Introduction
Iran’s regional stature has grown considerably in recent years, partly as a result of President Khatami’s soft diplomacy and his reform agenda, partly due to the polarization and fragmentation of the Arab order that allowed for a wider distribution of regional power, and finally due to the 2001 and 2003 military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively which effectively resulted in the removal from power of two hostile ruling regimes on Iran’s door-step. Of the two, by far the more significant was the fall of Sunni-dominated Baath regime Iraq to US forces in April 2003, which in effect opened the way for the extension of Iranian influence to the heart of the Arab world. But besides the benefits of geopolitical changes in the region, Iran’s own policies have played a key part in Iran’s role conception and regional power politics. It has been apparent to most observers that Iran’s soft power has been growing for over a decade now and that its views are now an important consideration in regional diplomacy. In addition, its irredentist position in relation to US power in the region post-9/11 has enabled Tehran to propel itself forward to a position of dominance in Middle East radical/ Islamist politics: strengthening Hezbollah in weak Lebanon on the one hand as a power base in the Levant. Deepening its financial, political and military links with the essentially Sunni Palestinian rejectionist groups (Hamas and Islamic Jihad), on the other, has given Tehran new levers to pull at the heart of Arab politics.
Iran in the twenty first century has grown into a regional broker, competing and cooperating with Arab actors at will.
Iran’s nuclear program of course has added a new layer of authority, despite the international controversy and the regional fears that its comprehensive nuclear and satellite launch ambitions have generated. The quo dos from being an independent political, military and now scientific actor are in some ways immeasurable. But they do reinforce the impression and image of a powerful Iran acting in its national interest on the international stage. There is of course a heavy price to be paid for the image and the content of Iran’s power. Iran’s apparent prowess has invited counterbalancing instead of band-wagoning and Iran’s pro-western neighbors have chosen to draw closer to the US and seek protection from the West and also from India and China as a way of heading off Iran’s influence. The West, in turn, has also sought Arab allies to contain Iran’s irredentism. This regional price for Iran’s prowess is matched by the international isolation of the country and also the domestic price for its growing regional role. At home, we have seen a securitization of public life and politics and also massive mismanagement of the country’s political economy since 2005 as misguided populism and militarism took hold. Indeed, this pattern has been reinforced since the controversial re-election of Ahmadinejad in June 2009.
Iran has rarely been out of the news over the last few years. Indeed, as it celebrated the 30th anniversary of its Islamic revolution and the birth of its unique Islamic Republic in early 2009, it was again enjoying full exposure in the international 3
media. Iran was in the headlines for a number of reasons: for the consequences of its apparent political influence and geopolitical weight in the broader Middle East region; for the intensity of its nuclear (and related military) programme; for the diplomatic crisis and economic and political stand-off with the international community that its nuclear intentions and future plans had sparked; for the antics and diplomatic conduct of its neoconservative president; and, for its 10th presidential race in June in which the incumbent was facing a strong challenge from three other candidates for his second and final term in office. The election was of immediate international concern this summer because of the consequences of its outcome for Iran and also for the country’s policy priorities for the next four years. The outside world was keenly interested in the election for it provided the first chance to see beyond the neoconservative Ahmadinejad who had come to power in 2005.
To re-cap, with the overwhelming victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran’s June 2005 presidential election, Iran entered new and uncharted waters in both its domestic politics and foreign relations. Elected on an anti-corruption and religiopopulist platform, Ahmadinejad’s (second round) success in the June 2005 ballot enabled him to take office on August 3rd as the clear champion of the conservative tendencies in Iran — indeed articulating a neoconservative position. President Ahmadinejad began implementing policies consistent with his new priorities and tried to move beyond the established interests of the state as drawn by the two previous administrations of Rafsanjani and Khatami. Ahmadinejad’s policy positions (for example, his vitriolic attacks on Israel and Zionism and his 4 denial of the Holocaust) unsettled nerves at home and abroad, and raised suspicions of Iran’s motives and strategic objectives in the region. Iran, arguably, entered a new era of post-détente after August 2005. Ahmadinejad has drawn considerable support from the Revolutionary Guards (Sepah) and the large paramilitary Basij force and in the relationship with this military elite his administration has been different from all previous ones. His election victory in 2005, one can argue, for the first time brought into the political mix the powerful Sepah and has given them a strong political voice in both domestic and external affairs of the republic. For all intents and purposes, the Ahmadinejad administration marked a break in both policy terms and outlook from its predecessors.
Thus, one can explain, the feverish interest in the June 2009 presidential poll in Iran: would Ahmadinejad lose to a pragmatic and progressive candidate or would he return to power to pursue his aggressive neoconservative policies anew? Given the outcome, since the June 2009 election Iran has continued to hog the limelight, but perhaps now for all the wrong reasons. Allegations of fraud in the June 12th presidential race, followed by brutal suppression of protesters, allegations of torture and Soviet-style show trials of prominent reformists for their alleged conspiracy to carry out a ‘velvet revolution’ in the country, have not only tarnished the republic’s image but have also exposed the deep cleavages in the country’s political elite about the future direction of the country. Credibility abroad and legitimacy at home have emerged as two new and important commodities for Tehran to re-acquire as it reassess its relationship with the world.
But it is worth underscoring the fact that before the June election Iran could not have been more assured of its standing in the region – it had, for one, penetrated the heartland of the Arab world and in both Iraq and Palestine it had established a strong presence. It also had as successfully strengthened its links with Syria and presence in Lebanon. It had established strong links with Islamist groups in Palestine, with Hamas in particular, and built a series of relationships with political forces in post-Taliban Afghanistan. In post-invasion Iraq, moreover, it had emerged as the new Baghdad’s trusted friend and partner and to the chagrin of Iraq’s Sunni Arab neighbours had also created enclaves of Iranian presence all across the country, in Iraqi Kurdistan as much as in the Arab-dominated parts of the country.
Also, with regard to its nuclear programme, Tehran had declared the negotiations over its uranium enrichment activities closed, and by snubbing the 5+1’s July 2008 package of incentives it had effectively rejected any compromise on this matter. Indeed, in the June election campaign President Ahmadinejad was to boast about his administration’s great success in defeating the West’s efforts to undermine Iran’s nuclear ambitions, stating that he had achieved all of Iran’s goals without any compromise or concession. Iran, in his eyes, had emerged stronger and more influential as a consequence – unlike the period in which Khatami had been in charge he emphasised. As he put it, Iran had managed to join the select nuclear club of countries with ease and in spite of western efforts to deny it the fundamentals of nuclear technology and power. On this front too, Iran apparently was worlds apart 6 from so many of its neighbours, for it had single-mindedly developed the country’s scientific base and also the means to defend it. Ahmadinejad argued that for all these achievements, therefore, Iran was in a better position than virtually all of its neighbours.
Iran’s 10th Presidential Poll
With oil prices at historically unprecedented levels too for much of Ahmadinejad’s first term in office (2005–2009), he truly must have felt blessed and incapable of doing anything wrong. In sum, going into the elections, Iran’s regional role and influence post-9/11 was apparently assured and its power unassailable. It was now a great regional power with a finger in every pie, and it was a power that was making rapid and eye-catching advances in the nuclear field as well as in the field of defence and military industries. All that it had to do now, to ensure its place as an international player of some significance, was to show the world the power and authenticity of its democratic system and institutions (though this term democratic would never be used by the Iranian establishment) and the massive grassroots support the regime enjoyed amongst the population. The final act in the return of Iran as a major player was to be in the regime showing the world the robustness of its political institutions and the effectiveness of its participatory processes. Ahmadinejad and his allies expected that on June 13th the world would wake up to a celebration of its political openness and people power as prescribed in Iran’s Islamic system. Indeed: “Just one day before the June 12 presidential election, the Islamic republic had never been so powerful. Tehran had not only survived three decades of diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions but had emerged a regional superpower, rivalled only by Israel. Its influence shaped conflicts and politics from Afghanistan to Lebanon.”[1]
On the 13th of June, though, everything had changed but not in the way that the regime had anticipated, for quite suddenly none of the above assumptions could hold as solidly as they had on the 11th of June, the day before the election.
To be sure, Ahmadinejad’s first term had not been free of problems and it was in fact one of the most turbulent of administrations in the Islamic Republic’s history. The economy had been severely damaged by his administration’s populist policies. The unprecedented and massive oil income had been largely squandered, and inflation and unemployment had reached high levels while productivity had slumped. Also, UNimposed sanctions for Iran’s unwillingness to suspend uranium enrichment had begun to hurt the economy, deterring foreign investors and raising the premium on doing business with Iran. Politically too there had been much instability. There had been a dozen high-level resignations and dismissals between 2006 and 2009, and the president had managed to alienate all strata of core elite members for his management style and ill-advised utterances. More fundamentally, his first term in office had also marked extensive securatization of society and state, with the paramilitary personnel increasingly present in the ministerial, economic and political corridors of power. Universities, intellectuals, the media and public space more generally were severely constrained during his presidency and in sharp contrast to the administration of his predecessor pressures on civil society and democratic discourse were increased.
But overall, the president, the Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Khamenei) and their allies were confident going into the election that their Islamic Republic was secure and its future as a beacon of Islamic resistance assured; in the bargain Iran itself was all powerful too and acting on the world stage on its own terms. Iran was a humiliated country no more and thanks to the revolution and the ‘principalist’ (fundamentalist) policies of President Ahmadinejad, Iranians could hold their head high knowing that their country was a player of influence. And thanks to President Bush’s two wars in the Middle East, Iran was secure in the knowledge that its voice in the region was significant and also that its Arab neighbours were in no position to effectively challenge its role. The regional setting in which Ahmadinejad had operated since 2005 had facilitated his hard line stance on so many regional issues and the spectacular success of pro-Iran Hezbollah militias in 2006 in the Lebanon war between the Hezbollah movement and Israel sealed Iran’s place as the most important Muslim state standing in front of Israel. But, the regional environment in which Ahmadinejad had operated between 2005 and 2009, and the one in which he was to start his second term in office would prove to be entirely different. While in the first period the region was still in the throes of the Bush doctrine (on which more to follow) whose policy outcomes seemed to facilitate Tehran’s radicalism and its support for the so-called ‘resistance front’ in the Arab world, the post-Bush era was to give birth to a whole new American outlook.
The Regional and International Environment I
In looking at the regional setting, it is worth noting that the region’s international relations is complex and unpredictable, and in this context it is useful to remember the region’s strategic setting in the period following the tragedy of 9/11. September 11th 2001 brought into even sharper focus the security dilemmas of the MENA region, at the same time also altering some features of inter-state norms by the inclusion of the war on terrorism as a mandatory aspect of the West’s relations with the Muslim world in general, and the United States’ contacts with the Middle East in particular. The war on terror demanded the adoption of a new grand American strategy which would seek to eradicate the three key sources of threat to America and its interests worldwide, these being: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue actors (states or groups), and regional states pursuing policies deemed hostile to the United States. For the neoconservative-led Bush administration 9/11 provided the logic for pre-emption, ‘anticipatory self-defense’, as the country’s first line of defence. Indeed, the Middle East became the testing ground of the new America project. The Arab world within it was identified as the source of what the US administration insisted was the new danger, and one even greater than that of the old Soviet threat. The new task of American foreign policy was not just to use force proactively but also to reshape the domestic environment of several ‘failed states’ in the Middle East, whose incompetent governments and stagnant economies had nurtured anti-American terrorism. On another front, the impression of intervention as part of a grand strategy was further reinforced by the democratization component of the Bush doctrine. President Bush brought this issue to the forefront of his national security strategy in November 2003, in the course of two major speeches, delivered in Washington (6 November) and London (19 November) respectively. In speaking of a ‘forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East’, he spoke of the need to change America’s relations with the region. In Washington, the president put the emphasis on the need for reform, there was a ‘freedom deficit’, he emphasised. In London on November 19th 2003 President Bush was even more candid, saying that “we must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East…in the past [we] have been willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability. Longstanding ties often led us to overlook the faults of local elites. Yet this bargain did not bring stability or make us safe. It merely bought time, while problems festered and ideologies of violence took hold.”[2]
Thus, post-9/11 the United States launched a ‘root and branch’ reform strategy, finally ditching one of the main planks of the West’s Cold War policies in the Middle East, namely extending full support for all those rulers deemed to be friendly to the West and its interests, irrespective of their policies at home.
In general terms, there is considerable evidence to suggest that after 9/11 the regional balance of power did begin moving away from the great Arab powers and shifting towards such countries as Iran and Israel. But the policies of the Arab states have remained vital to the overall strategic make-up of the region, and their role cannot and should not be underestimated. Within the Arab region itself too, power has been shifting — the role of Saudi Arabia has grown amongst the big three, and some smaller players, with their considerable financial muscle and also US support, have grown in significance. The Gulf Arab countries of Qatar, the UAE, and to a lesser extent Kuwait, fall into this category. These countries are said to be emerging as new influential actors in their own right in the Middle East arena, affecting regional politics in ways that does not always meet with the interests of the major regional actors.
Bush’s war on terror benefitted Iran quite directly for regime change in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) removed Iran’s two enemies from its doorstep and also facilitated the extension of Iran’s influence across the region. Regime change in Iraq also gave Iran another Shia-ruling regime in the region, the first one of its kind in the Arab world for the best part of a millennium. Once Iran was assured of its own security after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003 it began to plot for the extension of its role and influence, and once Ahmadinejad took the reigns in 12
September 2005 Tehran hardened its position on many regional issues, directly challenging the Bush doctrine in the Middle East. Until 2009, therefore, Tehran under Ahmadinejad was content to build on the failures of the Bush presidency in the region and flaunt its intransigence, assured in the knowledge that American’s unpopularity in the Middle East would give Iran’s open anti-Americanism a real boost on the so-called ‘Arab street’. In November 2008, several months before Iran’s own presidential race, the assumptions about American policies in the region were to change. That is, against Iran’s expectation, once Barack Obama had been elected to occupy the White House from January 2009.
The Regional and International Environment II
Thus, 2009 has given us a new start, for the one critically important new element in the region’s strategic equation must be the election of a new American president with an apparently wholly new agenda and outlook. President Obama entered the White House professing a new policy of engagement with the Middle East. He has expressed the interest and the intention to reach out to Iran and Syria, to work towards peace in Palestine, to reduce America’s military presence in Iraq, and to generally mend bridges with the Muslim world. This message of hope and diplomatic engagement is very significant for it signals a different body language to that of the Bush era. It also provides the new administration with breathing space as it sets about embedding America’s new policies and priorities. An America at peace with the region will mean an Iran at odds with it, given that Ahmadinejad built his presidency on that of ‘resistance’ to ‘World Zionism’, Israel, and the United States. What they will do with Obama’s stretched hand, which has been there since his inauguration in January, remains to be seen. Of equal interest is how might Tehran respond to Obama’s qualitatively different ‘carrot and stick’ strategy towards Iran if the parties do not reach a negotiated agreement over Iran’s nuclear programme? Threats of ‘crippling economic sanctions’ emerged alongside the political crisis that the election result has caused Tehran, reinforcing the siege mentality that Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei have been prone to. In this they both have accused the West of plotting the ‘velvet revolution’ in the country, and are arguably therefore less inclined to grasp Obama’s hand in friendship.
In this context, while Obama may have improved America’s image in the world, the standing of the United States will only improve in the Middle East once the peace process leads to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Also, it would appear that the absolute security of Israel is also being linked to the containment of Iran, evidently directly affecting the Obama Administration’s agendas with such global actors as China and Russia.[3] Clearly, containment has been the driver, even in the efforts to establish direct contact with Tehran. Iran’s isolation, through a new American bridge-building exercise with Syria and a reshaping of the Levant’s politics, has been viewed through the same prism. Ironically, even re-igniting the peace process by the new White House has cynics interpreting it as an effort to curtail Iran’s influence in the region. So, while President Obama is seen as a breath of fresh air, regional friend (Israel and Egypt, say) and foe alike remain suspicious and weary of some of his proposed policies, and uncertain of the direction in which his professed priorities will take the region. For Tehran, therefore, in strategic terms change of president in the US does not necessarily lead to fundamentally different policies in the Middle East. So long as this is their mindset, it should not be totally surprising to find that the pro-establishment factions in Iran would go out of their way to ensure the return to the presidency of Ahmadinejad — the hard line and uncompromising president equipped to strengthen the line of regional ‘resistance’ and by extension the power base of the neoconservatives in Tehran.
Iran Post-Election
On June 13th a different set of issues were prevailing. How secure was the regime? How can it recover from its crisis of legitimacy? What will be its foreign policy priorities when so many at home question the legitimacy of its president and also the judgement of the Supreme Leader (the final policy arbiter in the country)? It is of course impossible to say with any certainty where the post-election crisis will lead and what kind of Iran will emerge from the other side. Political change can be rapid, or could require months of gestation before manifesting itself. Even then we will not be sure of the makeup of a ‘new’ Iran. But we can be confident of two things: first, that the relationship between state and society has been changed in ways beyond the regime’s control. Society is fighting to throw the state off of its back, and the more that state pressures the people the more likely that the people will become more daring in challenging the state, and its symbols. Secondly, the relationship between the forces which make up the Iranian power elite will never be the same again. The zero-sum game in play has made compromise supremely difficult and as both camps now fight their battles purportedly for the soul of the revolution and its ideals, we are probably witnessing the disaggregation of the republican state as a single ideological monolith. Failure of the Iranian Islamist republic, therefore can mean the following, in the absence of a huge power change or another revolution: “Iran is at a crossroads… One road is complete militarization and control of the people and being completely cut off from the rest of the world like North Korea, and another road is being the dictatorship it is but opening up to the rest of the world and moving forward with the rest of the world in technology, in athletics and many other respects, which would in turn naturally provide a little bit more freedom for the youth each step of the way.”[4]
Concluding Thoughts
Clearly securitization of the Iranian state has mirrored the rapid militarization of regional politics post-9/11, but it would be foolish to argue that the former was the catalyst, let alone the cause, of the former. Iran’s neoconservatives had been planning their bid for power at the height of President Khatami’s presidency, well before events of autumn 2001. Furthermore, Iran’s neoconservatives represent a coalition of political, military and clerical forces whose roots are to be found in the foundation stones of the Islamic Republic. They certainly reacted to 9/11 by accelerating their drive for power, but they were not forged in response to 9/11.
But the three areas of concern highlighted by President Bush — terrorism, WMDs, anti-Americanism — continue to ring true today. Some of the issues underlined then have acquired an even greater degree of importance and policy urgency since 2008, most notably of course the challenge of Iran’s nuclear programme. This being the case, it is again the reality that Iran’s fortunes are likely to be regulated through its policies in the region and its perceptions of the outside world’s policies towards the ruling regime. What transpires over Iran’s nuclear programme is likely to prove decisive in my view. For a paranoid regime whose whole worldview is shaped by conspiracy theories and fear of regime change, to have its very foundations shaken by its own citizens is not good news. As the siege mentality is reinforced by the boldness of the protestors and their leaders there will be those in the establishment who will in all probability encourage the acceleration of the nuclear programme’s weaponization dimension. For them, survival can only be assured through a strong deterrence: to deter outsiders from interfering in its suppression of the opposition movement at home. None of this is good news — not for the sake of non-proliferation, nor for the sake of a more stable Iran, and improved relations between Iran and the West. We are therefore entering a new period of uncertainty for the region and given Iran’s significant weight and influence in the broader Middle East, developments in this country will cast a shadow over everything else in the region. Ironically, while Washington seems ready for a qualitative leap forward and a comprehensive deal for better relations with Iran, Tehran is nurturing a typical bunker mentality in which western enemies are sought behind every street lamp and imagined conspiracies are uncovered in the most innocent relationships. Tehran today seems less ready to chart a new path for the country in the world than at any time since the 1979 revolution.
In a wider perspective, however, Iranians are now second generation revolutionaries and one might have expected that the country would have settled down into a clearly visible, if not well defined, development path that would also have helped carving its role and position in the international (and by extension the regional) system. Over two decades since the revolution Iran is yet to decide what real role it will play on the international stage. Making its mind up has not been helped, of course, by the tense regional setting and the country’s growing geopolitical importance since the late 1990s. Developments in the region and security turmoil do seem to have had a direct effect on the domestic politics of the country, and so long as Iran sees itself as a beacon of resistance it will not be able to chart for itself an accommodating role, which in turn fuels tensions with its neighbours and the wider international community. Also, so long as Iran and the US see each other as regional hegemonic rivals Tehran will find it uncomfortable to swim with the currents sweeping the region. So, a combination of the above, added to the perceptible deliberalization of public space in Iran since the 2005 and 2009 presidential elections, indicate that the Islamic state has entered a new stage in its evolution, in which personnel changes at the top have brought to the fore new priorities. But these changes have also underlined the force of revolutionary values and ideology in the system. It is quite striking that the rhetoric of President Ahmadinejad has set him apart from many of his predecessors, even Khamenei when he was president in the 1980s. It is a consequence of the fluidity of Islamist Iran, and also the undeniable power of the ballot box where it is allowed to roam, that someone like Ahmadinejad can take center stage and so dramatically change the tempo and mood of the country and at the same time renegotiate the country’s regional role on its own terms.
Thirty years on from the revolution, Iran’s place in the world remains ill-defined, as indeed does its role conception. As we have seen, the very nature of the political regime that grew out of the revolutionary coalition is now being openly contested and as this drama unfolds, things for Iran and also for the Middle East are unlikely to be the same again.
[1] Robin Wright, ‘Tipping Point in Tehran’, Washington Post, July 14, 2009.
[2] ‘President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London’, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 19 November 2003.
[3] Jay Solomon, ‘U.S. Engages Russia, Syria to Isolate Iran’, Wall Street Journal, 4 March 2009.
[4] Paneta Beigi, quoted in Samira Simone, ‘Opposition Movement in Iran not Over, Experts Say’, CNN, 1 July 2009.
[5] Robin Wright, ‘Tipping Point in Tehran’, Washington Post, July 14, 2009.
[6] ‘President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London’, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 19 November 2003.
[7] Jay Solomon, ‘U.S. Engages Russia, Syria to Isolate Iran’, Wall Street Journal, 4 March 2009.
[8] Paneta Beigi, quoted in Samira Simone, ‘Opposition Movement in Iran not Over, Experts Say’, CNN, 1 July 2009.
