Iran has been on the top of news globally for most of the last three decades. The main reason for this news “popularity” has been its troubled relations with the Western powers, the United States and its European allies. The gradual process of expansion and evolution of the European grouping to the European Union (EU) has now changed the form of expression of European dissatisfaction with Iran from those of individual states to that of the EU. Thus, today, Tehran has troubled relations with both Washington and Brussels.

Iran’s troubled relations with the Western powers, including the ongoing nuclear issue, are the outcome of various factors. Undoubtedly, numerous mistakes of Tehran’s theocratic regime in conducting its foreign policy arising from a range of issues, including the inexperience of those in charge and the regime’s pursuit of ideological objectives, have been a major factor. Such mistakes have surely created fear and suspicion about its objectives among the foreign states, including the Western ones. Its religious nature has also complicated its foreign policy to intensify the mentioned suspicion. However, the core of the conflict is geared to Iran’s breaking out of the sphere of influence of the Western powers and its rising as a regional power with a claim to a higher status, owing to its growing influence in a few strategically important regions, including the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and the Caspian region, and its making an inroad into other region (Latin America and South and West Asia).

There are many political, economic, military, social, cultural, geographical and historical parameters, which have facilitated and will continue to facilitate Iran’s achieving such status. This is notwithstanding the retarding impact of the current Iranian regime on Iran’s economic, scientific, technological and social development with the effect of slowing down the country’s progress towards the mentioned status. Given this situation, the inevitable, but time-wise unpredictable, replacement of the Iranian religious regime with a secular one will not end the current hostile IranianWestern relations although it will surely change their form. The American and European acceptance of Iran as a pole (regional power) in the forming multipolar international system will therefore be the requirement for a viable normalization of Iranian-Western relations. Only can such acceptance ensure a durable framework for conflict-free and constructive relations between the two sides.

 

Background

The 1979 revolution ended the Iranian monarchy as the dominant form of government in place for thousands of years to give birth to the Islamic Republic of Iran. In absence of any popular and well-organized secular/nationalist political party, the radical development brought to power the Shia clergy and their non -clerical political activities allies subscribing to a spectrum of political orientations. Arising from a revolution with the promise of a fundamental change in the country and its governance, the religious elite has since formed a political culture fostering the development of strategies and policies, which in most cases are not in tune with the realities of the country and its long-term national interests. Unsurprisingly, in one form or another, they have provoked opposition inside Iran to gradually shrink the regime’s social basis and outside of the country to help its isolation. Contributing factors to this reality include the inexperience of the ruling elite lacking any relevant skill and experience to statecraft. Within this context, resort to revolutionary/radical rhetoric and advocacy of unachievable causes (e.g., “liberating the occupied Palestine”) have been in part a means to hide its inabilities and failures at home. Additionally, the elite’s religious nature and efforts, though unsuccessful to this date, to remodel the country and its populations according to a religious model has had a negative impact on the shaping of both domestic and foreign policies. To continue its grip on power when its theocratic and undemocratic nature is inconsistent with the Iranian society’s realities and to compensate for the rapid loss of its social basis, the religious elite’s resort to an authoritarian type of governance with its corresponding harsh and irresponsible rhetoric has worsened the situation internally and externally.

Against this background, there is no wonder why the ruling elite and its political system have helped generate negative views about it inside and outside of Iran. Thus, for over three decades, Iran has been on news in just about all regions and countries, including those with no ties of any significance with Tehran. Being a reflection of Western influence in the global media with the resulting ability to promote globally Western views on certain issues, reports on Iran have covered many areas ranging from Iran’s internal affairs to its conduct of foreign policy. In one way or another, they have all sought to portray a negative picture of the country to shape a negative global opinion about Iran. There is no wonder why such objective has been successful thanks to the theocratic regime’s numerous mistakes and wrongdoings. The resulting suitable context has been used by the Western governments, particularly the American one, to advance its national interests by accusing the Iranian regime of activities and programs, which have not been pursued by the regime and for which no evidence is presented. A well-known example is Iran’s pursuit of a secret nuclear-weapon production under the disguise of a civilian nuclear program even though the IAEA in charge verification of such accusations has not found any evidence to this effect during its regular inspections of the Iranian nuclear facility. IAEA has clearly stated this fact over time, including over the last two years.^[1] As a recent example, in September 2009, the then IAEA chief Mohamed El-Baradei stated unequivocally that “there was ‘no credible evidence ‘about an Iranian weapons attempt”.^[2] He added: “I do not think based on what we see that Iran has an ongoing nuclear weapons programme.”^[3]

Regardless of their specifics, the essence of Western reports has been to portray Iran as an international “outlaw” in violation of all internationally-accepted rules, regulations, norms and practices. This pretext has been used as part of the policy of isolating and weakening Iran whose components include various economic and non-economic sanctions imposed by international organizations dominated by the Western powers (e.g., UN), by regional organizations (e.g., EU) and/or by individual states (e.g., USA) followed by their friends and allies. The measures have sought to weaken Iran at the minimum and to prepare ground for a regime change to replace the current regime with a pro-West one, like that of the Shah. The American government has had such policy as reflected in the US Congress approving a budget in 2007 to help the Iranian opposition group to topple the Iranian regime.^[4] This is a mission impossible given the nature of the Iranian society, which removes the possibility of a foreigninduced regime change.

 

Factors Contributing to the Current Troubled Situation

Iranian-Western relations have been on a deteriorating path since 1979. Tensions have been the main characteristics of those relations excluding for a short period in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s. Thus, the election as president of reform-minded Mr. Mohammad Khatami helped reduce tensions between Iran and the West, in general, and between Iran and the EU, in particular.^[5]

Needless to say, there are two parties to these relations whose activities have contributed to the deterioration of Iranian-Western relations and thus both sides, not just one of them, are responsible for the existing situation. On the Iranian side, numerous mistakes of the theocratic regime in conducting its foreign policy have been a major contributing factor. They include the repeated remarks by many highranking clergy and non-cleric politicians/officials as to their supporting a radical change in the international system. They therefore advocated and encouraged the overthrow of the pro-American regional regimes, particularly those of the oil-exporting Arab countries of the Persian Gulf as well as the rest of the Middle East in the first decade of the revolutionary regime (1980s).⁶

Promoting revolutions as a stated policy was also another source of concern regionally and elsewhere during the same period. Clear anti-Western posture of the Islamic regime and its disdain for just about all norms and accepted behaviours in conducting foreign policy and diplomacy were others. The occupation of the US embassy in Tehran in 1980 was a clear manifestation of the latter with an extensive negative impacts on Iran going far beyond diplomacy although it was not, at least officially, a government-organized event. For instance, as a factor, the incident provided a suitable diplomatic environment internationally for the Iraqi invasion of Iran leading to the bloody/devastating Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). Iran’s regional and international isolation throughout the 1980s helped the war prolong and enabled the Iraqi military to violate all internationally-agreed code of conduct with impunity. Iran’s isolation was also accompanied by a wide range of punitive economic sanctions damaging the Iranian economy and paralyzing a major part of its industrial sector while disrupting the Iranians’ daily life because of the resulting shortages of consumer goods.

⁶ Many reports were released on this topic in the 1980, including the following: “Analysis shows Iran seeks to export revolution in fervor,” Telegraph, 12 February 1982 (http://news.google.com/newspapers? nid=2209&dat=1 9820211&id=GaMrAAAAIBAJ&sjid=n_wFAAAAIBAJ&pg=7013,2536915; accessed on 20 May 2010).

Resulting in the exhaustion of the Iranian economy, in the aftermath of the war, the devastating impact of the long war on Iran forced the religious elite to end their revolutionary, provocative and counterproductive foreign policy to avoid other armed conflicts and to embark on a necessary reconstruction project. Despite this major change in the conduct of the Iranian foreign policy out of necessity, Iran has not been successful in ending its isolation and its resulting economic and technological difficulties. Although the Iranian government has not compensated for the loss of its major Western suppliers, it has been able to restore or expand ties with many large and small countries. This is, in part, due to its adoption of a more pragmatic policy, a ‘more or less’ secular policy. In addition, Iran has also ended most direct interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Thus, its adopting a more pragmatic policy and thus pursuing a more or less secular policy enabling to restore ties or improve relations with many countries and ending the direct interference in the internal affairs of other countries have helped the Iranian government expand ties with many large and small developing counties. However, they have not compensated for the loss of its major Western suppliers.

On the West’s part, the clear policy of weakening and isolating Iran of the Western countries has been a major contributing factor to the current hostile relations. In particular, the repeated reference of the major Western countries, especially the United States, to an official policy of regime change in the 1980s and the 1990s and its continuation as an unofficial American policy to this date has been a major negative factor. In this regard, the allocation by the Bush administration of a budget for helping the Iranian opposition groups and individuals further worsened the situation.^[6] As a manifestation of the policy of isolation and weakening, the imposition of many economic and noneconomic sanctions on Iran left in place to this date (e.g., the American ban on selling civilian aircraft to Iran^[7]) has helped perpetuate a sense of Western hostility to provoke a similar Iranian reaction.

 

The Core of Conflict

Without a doubt, there has been a large number of agonizing issues triggering tensions and crises in IranianWestern relations over the last three decades. Looking back 10

at this period, both sides can certainly find many sources of concern and grievances regarding the unacceptable behaviour of each other. For instance, the Iranian government has accused the Western countries, particularly the United States, of interfering in its internal affairs, supporting its armed opposition, including separatist groups, based in the neighbouring countries, seeking to destabilize the regime and the country through various means, including economic ones, and denying Iran of technological advancement through the imposition of various sanctions. On their part, the Western governments have accused the Iranian regime of supporting anti-Western and anti-Israeli extremist groups, of seeking to destabilize pro-Western regimes in the Middle East and of having a clandestine nuclear-weapon program. Briefly, there is no shortage of grievances in their bilateral relations. However, these issues, regardless of their magnitude and importance at a given time, are not the reason for the current state of relations, but its consequences. This is to say that they have surely worsened hostility in their relations, but the main reason for such poor state of relation is a fundamentally different issue not necessarily related to every case of grievance. So long as the root causes of their hostile relations are not addressed, in different forms and with different magnitudes and severity, many other issues will arise in their bilateral relations to cause tensions, crises and conflicts.

Hence the main reason for conflict is a drastic change in the nature of Iran. Despite all its negative implications for Iran, the 1979 revolution, which was nationalist in nature but not in form, helped Iran break out of the sphere of influence of the Western powers, particularly the United States; the latter was the dominant foreign power in the country in its post- WWII era. Iran has since aimed at restoring its status as a regional power lost in the early 19^th century, a feasible scenario given its having all the required ingredients, including a large land, a large, growing and educated population, industrial and agricultural basis, extensive mineral and energy resources and financial means. As an indicator of its strong financial capability, for instance, its foreign currency and gold reserves in late 2008 was estimated to be US$58 billion,^[8] which jumped to over US$100 in late 2009^[9] while its debts were small (US$ 12.03 billion equal to 4% of its GNP) based on the most recent available statistics (2008).^[10]

The loss of Iran has been a major blow to the West’s interests given its strategically important location and its richness in energy (having the world’s second largest oil and natural gas reserves) and its rich, large and growing market, on the one hand. On the other, Iran rising as a regional power in the energy-rich and strategically important regions, namely the Persian Gulf (containing about 60% of the world’s proven oil reserves and 40% of its proven natural gas deposits), the Middle East, in general, and the Caspian region, has been a major source of concern for the West, especially the United States. Iran’s history clearly demonstrates its ability to rise both as a regional and a global power drawing on its vast material and human resources to which a strong will for such status among its population should be added. Apart from obvious reasons for aspiring to an eminent or preeminent status, the latter is a reaction to Iran’s ill-treatment by the global powers over the last two centuries. Hence, Iran’s achieving a strong regional power status is totally unacceptable to the USA and the EU for its direct weakening impact on their power and status especially now when the expanding multipolar international system is weakening their power and demoting them to the status of regional powers after about two centuries of global domination. Therefore, Iran’s rising as a regional power with a claim to a higher status because of potential ability to affect the pace of events in the mentioned strategically important regions has been the main single reason for hostility between Tehran and the West whose leadership is now divided between Washington and Brussels. Many political, economic, military, social, cultural, geographical and historical parameters have contributed to this development and will continue to help it consolidate its regional power status.

 

Historical Grounds

Iran’s current troubled ties with the West and its desire to act as a regional power have their roots in its recent history. As a global power, Iran lost its status in the early 19^th century. For about 6000 years, Iran experienced an eminent status as a strong regional power or preeminent status as an empire corrected for periods of its decline because of its internal problems and/or foreign occupations. In the late 18^th century, various internal factors weakened the Iranian economy and prevented the advancement of the Iranian industries, infrastructure and, particularly, educational/ scientific system only to put Iran on a declining track. As external factors worsening the internal weaknesses, two long and devastating wars with Russia in the early 19^th century (1804–1813; 1826–1828) revealed Iran’s disappearing status as a strong regional power. Making official Iran’s loss of the entire Caucasus and its annexation by the Russian Empire, the Turkmenchai Treaty of 1828 for by Russia on Iran^[11] symbolically heralded Iran’s demotion to the weakstate status from that of a strong regional power capable of meeting the Challenge of the Russian and the Ottoman Empires.

For about a century following the treaty, certain global powers of the time (Britain and Russia) took advantage of Iran’s weaknesses, especially the military one, to plunder its resources, undermine its sovereignty and impose their wills on it. The British monopolized the entire Iranian oil industry paying the Iranian government a token of its annual oil revenue while interfering in Iranian internal affairs on a regular basis. As the dominant power, the British extensively resorted to their gunboat policy to extract concessions from the weak Iranian government. Under the Tsars, the Russian government also sought concessions by using force thanks to its ability to dispatch the Russian military to Iran at will as a neighbouring power. Apart from direct interference in Iran’s internal affairs, maintaining military and/or police forces inside Iran, presenting unacceptable economic demands and enjoying self-declared judicial immunity for their nationals’ wrongdoings in Iran, Russia and Britain along with the Ottoman Turks undermined Iran’s neutrality during WWI as they occupied the country. The first two powers also undermined Iran’s neutrality during WWII as they occupied it this time along with the United States. In the post-WWII era, the rise of the United States as a superpower removed Russian influence now under the Soviet Union and severely weakened that of the UK. The Americans established themselves as the dominant power in Iran following the 1953 Anglo-American coup. The coup removed the democratically elected nationalist prime minister (Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh) and brought back the Shah to power as a US-puppet. For a quarter of century, the country remained under US influence until the 1979 Revolution.

Between the period 1828 and 1979 when the Islamic Revolution ended monarchy in Iran, there were many attempts by the nationalist forces to end Iran’s weaknesses and restore its powers. From within the establishment, a major effort in the 19^th century failed to become durable as it faced the resistance of the corrupt establishment and lacked a popular social basis as elite-led reforms. The attempt to reform from above also faced the orchestrated opposition of the British and the Russian governments, which used their puppets within the Iranian ruling elite to end it. Taking place almost parallel to the Japanese efforts to modernize their country and end their underdevelopment, it followed the Japanese model, so to speak, without even being aware of the development in the country of the rising sun. Led by a nationalist prime minister (Amirkabir), the initiative sought to modernize the government, the state bureaucracy and the military as a prerequisite for reforming from above. Towards that end, it aimed at ending the power of local influential leaders and restoring government authority throughout the country, establishing a modern educational system, training a cadre inside and outside the country and establishing a viable/modern industrial sector. The removal from power and eventually murder of the prime minister ended the initiative after about four years.

The rise of the Pahlavi Dynasty in early 20^th century began a new period of reform from above. Reza Shah, the founder of the Dynasty, succeeded in establishing a strong central government, ending the power of influential local figures, forming modern military and police and embarking on a major educational program. He was also successful in creating an industrial capacity setting the ground for its subsequent expansion as he expanded and modernized the basic infrastructure. Under the excuse of the growing influence of the Germans in Iran, Iran’s occupation by the Allied forces in 1941 ended the initiative as a governmentpushed project. It was re-started in the early 1960s when both the internal political situation and the external influences, including the US government, were favourable, of course for different reasons. Drawing on growing oil-generated revenue, Mohammad Reza Shah embarked on a far more extensive modernization and industrialization project backed by the Iranian private sector. This laid ground for a major leap forward supported by a growing educated population. Iran’s strong financial capability resulting from its oil exports and large investments abroad provided financing for Iran’s modernization projects.

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 interrupted the process abruptly. The chaotic situation caused by the revolution was worsened by the mismanagement of the country by the inexperienced new elite. Against a suitable ground in the region and at the international level for ending the revolution and thus preventing its spill over to other countries in the Middle East and particularly the Persian Gulf, the Iranian regime’s numerous mistakes in conducting its foreign and domestic policies and its resulting weakening of Iran paved the way for the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980. As Iraq received the explicit and implicit backing of just about all Western countries and also Eastern countries, including the Soviet Union, the devastating Iran-Iraq War only ended eight years later when Iran was exhausted having lost eight years of potential growth and the fruits of previous decades to advance Iran. Having a heavy toll on Iran in terms of human lives estimated as about 1,500,000 dead and wounded, the destructive war destroyed a major part of the Iranian infrastructure and industries while damaging its natural resources (forests, pastors and fresh water resources). Hence, not only did the first decade of the Islamic regime retard the fast-paced process of development, it also pushed Iran backward on that road.

However, this period also brought about a process of industrialization by force. Iran’s isolation and the imposition of all sorts of economic sanctions on Iran in reaction to the Islamic regime’s behaviours led to Iran’s loss of just about all its suppliers. Given this situation and the limited availability of the required supplies through black markets, the Iranian government had to expand the Iranian industries by pursuing an import substitution policy led by the public sector, the largest sector thanks to extensive nationalizations of private enterprises. Out of necessity, it also encouraged a degree of small-scale and medium-scale private industries as it realized the limited resources of the public sector. Within this framework, meeting Iran’s gigantic defence needs when facing the well-armed Iraqi forces as well as those of its population helped the expansion of the Iranian industries and farming in the 1980s. This trend continued in the second decade of the Islamic regime for various reasons. They included Iran’s limited financial resources compared to its extensive needs, which restricted its ability to import apart from the continued unavailability of many supplies because of the various trade and economic sanctions. Despite its limits and shortcomings, the economic liberalization of the 1990s helped grow the Iranian industries, agriculture and service sectors notwithstanding the numerous restrictions and bureaucratic bottlenecks put in place by the Iranian government. Added to meeting the growing needs of the expanding population, the post-war reconstruction projects and also development projects, Iran’s defence requirements prompted the expansion of the Iranian military industries when the major international suppliers were unwilling to supply its needs. Compared to the civilian industrial sector, the Iranian military industries have become more advanced and successful as evident in Iran’s achievement in its air and space industries. For instance, this is evident in its ability to design and manufacture naval assets such as submarines and destroyers (e.g., guided missile destroyer Jamaran^[12]), design satellites (Omid) and deploy them in orbit,^[13][14] design a space launch vehicle or satellite lifter (Safir¹⁵), produce short- and medium-range missile (Shahab 3^[15]) and develop advanced air defence systems. As a most recent example, in April 2010, Iran unveiled Mersad Air Defence System capable of “resisting electronic warfare”.^[16]

Today, there is no question that Iran is suffering from shortcomings in its industries, agriculture and service sectors added to infrastructure thanks to the continued wrong polices of the ruling elites and the rampant corruption exhausting the country and preventing the realization of its potentials. Briefly, the country should have been far ahead of countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and India both in terms of its GDP and industrial/agricultural advancement, given its much better start in the 1960s and its richness. Hence, when it comes to evaluating the performance of its ruling elite, they have surely failed to realize Iran’s capabilities. Nevertheless, out of force, Iran has turned into an industrialized country capable of embarking on many civilian and military projects by drawing on its large and growing highly educated population. This is evident in its higher education institution have over 3.5 million students in 2010.^[17]

This capability along with Iran’s strong financial resources has enabled it to emerge as a regional power capable of affecting the pace of events in a few strategically important regions, namely the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Social, cultural, ethnic, religious and historical ties have helped Iran expand its influence in those regions added to its growing economic ties. Clearly, Iran is a force to reckon with in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, for instance, as evident in its influence in Syria, Lebanon, the Occupied Territories and, of course, Iraq. It has also made inroads into the regions far beyond its borders, i.e., Southern and Western Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. For instance, this is apparent in its growing trade with Brazil (US$2 billion in 2009)^[18] and large and growing investment in Venezuela, both located in a region traditionally known as the American backyard. Since 2005, Iran and Venezuela have signed dozens of agreements covering many sectors, including banking, construction, food processing, engineering, transport, and oil. Their joint investments are estimated to be around US$20 billion.^[19]

Western Reaction to Rising Iran

The rise of Iran as an independent power capable of affecting the pace of events in certain energy-rich and strategically important regions has made the Western powers (USA and EU) concerned, a natural reaction given their vested interest in those regions. This is notwithstanding the fact that, in many cases, there is not any conflict of interests and will not be any in the foreseeable future given the two sides have different objectives. In spite of this fact, the very presence of Iran in those regions, which has challenged the unrivalled power of the Western powers in control of the energy-rich regions for over a century, is considered unacceptable for those powers because of its long-term weakening impact on their global power and influence. Moreover, while Iran faces economic difficulties and lags behind in certain fields of technology, this is not the result of an intrinsic deficiency, but mainly the outcome of over three decades of ill-management of the country. The country has therefore a very realistic potential for rapid growth to address its underdevelopment in certain fields because of its rich material and human resources when a secular and, hopefully, democratic political system replaces the existing theocracy. This is an inevitable scenario arising from the incompatibility of the existing political system with the Iranian realities. The latter was manifested in the “Green Movement” engulfing just about all parts of the country to show the large social basis for change. Lasting well into March/April 2010, the movement was triggered by the June 2009 presidential election whose result (re-election of the incumbent president) was widely contested. Having said that, no one can predict a date for a regime change prompted by Iran’s internal dynamics. Given this distinct possibility, if not probability, the USA and also the EU are especially concerned about Iran’s rise as a regional power, which could lead to a much higher status for that country over time.

Against this background, it is true that there have been many issues leading to tensions, crises and conflicts in Iran’s bilateral relations with the USA and the EU since 1979.

Today, many of them seem to be the major reasons for such poor state of relations given their importance. However, although addressing these issues will have to be an indivisible part of any process of normalization of relations between the two sides, their actual addressing, while a necessity for tension reduction, will not necessarily lead to that objective for as long as the Western powers are not prepared to accept Iran as a regional power with legitimate interests in the mentioned strategically important regions.

This reluctance has been the single reason for the current hostile ties between the two sides. Such reluctance has provided a ground for resorting to various means to isolate and weaken Iran in order to stop, retard or reverse the process of its rise. Within this context, various issues have been used as excuses of which one is particularly well-known: Iran’s nuclear program. Even though Iran’s pursuit of its non-military nuclear program is well within its rights as a signatory to the NPT (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968), it has become a target by both the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for its alleged violation of its NPT obligation. This is notwithstanding the fact that, to this date, the IAEA has failed to find any evidence of such alleged violation, i.e., any indication of its having an active nuclearweapon production as reported many times.^[20] Nevertheless, it has been under various types of sanctions both authorized and unauthorized by the UNSC.

As the most recent manifestation of this policy, the reaction of the USA and the EU to Iran’s agreement with Turkey and Brazil of 17 May 2010 is noteworthy.^[21] Iran needs fuel rods for its experimental Tehran reactor built by the American government about half century ago as part of the American Atom for Peace Program. Towards that end, Tehran has sought to purchase the required fuel rods from a few suppliers unsuccessfully, given a US-led demand made by the UNSC that Iran must ship out 1,200 kg of its lowenriched uranium to Russia first to be further enriched to 20% and subsequently sent to France to be turned into fuel rods. This demand has been unacceptable to Tehran as it is designed to reduce Iran’s low-enriched uranium reserves without providing any practical guarantee that it will actually receive the needed fuel in a timely manner. Iran’s counter proposal as manifested in its deal with Turkey and Brazil meets both sides’ concerns. Accordingly, Iran will ship 1,200 kg of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey, which is trusted by the West as Washington’s closest ally in West Asia and a NATO member housing US and NATO bases while being also trusted by Iran as a friendly neighbour. Turkey will keep the uranium in its territory as a guarantee that both sides will honour their obligations. For its part, the IAEA, through the supplying nations, will provide Iran with 120 kg of 20%-enriched fuel in the form of fuel rods within a year at which point Turkey will transfer the Iranian low-enriched uranium to IAEA or a designated supplying country. If the suppliers refuse to supply Iran with the required enriched uranium, Turkey will transfer back Iran’s uranium to that country.

Although this agreement should end the current impasse in Iran’s ties with the IAEA with respect to the issue and also satisfy the West, the reaction of the US, Britain and France has been negative. They all have rejected the Iranian-Turkish deal also guaranteed by Brazil, which along with Turkey, is currently a non-permanent member of the UNSC. They have therefore pushed for new sanctions on Iran when there is no ground for it. For example, a White House spokesperson stated right after the 17 May 2010 agreement: “Given Iran’s repeated failure to live up to its own commitments … the United States and international community continue to have serious concerns”. [He added,] “I think we are making steady progress on a sanctions resolution.”^[22] British Foreign Secretary William Hague also rejected the deal as he held “Work on a new U.N. sanctions resolution must go on. Iran’s move ‘may just be a delaying tactic.’”^[23] Likewise, French Foreign Ministry spokesperson Bernard Valero said: “Let us not deceive ourselves, a solution to the (fuel) question, if it happens, would do nothing to settle the problem posed by the Iranian nuclear programme.”²⁵ The absence of any ground for such reaction was raised by Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, the former director general of IAEA, on 19 May 2010 as he described Iran’s deal with Turkey and Brazil as “a good agreement” and dismissed the sceptical response from Western nations as “a dead end street.”^[24] The development clearly indicates the lack of interest on the part of the West to settle issues with Iran and its preference to prolong the current impact as a means to maintain pressure on that country.

 

Conclusion

The current poor state of relations between Iran and the Western powers (USA and EU) is counterproductive for both sides while it has the potential to escalate to even armed conflicts should the existing hostility continue. Given the experiences of the last 31 years, there is no evidence to suggest that any meaningful rapprochement between the sides could be reached for as long as the clerical regime is in power although tension reductions are still possible. Of course, the eventual coming to power of a secular regime in Tehran with its expected change in the tone and rhetoric as well as style of statecraft will certainly reduce tensions to the extent caused by the immature behaviour of the religious regime. That should help reduce hostility and tension to some extent and create a better environment for negotiations. However, even such drastic development in the Iranian political system will not likely end the current hostile Iranian-Western relations qualitatively for a simple fact. Due to fundamental changes in Iran’s social fabric as well its capabilities and needs, the country will continue to act as a regional power in the strategically-important regions of interest to both the USA and the EU. For as long as the west is unwilling to accept Iran in such capacity, the current state of relations between the two sides will remain in place regardless of the nature of the political system in Tehran. Consequently, the Western power’s acceptance of Iran as a pole (regional power) in the in-formation multipolar international system will be the requirement for a viable normalization of Iranian-Western relations.

 

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36. MOJ News Agency. “Iran, Brazil to Raise Bilateral Trade to $4 bln.” 13 April 2010 (http://www.mojnews.com/en/Miscellaneous/View Contents.aspx?Contract=cms_Contents_I_News&r=484995; accessed on 22 May 2010).
37. “No sign Iran seeks nuclear arms: new IAEA head.” Reuters, 3 July 2009 (http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL312024420090703?sp=true; accessed on 20 May 2010).
38. Pressly, Linda. “The ‘axis of annoyance.’” BBC News, 13 August 2009 (http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8195581.stm; accessed on 21 May 2010).
39. “Q&A: Iran and the nuclear issue.” BBC News, 22 January 2010 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4031603.stm; accessed on 20 May 2010).
40. Rattansi, Afshin. “Iranian planes and hidden toll of sanctions.” Aljazeera, 21 July 2009 (http://aljazeera.com/news/articles/42/Iranianplanes-and-hidden-toll-of-sanctions.html; accessed on 20 May 2010).
41. “Report: Iran shifts foreign currency reserve to Euros.” Gulf News.com, 21 September 2009 (http://gulfnews.com/business/investment/reportiran-shifts-foreign-currency-reserve-to-euros-1.540231; accessed on 20 May 2010).
42. Simanowitz, Stefan. “El Baradei: To dismiss Iranian nuclear agreement would be ‘a dead end street’.” com, 19 May 2010 (http://www.payvand.com/news/10/may/1209.html; accessed on 21 May 2010).
43. “US senators seek regime change in Iran.” Press TV, 17 February 2010 (http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=118814&sectionid=351020101; accessed on 20 May 2010).
44. “U.S.-Iran Relations.” Robert S. Strauss Centre for International Security and Law, University of Texas at Austin, August 2008 (http:// hormuz.robertstrausscenter.org/us_iran_relations; accessed on 20 May 2010). 24. World Bank. World Development Indicators Online. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2010 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator; accessed 1 May 2010).

MEI Publications

• How Far Can Democracy Go? The Case of Lebanon 2005

Hussain Abdul-Hussain  May 2010

• Singapore’s Hadrami Community in Today’s Economy

Ben Simpfendorfer     March 2010

• The Intellectual Roots of Egypt’s Regional Role

Mohamed Soffar

March 2010

• Iran: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in a Wider Regional Context

Prof Anoushiravan Ehteshami           December 2009

• Arab World Economies — Weathering the Storm

Dr Salem Ben Nasser Al Ismaily

December 2009

• China’s Interests in the Gulf — Beyond Economic Relations?

Dr Zhang Mei

November 2009

• Refining the Saudi “Will to Power”

Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian

June 2009

• The Friendship With Israel: India Squares The Circle Dr P R Kumaraswamy

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• The United States and Political Islam: The Dialectic of Hegemony and Resistance

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• The GCC Economies and the Crash: Short-term Weaknesses, Long-term Strengths

Dr Steffen Hertog

April 2009

• Social Change in the United Arab Emirates: Challenges of Migration and “Emiratisation”

Dr Habibul Haque Khondker

February 2009

• The Dynamics of Middle Eastern Political Language

Dr Matthew Gray

February 2009

• Islamisation Trends in Middle East and Beyond

HE Amb Hussein Haridy

February 2009

To request a hard copy of a publication listed above, kindly email contact.mei@nus.edu.sg

To access an electronic copy, please visit www.mei.nus.edu.sg/publications.html

[1] “No sign Iran seeks nuclear arms: new IAEA head,” Reuters, 3 July 2009 (http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL312024420090703?sp=true; accessed on 20 May 2010); “Q&A: Iran and the nuclear issue,” BBC News, 22 January 2010 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4031603.stm; accessed on 20 May 2010)

[2] Q&A: Iran and the nuclear issue, BBC News, 22 January 2010 (http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4031603.stm; accessed on 20 May 2010)

[3] Ibid.

[4] “U.S. Support for the Iranian Opposition,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 9 July 2007 (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/template C05.php?CID=2634; accessed on 20 May 2010); “US senators seek regime change in Iran,” Press TV, 17 February 2010 (http://www.presstv. ir/detail.aspx?id=118814&sectionid=351020101; accessed on 20 May 2010).

[5] For an account on tension reduction during Khatami, see: “EU relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Europa, 7 February 2001 (http:// europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_ third_countries/middle_east/r16004_en.htm; accessed on 20 May 2010); “U.S.-Iran Relations”, Robert S. Strauss Centre for International Security and Law, University of Texas at Austin, August 2008 (http://hormuz. robertstrausscenter.org/us_iran_relations; accessed on 20 May 2010).

[6] In 2002, President Bush labeled Tehran part of the global “axis of evil” and advocated the need for change. The US Congress subsequently allocated US$20 million to promote democracy in Iran. Four years later (2006), the Bush administration requested an additional US$75 million for “democracy promotion” in Iran. See: “U.S. Support for the Iranian Opposition,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 9 July 2007 (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2634; accessed on 20 May 2010).

[7] “The Iran sanctions dilemma,” The Guardian, 1 February 2010 (http:// www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/feb/01/iran-

sanctions-us-airline; accessed on 20 May 2010); “Iranian planes and hidden toll of sanctions,” Aljazeera, 21 July 2009 (http://aljazeera.com/news/ articles/42/ Iranian-planes-and-hidden-toll-of-sanctions.html; accessed on 20 May 2010).

[8] “Report: Iran shifts foreign currency reserve to Euros,” Gulf News.com, 21 September 2008 (http://gulfnews.com/business/investment/report-iranshifts-foreign-currency-reserve-to-euros-1.540231; accessed on 20 May 2010).

[9] “Euro overtakes dollar in Iran foreign reserves,” Bloomberg, 14 October 2009 (http://www.arabianbusiness.com/570545-euro-overtakes-dollar-iniran-foreign-reserves; accessed on 21 May 2010).

[10] World Bank, World Development Indicators Online, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2010 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator; accessed 1 May 2010).

[11] For details of the Turkmenchai Treaty, see: Bahram Amirahmadian, 2000, “The Trend of Developments in the Karabakh Crisis,” Journal of Central Asia and the Caucasus Review 28 (Winter), p. 32.

[12] “Iran navy Launches Destroyer,” ABC News, 20 February 2010 (http:// www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/02/20/2825375.htm; accessed on 24 May 2010).

[13] “Iran Launch Homegrown Satellite, BBC, 3 February 2009 (http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7866357.stm; accessed on 24 May 2010).

[14] Parisa Hafezi, “Iran says it has put first dummy satellite in orbit,” Reuters, 17 August 2008 (http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSHAF75296620080 817; accessed on 24 May 2010).

[15] “Iran Shows Home-Made Warfare Equipment at Military Parade,” Fars News Agency, 22 September 2007 (http://english.farsnews.com/newstext. php?nn=8606310435; accessed on 20 May 2010).

[16] “Iran: Tehran Unveiling of a New Air Defence System Seen as a Warning to the West,” AFP, 11 April 2010 (http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/ babylonbeyond/2010/04/iran-tehran-unveils-new-air-defense-system-inwarning-to-the-west.html; accessed on 21 May 2010).

[17] “IRAN: A snapshot of higher education,” University World News, No.: 0058, 11 January 2009 (http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php? story=20090108195149241; accessed on 21 May 2010).

[18] MOJNews Agency, “Iran, Brazil to Raise Bilateral Trade to $4 bln,” 13 April 2010 (http://www.mojnews.com/en/Miscellaneous/ViewContents. aspx?Contract=cms_Contents_I_News&r=484995; accessed on 20 May 2010).

[19] Linda Pressly, “The ‘axis of annoyance’,” BBC News, 13 August 2009 (http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/8195581.stm; accessed on 21 May 2010).

[20] “No sign Iran seeks nuclear arms: new IAEA head,” Reuters, 3 July 2009 (http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL312024420090703?sp=true; accessed on 20 May 2010).

[21] Julian Borger, “Iran-Turkey nuclear swap deal ‘means new sanctions are unnecessary’,” Guardian, 17 May 2010 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2010/may/17/iran-nuclear-uranium-swap-turkey; accessed on 21 May 2010).

[22] Parisa Hafezi and Fernando Exman. “Iran makes nuclear offer, but West unconvinced,” Reuters, 17 May 2010 (http://www.reuters.com/article/ idUSTRE64G18A20100517; accessed on 18 May 2010).

[23] Ibid. ²⁵ Ibid.

[24] Stefan Simanowitz, “El Baradei: To dismiss Iranian nuclear agreement would be ‘a dead end street,’.” Payvand.com, 19 May 2010 (http://www. payvand.com/news/10/may/1209.html; accessed on 21 May 2010).