By Ahmed Aboudouh*
Since the 7 October attacks by Hamas in Israel, and the subsequent war, China has attempted to portray itself as a neutral power by calling for a ceasefire, condemning the killing of civilians in Gaza, and warning against an expansion of the violence into a regional conflagration — a scenario the military escalation in the Red Sea could turn into reality. Simultaneously, Beijing has used the Gaza war to discredit the United States’ position and undermine its moral standing as a way to gain legitimacy as the leader of the so-called Global South (which includes the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America), which is brimming with sympathy towards the Palestinians. China’s policies towards the war are thus not pro-Hamas or hostile to Israel (although there has been some anger in Tel Aviv over Beijing’s refusal to condemn Hamas): Instead, they effectively reflect an anti-Western neutrality.
Historically, China’s policies towards Israel have oscillated due to domestic developments in the People’s Republic, and shifts in the international system. Two other determining variables for its positions are Beijing’s sympathy towards Palestinians, and its relationship with the US and Arab countries. As Israel’s position on peace with the Palestinians, and the Arab world more broadly, has evolved, so has China’s.
This was evident in China’s approach to Israel during the 1960s and 1970s, which was tinged with anti-colonialism. In 1965, Chairman Mao Zedong described Israel and Taiwan as Western Trojan Horses, saying: “Israel and Taiwan are bases of operation for imperialism in Asia. They created Israel for the Arabs, and Taiwan for us. They both have the same objective.”[2] Since then, the Arab factor has remained at the centre of China’s policies on the Palestinian issue, including during the reform and opening-up era, and after the formal establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992.[3]
Although the Arab factor remained (and still remains) crucial to China’s views on the issue under President Xi Jinping, the US factor decisively took precedence as the strategic competition between the two superpowers sharpened. For example, China’s 2017 four-point peace proposal represented its first attempt at using the Palestinian issue to advance its alternative vision of security and global governance, by promoting the “common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable” concept.
China has thus moved to promoting a form of neutrality that is aimed at achieving leadership in the Arab and Muslim worlds and the broader Global South, while asserting its position as a great power fixed on consolidating its own views of the international system.
Aligning with Arab and Muslim Countries
Right after Hamas’ 7 Oct attack, China was quick to affirm its views on the two-state solution, building on its prior attempts to position itself as a potential mediator to resume peace negotiations.[4] Beijing’s refusal to condemn Hamas triggered anger in Israel. The Israeli Foreign Ministry responded by expressing its “deep disappointment” at the Chinese announcements and statements.[5] China’s position since then has been consistent. It has called for a permanent ceasefire, and allowing more humanitarian aid into Gaza, while condemning Israel’s bombardment of civilians while blocking supplies of essentials, such as food, water, fuel, and life-saving medical supplies, from entering the Strip. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, meanwhile, deemed that Israel’s actions went “beyond the scope of self-defence”, and had inflicted “collective punishment” on the Palestinians.[6] On 20 Oct, the country’s special envoy on the Middle East, Zhai Jun, toured the region, and reiterated Beijing’s willingness to “play a constructive role in easing tensions between Palestine and Israel, and promoting peace talks”.[7]
Taken together, these statements sent a clear signal that the People’s Republic was more interested in aligning its position with the Arab and Muslim countries than in showing an understanding of the motivations behind Israel’s military campaign, or buying into its self-defence messaging. Notably, China was the first stop of the Arab and Islamic Ministerial Committee on the War in Gaza — which comprises the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia, Qatar, Turkey, the Palestinian authorities, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, among others — on 20 November to push for a ceasefire and a diplomatic solution. Mr Wang used the occasion to portray Beijing as a “good friend and brother of Arab and Muslim countries”, and said that it “always firmly supported the just cause of the Palestinian people to restore their legitimate national rights and interests”.[8]
China has also sent officials to Iran to discuss preventing the conflict from becoming a regional war, which has not yielded concrete results thus far. Additionally, Chinese officials thought to build on the normalisation agreement the country had brokered between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023 by maintaining communication lines with both sides on regional de-escalation. During a meeting with Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Waleed Elkhereiji and his Iranian counterpart, Ali Bagheri Kani, on 16 December, Mr Wang reiterated Beijing’s position on the need to achieve “a ceasefire in Gaza, stop the war, promote humanitarian assistance, and resume the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations”.[9]
China has also used its rotating presidency of the Security Council to consolidate global leadership on the war in Gaza and call for a “just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement” of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Beijing also appeared to be siding with the majority of 153 countries — most of them from the Global South — in adopting a resolution to stop the war in the UN General Assembly on 12 Dec.[10] Mr Wang also came up with a five-point proposal which emphasised the Security Council’s role in implementing the relevant resolutions on the two-state solution, and overseeing an international conference that restarts the peace process.[11]
Anti-Western Neutrality
China’s publicly neutral stance in this conflict is a form of hedging designed to undermine Western interests. This could be termed “anti-Western neutrality”. This concept, constructed by the author, serves President Xi’s global vision by focusing on undermining US power and position, and the merits of liberal morality underpinning the global order, while projecting neutrality in a conflict resolution context.
Anti-Western neutrality is a position, and a diplomatic effort designed to align China’s view with the majority of countries in the Global South, while portraying the US as a double-standards-driven hegemonic power.[12] The Communist Party’s leadership drove home the message of the war of narratives with the West during the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs on 27 and 28 Dec, which was convened for the first time since 2018. The readout from the event stated that China has gained “greater moral appeal”, and it is imperative that “on major issues concerning the future of humanity and the direction of the world, we must take a clear and firm position, hold the international moral high ground, and unite and rally the overwhelming majority in our world”.[13]
This has been in the works since before the Hamas attack, and seems to be paying off as China overtakes the US in public perception in the Global South. An opinion poll in June 2023 showed that 80 per cent of Arab youth see China as an ally, while 72 per cent consider the US one.[14] Another public opinion poll in major non-Western countries in November 2023 revealed high compatibility between China’s policies and what people in the Global South want.[15]
It is safe to say that the 7 Oct attack has provided Beijing with an opportunity to double down on this support. Not only does the US now find itself isolated on the international stage, but the morality of its position, credibility as a global power, and absence of its impartiality as the only interlocutor in the peace process is being challenged. In a phone call with his Iranian counterpart on 15 Oct, Mr Wang emphasised this by urging the Muslim World to “speak with one voice” with Beijing on the Palestinian issue.[16]
Undoubtedly, some features of China’s anti-Western neutrality can be observed in its position on the war in Ukraine, where analysts have suggested that Beijing is adopting a “pro-Russian neutrality”.[17] However, in the Gaza war, interpreting the PRC’s position as “pro-Hamas neutrality” paints only half the picture: While China did not condemn Hamas’ attack (though it condemned attacks on Israeli and Palestinian civilians alike), it did not lend its support either. Meanwhile, as it keeps criticising the civilian toll in Gaza, there is so far no evidence to suggest that there has been a change in the trade, investment ties, and high-tech cooperation between China and Israel. The discrepancy between China’s rhetoric and actions towards Israel further reinforces the idea that the American factor is the key consideration in Beijing’s strategic calculations.
Over the past few years, China has demonstrated more confidence in promoting its alternative vision for global governance, which challenges the norms, values, and practices supporting the liberal international order. China’s visions are enshrined in the concepts and norms of the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilisation Initiative.[18] It is also reflected in its objectives for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the vision of building a community with a shared future for mankind, which was explained further in an official document last September.[19]
China’s vision for regional security principles was displayed in the détente agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023. While Iraq and Oman did the diplomatic heavy-lifting in lead-up to the agreement, it demonstrated the two rivals’ support of China’s expanding posture in the Middle East, and their approval of its governance model.
By siding with the countries of the Global South in the Gaza War, China expects to tap on them for support for its other strategic priorities, such as its policies in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Tibet.[20] This could also help China rebrand its policies in Xinjiang by contrasting what it considers politically-motivated Western rhetoric over its treatment of the Muslim Uighur minority with US support of Israel’s killing of innocent Palestinian civilians. To highlight this narrative, the Chinese Embassy in France’s X (formerly Twitter) account published a photo comparing supposedly prosperous Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital, to utterly devastated Gaza.[21]
Domestically, this messaging enables the Communist Party’s leadership to use the Gaza conflict to consolidate the government’s nationalist rhetoric. By highlighting the slew of visits and diplomatic interactions with stakeholders and at the Security Council, China’s leaders emphasise to their citizens that by turning into a prominent voice and potential mediator in the most complicated, high-profile geopolitical issue in the world, it gains international recognition as a great power on par with the US. This approach is aligned with the consistency of China’s position on the two-state solution, and historical affinity with the Palestinians. Indeed, shortly after 7 Oct, Mr Wang stated that “there is no shortage of injustices in the world, but the injustice to Palestine has dragged on for over half a century”, and that China stands for “peace and human conscience”.[22] This is a clear attempt to distinguish between Beijing’s focus on morality towards the Palestinians’ suffering, and the pure pragmatism that dictates its ties with Israel, which are reflected in trade and investments. It also plays into the nationalist rhetoric around the so-called “century of humiliation”, which aims to vilify the US – and the broader West – in the eyes of Chinese citizens.
US Double Standards
The US’ conflicting messages aid Beijing’s cause. On 20 Oct, President Joe Biden compared Israel’s position to Ukraine’s, saying Hamas and Russian President Vladimir Putin “want to completely annihilate a neighbouring democracy — completely annihilate it”.[23]
In Beijing and many other capitals in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, this sparks incredulity — the commonly-held view there is that Israel is replicating Russia’s targeting of innocent civilians and civilian infrastructure, while sustaining an illegal occupation of Palestinian lands.
Likewise, Operation Prosperity Guardian, the US-led maritime coalition that seeks to deter Houthi attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea, is a target for China’s effort to frame the narrative. As of this writing, the US and its allies have carried out eight strikes against multiple targets in Yemen, sparking new fears about a widening conflict.
While expressing its concern about regional instability in the Security Council, China put some distance between it and the US and its allies’ narrow framing of the escalation as exclusively a freedom of navigation crisis. Instead, during a visit to Cairo on 14 January, Mr Wang interpreted it as a direct spillover effect of Israel’s war on Gaza, and highlighted the US-led military response’s ramifications for stability in Yemen and the wider region by describing it as “adding of fuel to the fire of tensions.”[24]
However, the Houthis’ claim of targeting only Israeli ships, or those bound for Israeli ports, complicates China’s calculations. Chinese leaders believe their political backing for the maritime coalition could undermine their consistent support for a permanent ceasefire and a peace process in Gaza. This position naturally throws China’s weight behind the Houthis, since the coalition’s stated goal is to protect freedom of navigation to stave off an international shipping crisis. The Houthis’ attacks are also indiscriminate, and target ships with no ties to Israel, including a Singapore-flagged vessel, and have repercussions for the global economy. China’s stance may thus antagonise regional populations and delegitimise its long-term prospects for the leadership of the Global South.
Bumps on the Road
That is not the only complication for China’s campaign to undermine US credibility.
For a start, China has almost certainly lost its appeal as a mediator and reliable partner in Israel after 7 Oct. In addition to its “disappointing” reaction to Hamas’ attack (in Tel Aviv’s view), and its criticism of Israeli military actions, the state-owned shipping firm Cosco suspended shipping to Israeli ports on 7 January because of Houthi actions in the Red Sea.[25] This may further perceptions within the Israeli leadership that China is an unreliable partner in times of conflict, in stark contrast with the US’ steadfast support and show of sympathy. Even before 7 Oct, Israel has hewed to the US position, as shown by its rejection of Chinese firms’ bids to carry out a desalination plant project in 2020 and a light rail project in 2022 after pressure from Washington.[26] Most importantly, this affirms the complexity and socially-constructed nature of China’s anti-Western neutrality: While Beijing wants to be appear neutral in the conflict, others, especially the parties involved, must also believe it. However, China’s fading desire to follow up on its mediation efforts post-7 Oct — Beijing shelved its proposals in favour of a more enhanced role for the Security Council — shows it has never been a serious alternative to the US in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The Palestinian leadership is similarly unconvinced when it comes to China. During President Mahmoud Abbas’s visit to Beijing in June 2023, Mr Xi pushed for a more prominent Chinese role in mediating the conflict by elevating bilateral relations to the “strategic partnership” level and offering a three-point proposal to achieve “a just and lasting solution to the Palestine issue.”[27] However, Beijing has yet to fully present its vision for a pathway to peace. The US$4 million of aid that China has offered the Palestinians since the beginning of the war shows how little it is interested in being deeply involved in creating permanent solutions. By contrast, the US has already earmarked more than US$100 million thus far.
China’s refusal to condemn Hamas carries risks as well. It suggests that Beijing views Hamas as representatives of the Palestinians, on par with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (which Hamas is not part of) — which are internationally recognised. The majority of Arab governments, on the other hand, have no love for Hamas and want to see the return of a more secular administration in Gaza.[28]
In similar fashion, China is seen as instrumental in preventing the war from widening because of its supposed sway over Iran. The theory that China could persuade Tehran to rein in its proxies overestimates its influence over the Islamic Republic, however. Intensified Western military action against the Houthis could also undermine Chinese regional interests significantly, by hardening the Yemeni group’s stance and unravelling peace negotiations in the country. This, in turn, heightens the risks of a resumption of Houthi drone and missile attacks against Saudi and Emirati targets or US military installations across the Gulf. An end to peace negotiations in Yemen would risk the collapse of the China-brokered Saudi-Iran détente, which Beijing sees as the bedrock of its regional vision through the Global Security Initiative.[29] This would certainly serve the US and its strategy of containing China’s future role in regional security, albeit at immense cost to regional stability.
The Gaza war is a major test of Arab governments’ perceptions of Beijing, and its unwillingness to play a bigger role is a source of frustration for them. If a supportive rhetorical posture is the best China could offer on a major conflict that could embroil the whole region, the future might only intensify doubts about its alternative visions on global governance, security, and norms. This is the outcome that is least favourable to China, especially since it comes less than a year after it demonstrated its strengths as a rising global power by facilitating the thaw between Saudi Arabia and Iran. From the perspective of many Arab regimes, however, the war in Gaza may have already exposed China’s weakness.
Conclusion
The Gaza War has inflicted severe damage on the US’ standing and appeal in the Middle East. However, its commitment to preventing a regional conflict, and extensive diplomatic efforts to minimise civilian casualties and allow more aid into Gaza signals that it is not pivoting away from the region. Instead, it strengthens the case that Washington remains the indispensable power in the Middle East. While the US has been accused of double standards due to its support for Ukraine’s right of resistance and Israel’s war on Gaza at the same time, it is safe to say that the flip side puts China’s own double standards on display, too. Defending the Palestinians’ right to self-determination while not acknowledging Ukranians’ entitlement to chart the path they aspire to and backing Mr Putin’s war undermines China’s claims for a more righteous and fair global system.
These challenges create an uncertain environment for Beijing. While it is gaining some friends now as it asserts its position as an alternative to the Western-led global order, Beijing’s inability to contemplate an alternative to the US’ roadmap towards a Palestinian-Israeli peace tests the limits of its influence in the region while highlighting its keen sense of risk aversion and self-interest.
Image Caption: China’s President Xi Jinping attending a meeting at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi on 13 December 2023. China and Vietnam pledged a day earlier to deepen ties during President Xi Jinping’s first visit in six years, as Beijing seeks to counter growing US influence with the communist nation. Photo: Luong Thai Linh / Pool / AFP
About the Author
*Ahmed Aboudouh is an associate fellow with the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme, based in London. He is a foreign affairs, security, and geopolitics specialist. He focuses on China’s rising influence in the MENA region, Gulf geopolitics, the US-China competition, and its implications worldwide. He is a non-resident fellow with the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, and currently heads the China Studies research unit at the Emirates Policy Center (EPC). He holds a Master of Arts in International Relations from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, with a specific focus on China’s influence and great power competition in the MENA region.
End Notes
[1] Chen, Y. (2012). China’s Relationship with Israel, Opportunities and Challenges, Perspectives from China. Israel Studies, 17(3), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.2979/israelstudies.17.3.1
[2] Tjong-Alvares, B. (2012). The Geography of Sino-Israeli Relations. Jewish Political Studies Review, 24(3/4), 96–121. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41955510
[3] Ibid.
[4] AP. (2023, June 16). Palestinian leader Abbas ends China trip after backing Beijing’s crackdown on Muslim minorities | AP News. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/china-palestinians-abbas-xinjiang-7aa4038f6a3302dcaaedd23d44e0a3de
[5] Chacar. (2023, October 13). Israel says “deeply disappointed” over lack of China condemnation of Hamas attack. Reuters.
[6] Chik, H., & Chik, H. (2023, October 24). Israel ‘gone beyond self-defence’ in Gaza, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi says, calls to ‘stop collective punishment.’ South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3237992/israel-gone-beyond-self-defence-gaza-chinese-foreign-minister-wang-yi-says-calls-stop-collective
[7] China’s special envoy begins Middle East tour on Palestine. (2023). https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/china-s-special-envoy-begins-middle-east-tour-on-palestine/3027206
[8] Ziwen, Z., & Ziwen, Z. (2023, November 20). ‘Halt the fighting’: China and Arab nations renew call for ceasefire in Gaza. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3242216/halt-fighting-china-and-arab-nations-renew-call-ceasefire-gaza
[9] Ziwen, Z., & Ziwen, Z. (2023, December 17). China urges Iran and Saudi Arabia to work together to ‘avoid miscalculation’ as diplomats meet on restoration of ties. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3245358/china-urges-iran-and-saudi-arabia-work-together-avoid-miscalculation-diplomats-meet-restoration-ties
[10] Nichols. (2023, December 13). United Nations demands humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza. Reuters.
[11] Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on Resolving the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. (n.d.). https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbxw/202311/t20231129_11189405.html#:~:text=President%20Xi%20Jinping%20stated%20China’s,the%20expansion%20of%20the%20conflict.
[12] Aboudouh. (2023, December 14). China is fixed on discrediting the US on Gaza War. But this policy lacks credibility and will likely fail. Atlantic Council. Retrieved January 5, 2024, from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/china-gaza-hamas-israel-war/
[13] The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs was Held in Beijing Xi Jinping Delivered an Important Address at the Conference. (n.d.). https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202312/t20231228_11214416.html
[14] Abdelbary , & Al Lawati. (n.d.). China surpasses US in popularity among Arab youth as Beijing expands Middle East footprint. CNN. Retrieved January 8, 2024, from https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/21/middleeast/china-surpasses-us-mideast-survey-mime-intl/index.html
[15] Garton Ash., et al. (2023, November 15). Living in an à la carte world: What European policymakers should learn from global public opinion. ECFR. Retrieved January 8, 2024, from https://ecfr.eu/publication/living-in-an-a-la-carte-world-what-european-policymakers-should-learn-from-global-public-opinion/
[16] Chinese, Iranian FMs warn against humanitarian disaster in the Gaza Strip. (n.d.). https://english.news.cn/20231015/ede5991834a84d889e99c73cf0cbe688/c.html
[17] Webster, J. (2023, November 22). The West Shouldn’t Forget China’s Pro-Russia Neutrality. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/the-west-shouldnt-forget-chinas-pro-russia-neutrality/
[18] Schuman, et al. (2023, November 30). How Beijing’s newest global initiatives seek to remake the world order. Atlantic Council. Retrieved January 5, 2024, from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/how-beijings-newest-global-initiatives-seek-to-remake-the-world-order/
[19] Build a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind and Jointly Deliver a Brighter Future for the World. (2023). https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202309/t20230922_11148422.html
[20] Aboudouh, A. (2023, October 25). China’s approach to the war in Gaza is not anti-Israel. It’s designed to contain the US. Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/10/chinas-approach-war-gaza-not-anti-israel-its-designed-contain-us
[21] Ambassade de Chine en France. (2023, October 30). X. Retrieved January 5, 2024, from https://twitter.com/AmbassadeChine/status/1718984017570078814
[22] Wang Yi: China Stands on the Side of Peace and Human Conscience on the Question of Palestine. (n.d.). http://gb.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202310/t20231014_11160987.htm#:~:text=There%20is%20no%20shortage%20of,an%20independent%20State%20of%20Palestine.
[23] House, W. (2023, October 20). Remarks by President Biden on the United States’ Response to Hamas’s Terrorist Attacks Against Israel and Russia’s Ongoing Brutal War Against Ukraine. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/10/20/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-unites-states-response-to-hamass-terrorist-attacks-against-israel-and-russias-ongoing-brutal-war-against-ukraine/
[24] Choukeir. (2024, January 14). Egypt, China stress priority of safety, security of Red Sea navigation. Reuters. Retrieved January 16, 2024, from https://www.reuters.com/world/egypt-china-stress-priority-safety-security-navigation-red-sea-joint-statement-2024-01-14/
[25] Rabinovitch, & Scheer . (2024, January 7). China’s COSCO halts shipping to Israel -Israeli media. Reuters. Retrieved January 9, 2024, from https://www.reuters.com/business/chinas-cosco-halts-shipping-israel-israeli-media-2024-01-07/
[26] Bob, B. Y. J. (2022, April 17). China sues Israeli gov't for denying light rail tender under US pressure. The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com. https://www.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/energy-and-infrastructure/article-704417
[27] Xi Jinping Holds Talks with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. (2023). https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202306/t20230618_11099414.html
[28] Egypt and the War in Gaza: A Conversation with Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry | CSIS. (2023). https://www.csis.org/events/egypt-and-war-gaza-conversation-egyptian-foreign-minister-sameh-shoukry
[29] Aboudouh, A. (2024, January 9). Houthi attacks in the Red Sea help China criticize the US – but threaten long-term policy. Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/01/houthi-attacks-red-sea-help-china-criticize-us-threaten-long-term-policy
