulf visit marks a symbolic pivot for American policy in the Middle East, the road ahead is far from assured. First, the failure to secure a long-anticipated Saudi-US nuclear deal reveals structural limits to this emerging framework, echoing the earlier rejection of the UAE’s F-35 acquisition. Second, just as previous mega-deals during Mr Trump’s first term often fell short of the hype, the new agreements may not materialise due to a lack of instruments and even purpose, or a change in the next US administration. The prospects of declining fiscal capacity in the Gulf countries due to low oil prices may further affect matters.

Third, “de-hyphenation” will likely require not only separating Israel’s calculus from that of the wealthy Arab nations — an unfettered Israel is definitely not on their books — but also from Iran’s when it comes to any negotiations over a nuclear deal. This may put US objectives at odds with each other: It would be almost impossible to attract capital from the Gulf when the region is edging towards an even more volatile phase while attempting to ignore the concerns of both the Gulf countries and Israel about Iran’s nuclear programme. Mr Trump’s latest comments on the war between Israel and Iran, in which he appeared to suggest that Washington is open to action against Tehran, and demanded its “surrender”, add to the turmoil.

Unless peace becomes more than a diplomatic aspiration, even the least ambitious US-Gulf ventures risk stagnation. The vision of a pragmatic, “de-hyphenated” Middle East policy remains compelling, but without political resolve and regional stability, it may prove unsustainable.

 

 

 

 

Image Caption: US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during the Saudi-US investment forum at the King Abdul Aziz International Conference Center in Riyadh on 13 May 2025. Saudi Arabia promised billions of dollars in deals with the United States from defence to artificial intelligence as it threw a lavish welcome for President Donald Trump on the first state visit of his second term. Photo: AFP

 

 

 

 

About the Author

Islam Alhalawany is a strategic analyst and business consultant. He previously worked as an Assistant Professor and Assistant Dean for International Collaborations at Jindal Global University in India. He has extensive work experience with government-affiliated think tanks in Egypt alongside consulting firms in the GCC.