This event is jointly organised by Al Sharq Strategic Research and Political Economy Research Cluster of Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore.

Abstract

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi unveiled a five-point plan to secure and stabilize the Middle East during a six-nation tour of the region. Celebrating the 50th anniversary of China-Turkey relations, Yi held out the prospect of elevating ties between the two countries to a comprehensive strategic partnership. China already has strategic partnerships with several states in the region, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Egypt. This webinar will explore China’s vision of a future role in the Middle East. It will seek to unpack what China’s strategic partnerships entail, how it hopes to manage relations with regional partners that are at loggerheads, and to what degree Middle Eastern willingness to accommodate China is rooted in exaggerated expectations of Chinese support. Will China transform from being an economic actor and trade partner to a security partner for the region? What kind of role regional partners want China to play in the region? Are they hedging their bets in case the United States withdraws from the region or is it that China offers a new model to follow?

Co-organized by Al Sharq Strategic Research and Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore, this panel will explore these questions and more.

This public talk will be conducted online via Zoom on Friday, 16 July 2021, from 7.00pm to 9.00pm (Singapore Time). All are welcome to participate. This event is free, however, registration is compulsory. Successful registrants will receive a confirmation email with the Zoom details closer to the date of the event.

For more information on the speakers of the event and to register, click here. 

Image Caption: Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, pose for a picture after signing an agreement in the capital Tehran, on 27 March 2021. (Photo by – / AFP)

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By Ethan Phua
Intern, Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore

Under President Xi Jinping’s administration, China’s presence and involvement in world affairs has been steadily increasing, from laying down the foundation of the Belt and Road Initiative to investing in infrastructure and resource extraction development in developing nations. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s diplomatic expedition to the Middle East earlier this year highlighted China’s emerging position as a trade partner and investor to the region as well as a geopolitical alignment in the regional and new Cold War as China slowly but surely abandons its historical long-standing foreign policy of neutrality and non-interference. Senior Associate Fellow Omer Aslan from Al Sharq Strategic Research hosted a comprehensive discussion on Beijing’s plans in the region, featuring his colleague Senior Associate Fellow Galip Dalay alongside a few others – MEI’s Principal Research Fellow Alessandro Arduino and Senior Research Fellow James M Dorsey and Assistant Professor Kadir Temiz from Istanbul Medeniyet University.

Alessandro Arduino: Selective Engagement- Changing Chinese Policy in the Middle East

Dr Alessandro Arduino believes that the decade-long Chinese foreign policy of non-interference will slowly make way for selective engagement due to evolving strategic interests in the Middle East. Historically, China has not been completely dormant regarding affairs in the Middle East, as they followed orthodox Marxist doctrine by supporting the Anti-Imperialist movement in the Bandung Conference as well as funding pro-independence movements in Algeria, Palestine and Oman. However, such participation in regional affairs dwindled following the Sino-Soviet split as China distanced itself from Russian policy and efforts in the Middle East. It was the surge in energy demand in recent decades that lured China back to Middle Eastern politics, with its strategic interests manifesting in the 2016 China Arab White Paper.

While energy remains a primary source of interest to Beijing, with the region supplying 40% of China’s energy, Beijing will be looking to strengthen its strategic partnerships with regional players namely Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, Algeria and Egypt so that it works in China’s favour. Vaccine diplomacy in the Middle East has also bore fruit for China, as various Gulf states are already using Chinese-made Covid-19 vaccines, indirectly causing their economy to be dependent on China to a certain extent and thereby increasing Chinese influence in the Gulf. China’s ambition for a Digital Silk Road also largely involves the co-operation of the major economic hubs in the Gulf region and will undoubtedly use its extensive arsenal of digital technology to lure the Gulf states into active participation in the technological side of the Belt and Road Initiative.

However, the Middle East is not exactly welcoming the Chinese with open arms. The Gulf states, in particular, are more than wary of the fact that the gradual American withdrawal will not bode well for the stability of the region and China is anything but a trustworthy security provider. Furthermore, there is an element of skepticism from Middle Eastern countries regarding bilateral relations with Beijing given China’s unwillingness to favour any sides in the Middle Eastern Cold War. Beijing shares warm relations with Tehran, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Ankara, Damascus and even Tel Aviv. Conflicts of interests were likely the main cause of headache for Wang Yi’s diplomatic efforts but China will most likely continue its efforts in balancing diplomatic ties with the various factions of the Middle East. Ultimately, the Middle East must play the delicate game of balancing economic opportunity with political sovereignty, lest they fall prey once again to foreign imperialism.

Galip Dalay: Gambling on the Orient

China’s regional partners in the Middle East are acutely aware of the multipolar order of the region and know that increased proximity with Beijing will mean deviation from Washington. However, given the ever-increasing demand for energy in the Chinese market, trade will only continue to grow, with China being the one of the largest trading partners of several nations in the region. The ever-present anti-Western sentiment in the region further fuels regional pro-Chinese movements, as unlike the West, China’s non-interference policy allows it to trade and invest in any country regardless of the political structure or human rights track record, which is music to the ears of the likes of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran in particular, will be once again looking to become the centerpiece of the New Silk Road, just as the Persians were a millennia ago, to bypass Western sanctions and export its abundant supply of oil and natural gas to the hungry markets of the East. While the Gulf region remains a stronghold for American hard power, the dwindling US presence in the rest of the Middle East has welcomed Russia and China to fill the void – the former as a security provider and latter as an economic partner.

Furthermore, what China offers besides billions of dollars worth of trade and investment, is a socio-economic model that drastically differs from the “American dream” that US influence has spread throughout the world. The Western way of life that encompasses individualist liberalism, civil liberties, democracy and consumerism has proven to fail in many parts of the world, especially in the Middle East – American efforts at nation rebuilding failed utterly in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, what the Chinese model offers may significantly be better suited to Middle Eastern culture and way of life, with a strong emphasis on societal harmony, national stability, social conservatism and collectivism.

However, one key issue that will undoubtedly hinder Chinese efforts at winning over influence over Middle Eastern society will be its treatment of Uyghurs and their culture in Xinjiang. Pictures of century-old mosques being razed and detailed documentation of concentration camps simply cannot be erased and ignored by the Muslim world, regardless of the amount of money China is willing to invest. Uyghur refugees have built large communities throughout the Middle East, notably in Turkey where up to 45,000 Uyghurs reside, many as refugees. So long as Muslims are oppressed in China, there will be societal resistance to Chinese presence and that very well may be a deciding factor in whether Chinese diplomatic and economic efforts will succeed.

Kadir Temiz: Beyond Energy- Chinese National Interests in the Middle East

Economic opportunity has always been the primary interest for foreign powers in the Middle East and China is no exception. The “New China” on the world stage can be described as more assertive, aggressive and even coercive. However, there are many different perspectives to view Chinese interests in the Middle East – from economic to strategic to cultural. China needs to balance its different motives in the region, with the primary one being about securing stable energy supply. However, if its other goals of building a multi-dimensional new Silk Road, expanding political influence in the region, fighting terrorism and countering American influence are to be met, a more robust relationship with regional players must be fostered, beyond mere investment deals and oil rights. To truly establish a formidable presence in the Middle East, China’s image must change.  It can no longer use its economic might to coerce its way to strategic partnerships – a portrayal of a reliable and trustworthy partner is required, to have a shot at erasing the scars of the Uyghur cultural genocide from the population of the Middle East and truly winning them over.

China’s regional strategy of maintaining impartiality when dealing with regional conflicts certainly has historical precedence, as seen in the Iran-Iraq war as well as the numerous conflicts between Israel and the Arab nations. This unbiased political stance allows China to develop economic ties with all of the Middle East, regardless of the ongoing regional political dynamics. It is the sheer practicality of China’s foreign policy with a staunch neglect of political ideology that gives them an edge over the image-concerned West, as China has the luxury of ignoring the kidnapping of journalists or abuse of political dissidents when striking up lucrative resource rights deals with authoritarian countries. While anti-Western cultural imperialism as an ideology has become somewhat relevant to foreign policy under the
Xi administration, with its support of a two-state solution for Palestinians as well as eagerness to work with the Taliban in Afghanistan instead of against it, practicality will remain as the primary motive in pursuing its foreign policy.

James M. Dorsey: China, the Next Middle East Police?

The new policy of the White House is to restructure its commitment to focus more on the Indo-Pacific theatre, not abandon the Middle East. While China can indeed, in the distant future, very much fill the void of the gradual American withdrawal as a security partner in the Middle East, developments in Chinese foreign policy as a whole needs to take place before anyone can consider China as a reliable security partner. A fundamental difference between the Americans and Russians compared to the Chinese – when it comes to foreign relations – is that the former two believe in alliance webs whereas the Chinese believe in forming bilateral relations with individual states. China’s impartiality towards regional rivalries could well mean that shaping the Middle East into a multilateral region would be beneficial for Chinese presence in the region. Multilateralism in the Middle East, as a concept, has been widely considered by all involved parties – be it as an economic or security structure. While it would undoubtedly take a lot of work to end the Middle East Cold War and form a multilateral apparatus structure – including ending the proxy wars in Yemen and Syria – it could be the answer to finally restoring stability in the Middle East for the first time since the Ottoman days.

The Chinese have made a clear distinction between the Arab and non-Arab parts of the region. To the Chinese, the Arab nations especially in the Gulf, serve predominantly as energy suppliers and hence treat them largely as economic partners. However, the Chinese are acutely aware that the future hegemon of the Middle East will not be an Arab nation, certainly not from the Gulf despite current projections of power by the Saudis and the Emiratis. Their abundance in oil wealth simply cannot match the large educated young populations, battle-hardened militaries, century-old national identities, geographic advantage and sheer socio-economic potential of Iran and Turkey, who are the likely contenders to dominate the region in the future. China is the undisputed master of long-term planning and if they are going to bet on a long-term regional hegemon to develop a robust strategic partnership with, it is likely that Wang Yi will be making more frequent trips to Ankara and Tehran.

Highlights from the Q&A Session

When asked about the complexity of current global dynamics and what happens when there is a clash, Dr Temiz said that contradictions within Chinese foreign policy towards the Middle East need to be considered when there is a clash of interests, as well as considerable American pressure towards Beijing’s actions in the region. China’s policy of selective engagement involves picking and calculating fights that are worth fighting while staying out of others. This can be seen in the examples of China supporting its ideological ally, the Al-Assad regime while balancing its involvement to not directly antagonise the Americans.

Furthermore, China has always been adamant about being against foreign intervention of any sort. However, this stance has been faltering following Russia’s direct intervention in Syria in 2015 – something that China has been silent about. China has also been on the fence regarding the Israel-Palestine issue – historically and officially supporting the Palestinian cause while maintaining strategic ties with Israel largely for the purpose of acquiring the military technology the latter possesses. Beijing-Ankara relations used to be considerably cold following the Turkish president’s remarks over the Uyghur genocide but strategic relations and Chinese investment proved more significant to Ankara’s interests than protesting the oppression and abuse of fellow Muslims. Changes in Chinese positions on regional issues have become increasingly common in recent years and will most likely play a greater role in influencing regional dynamics.

On the question of whether regional players expect China to replace the US as a security partner given the gradual reduction of American military involvement in the Middle East, Dr Arduino, Dr Dorsey and Mr Dalay shared that there is a massive difference in the regional perception of the world powers’ desert warfare capabilities as well as expectation of security contribution towards the region. While China has been investing heavily in counter-insurgency warfare and blue water naval capabilities, the complete lack of experience in foreign operations and power projection renders the People’s Liberation Army and Navy unreliable and inadequate replacements for the US Marines and Navy SEALs.

What China can offer is cyber security, instead of boots on the ground. As Chinese technology and expertise in cyber warfare continues to advance, the Digital Silk Road will undoubtedly encompass cyber security, an offer that will only become increasingly attractive as the global economy shifts towards digitalisation. Whoever controls data will control the economy and the Middle East is extremely weary of that as Huawei offices increasingly pop up throughout the region. The Americans, on the other hand, are likely to remain using hard power in projecting their regional influence, along with their longstanding status as the global police and identity as the sole world superpower. Hence, from a Middle Eastern perspective, Beijing is not and likely will not be a direct replacement for Washington anytime soon.

Regarding the Uyghur issue and to what extent it will affect China-Turkey relations in the short and mid-term, Dr Temiz said that since condemning the Chinese government for the oppression of the Uyghurs, there has been a deafening silence from Ankara as concentration camps in Xinjiang continue to operate. Uncoincidentally, Chinese influence over the Turkish economy as well as society, in the forms of investment deals and Confucius societies, have been increasing steadily. With Turkish politics heading alarmingly towards the authoritarian direction, the perception of China by an average Turkish national has been rapidly changing – from an oppressor of Islam to a socio-economic role model compatible with Turkish culture.

Turkey has been historically hostile towards the Russians and uncongenial to the Europeans. Recent events have also soured relations with the Americans. This leaves China their sole friendly world power which creates a geopolitical and economic dependency, as well as a dilemma on the Uyghur issue. With the silence about their fellow Muslims likely to carry on in Turkish politics, pro-Uyghur demonstrations and sentiments may well see a gradual dwindling in size and support, as a growing number of Turkish people get employed by Chinese companies.