



# India, the Arab Gulf Countries and the Pakistan Factor

---

Khurram Abbas

[Type here]

---

## India-Middle East Relations

### Opportunities and Challenges

---

With the United States shifting its security focus from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific, other major powers are seen as potential players that might fill the void in Middle East security. The fact that India is one such player is further manifested in the recently announced India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor.

This series of *Insights* seeks to unravel the evolutionary paths that the growing multifaceted connections between India and the Middle East might take and the challenges arising. India's relationship with Israel, especially under the purview of the I2U2 partnership, which also includes the United Arab Emirates and the United States, has in particular generated much curiosity among observers. India's longstanding economic ties with the GCC countries, along with its ties with Iraq and Iran, have added to the strategic significance of the Middle East for India and given it strong reasons for a greater role in the Middle East.

Cover image: (L) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during a joint press briefing in New Delhi on 20 February 2019. Money Sharma/AFP. (R) Caretaker Prime Minister of Pakistan Anwaarul Haq Kakar and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during a meeting in Riyadh on 12 November 2023. "X" (Twitter) account of Pakistan Prime Minister.

# India, the Arab Gulf Countries and the Pakistan Factor

Khurram Abbas\*

---

On the deep-rooted rivalry between India and Pakistan, particularly on the Kashmir issue, the Saudi-led GCC countries had long lent diplomatic and strategic support to Islamabad. For instance, Saudi Arabia supported Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars against India. However, in the past few years, the GCC countries have been trying to adopt an equidistant approach towards India and Pakistan. For instance, rather than supporting Pakistan, the GCC countries remained neutral and offered mediation during the February 2019 India-Pakistan tensions. This paper observes that the shift in the GCC countries' stance is due in part to Pakistan's reluctance to play a proactive role in conflicts in the Middle East. New Delhi's growing economic, political and diplomatic clout is another important factor in the shift in the GCC countries' stance.

---

**T**he Arab Gulf countries, particularly, Saudi Arabia, had long forged close political and strategic relations with Pakistan. The Pakistani air force had played an active role in the development of the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) and, in fact, during Saudi Arabia's Al-Wadiah dispute with Yemen in the 1960s, Pakistani pilots flew RSAF fighter jets.<sup>1</sup> Pakistani army engineers built fortifications along the Saudi-Yemen border. The Pakistan army was also critical in assisting Saudi

---

<sup>1</sup> Shaul shay, "Saudi Arabia and Pakistan – Strategic Alliance", Herzliya Conference Papers, April 2018, <https://www.runi.ac.il/media/u2tmcjst/shaulshaysaudi-arabiapakistaneen22-4-2018.pdf>

authorities in ending the standoff during the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Pakistan subsequently sent 15,000 soldiers to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s to strengthen the country's defence against any attempted attack.

## Fraying Strategic Relations

The quid pro quo for such strong support from Pakistan was that in the 1960s–1980s the Arab countries in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, supported Pakistan in its long-standing rivalry with India. Riyadh's backing for Islamabad throughout the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971 was a clear indication of its pro-Islamabad policies. King Faisal generously at that time gave Pakistan 75 planes and referred to the Indian attack in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) as "treacherous".<sup>2</sup>

For Pakistan, such support from the Arab countries was important. Throughout its 76 years of independence, Pakistan has faced several foreign policy crises in various regions, especially within its South Asian backyard, and crises arising from major power competition during the Cold War era. But the Middle East was a unique region in Pakistan's foreign policy, remaining free of foreign policy shocks for Islamabad. The Arab Gulf countries provided unprecedented diplomatic support to Pakistan on various political and strategic issues. In particular, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) provided unequivocal support on the Kashmir issue and on the Afghanistan conflict. In fact, India, with the world's largest Muslim minority population, participated in the inaugural meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1969 and would have been a member of the organisation if not for Pakistan's objections and the Arab countries' acquiescence – grudging or ungrudging – in Pakistan's views.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Khurram Minhas, "The Saudi Mediation", *Express Tribune*, 13 March 2019, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1928061/the-saudi-mediation>

<sup>3</sup> Gurbachan Singh, "How Pakistan Scuttled India's Invitation to the First OIC Plenary", *The Wire*, 23 February 2019, <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-pakistan-oic-first-plenary>

It was this relationship of trust between the Gulf countries and Pakistan that led to the signing of various security agreements between them. The security pact of 1982 with Saudi Arabia is one of the most prominent in this context. The pact entails Pakistan providing military support to maintain Saudi Arabia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Islamabad's civilian leadership's frequent assurances of support for Saudi Arabia since then promoted Pakistan to the rank of second largest security guarantor of Saudi Arabia after the United States. Indeed, a contingent of 13,000 Pakistani troops was deployed in Saudi Arabia as a deterrent to protect the country against potential aggression by Iraq during the first Gulf War in 1991.<sup>4</sup>

**“In the 1960s–1980s the Arab countries in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, supported Pakistan in its long-standing rivalry with India.”**

Naturally, then the leadership of the Gulf countries had expectations of Pakistan playing a proactive role in support of their interests in various Middle Eastern conflicts. The 21st century in fact has brought massive shockwaves to the Middle Eastern region that tested Pakistan's assurances of support for the Gulf countries. The region experienced fundamental geopolitical shifts ranging from the Arab Spring, the rise and fall of ISIS, the Iran nuclear deal, the US disengagement from the region, Saudi-Iranian tensions in 2016, the Qatar diplomatic conflict and the Yemen conflict. Some of these events posed existential threats to the Gulf monarchies and had a profound impact on the strategic thinking of the ruling elites.

To mitigate some of these challenges, the Gulf countries sought the support of their allies, such as Pakistan. They included Pakistan in an Islamic military alliance known as the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) and sought Islamabad's military support in the Yemen conflict in 2015. However, the Saudi and Emirati demand for

---

<sup>4</sup> Shaul shay, “Saudi Arabia and Pakistan – Strategic Alliance”.

military support surprised the security and foreign policy apparatus of Pakistan. Pakistan in fact adopted a policy of neutrality in the Yemen conflict, which was surprising for the Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The way Islamabad handled its posture of neutrality added fuel to fire. Pakistan's National Assembly passed a unanimous resolution officially announcing its neutrality in the Saudi-led coalition's campaign against Yemen.<sup>5</sup> This policy of neutrality was not well received by the Gulf countries. The then UAE deputy foreign minister, Anwar Mohammed Gargash, even warned that Pakistan would pay a "heavy price" for its neutral stand.<sup>6</sup>

**“Pakistan’s policy of neutrality in Middle Eastern conflicts in recent years has dented its ability to garner the outright support of the Arab Gulf countries in the India-Pakistan conflict.”**

Pakistan's policy of neutrality in Middle Eastern conflicts, notably, its repeated offers of mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran,<sup>7</sup> has dented its ability to garner the outright support of the Arab Gulf countries in the India-Pakistan conflict. India's growing economic cooperation with and political clout in the Middle Eastern region is an additional factor in this respect. This shift in the GCC countries' stance has been evident since the Pulwama incident of 2019, which resulted in a military standoff between India and Pakistan. The Arab countries sought to establish a role as mediators in the India-Pakistan conflict rather than

---

<sup>5</sup> Asad Hashim, "Pakistan Parliament Backs Neutrality in Yemen Conflict", Al Jazeera, 10 April 2015. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/4/10/pakistan-parliament-backs-neutrality-in-yemen-conflict>


<sup>6</sup> Dawn, UAE Minister Warns Pakistan of 'heavy price for ambiguous stand' on Yemen", 11 April 2015. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1175284>

<sup>7</sup> Khurram Abbas, "Passive Mediation in Persian Gulf Conflicts: An Analysis of Pakistan's Peace Initiatives", *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies* 13, No. 4, pp. 604–620.

side with Pakistan. This approach is contrary to the Arab countries’ policies of the 1960s–1980s.

Islamabad’s neutral approach seems to have diminished Pakistan’s relevance to the Gulf countries. Islamabad has nothing to offer to the Gulf countries except security assurances in return for generous economic and political support from the Gulf countries. Pakistan’s negative trade balance with the GCC countries (Figure 1) as well as heavy reliance on oil imports – that too for deferred payments – has diminished Islamabad’s ability to influence the Arab countries for its political and strategic gain.

**Figure 1. Pakistan-GCC Trade**



Source: Pakistan Business Council Market Access Report 2022, [https://www.pbc.org.pk/research/potential-for-a-pakistan-gcc-free-trade-agreement-market-access-series-2022/#:~:text=Other%20top%20exports%20of%20Pakistan,%20\(HS%2D620322\)](https://www.pbc.org.pk/research/potential-for-a-pakistan-gcc-free-trade-agreement-market-access-series-2022/#:~:text=Other%20top%20exports%20of%20Pakistan,%20(HS%2D620322))

## Dynamics of India-GCC Relations

In contrast to Pakistan, India, over the past two decades, has gradually increased its foothold in the Gulf region to establish a deep economic and political presence. India’s major strength in the Gulf region is its energy and merchandise trade (Tables 1–2) and vibrant diaspora that has helped to increase New Delhi’s soft power. A major boost to the economic presence of India in the Gulf region came about on 27 July 2005 when India’s then prime minister, Manmohan Singh, formally unveiled India’s “Look West” policy, which is aimed at deepening India’s ties with countries to its West, stretching from Afghanistan to the Persian

Gulf region,<sup>8</sup> but in reality focused on the Gulf region. This policy is seen as a driving force in organising and prioritising India's interests in the region. It is a comprehensive strategy for strengthening ties with the region. The key determinants of this policy include frequent state visits, defence and security cooperation, the security of oil and gas supplies, and the welfare of the Indian diaspora in the region. Since then, India has also increased its cooperation with the Arab countries in areas such as information technology and technology transfer.

**Table 1. Indian Imports from the Gulf Region (in US\$ million)**

Country	2006–2007	2012–2013	2017–2018
Bahrain	471.23	664.66	431.12
Kuwait	5993.23	16588.13	7165.70
Oman	458.90	2009.72	4264.29
Qatar	2060.08	15693.08	8409.08
Saudi Arabia	13355.33	33998.11	22069.96
United Arab Emirates	8655.28	39138.36	21739.96

Source: “Region-wise Imports, Export Import Databank”, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, India, 2018, <http://commerce-app.gov.in/eidb/irgncntq.asp>

Furthermore, India has granted the GCC countries most favoured nation (MFN) status in the hope that such status can help India obtain a free trade agreement (FTA) with the GCC.<sup>9</sup> India's public and private sectors have been actively establishing business and partnerships with entrepreneurs and investment authorities from the Gulf countries. In terms of oil and gas, India has proven to be an attractive market for the Gulf region throughout the years. The GCC is the largest trading bloc for India, with exports to the region in FY 2021–22 valued at

<sup>8</sup> Prime Minister's Office, India, “PM Launches ‘Look West’ Policy to Boost Cooperation with Gulf”, Press Release, 27 July 2005, <http://pmindia.nic.in/prlease/pcontent.asp?id=278>

<sup>9</sup> Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Stuti Bhatnagar, “Gulf States and the Conflict between India and Pakistan”, *Journal of Asia Pacific Studies* 1, No. 2 (2010), 2pp. 59–291.



approximately US\$44 billion and imports at US\$110 billion.<sup>10</sup> The GCC countries account for about 35 per cent of India's oil imports and 70 per cent of its gas imports. In 2021–22, India's total crude oil imports from the GCC amounted to about US\$48 billion, while gas imports amounted to about US\$21 billion.<sup>11</sup> GCC investments in India are currently valued at more than US\$18 billion.<sup>12</sup> India is developing a strategic petroleum reserve in Karnataka state with the assistance of the UAE, which has strengthened its reliance on the region. Furthermore, the Indian Oil and Gas Corporation is collaborating with Saudi Arabia to build a refinery in the state of Andhra Pradesh.<sup>13</sup>

**Table 2. Indian Exports from the Gulf Region (in US\$ million)**

Country	2006–07	2012–13	2017–18
Bahrain	184.52	603.47	556.82
Kuwait	614.81	1061.08	1497.99
Oman	630.97	2599.49	2728.30
Qatar	331.53	687.18	1471.88
Saudi Arabia	2,590.77	9785.70	5410.70
United Arab Emirates	12,021.77	36316.65	31175.50

Source: “Region-wise Exports, Export Import Databank”, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, India, 2018, <http://commerce-app.gov.in/eidb/ergncntq.asp>

<sup>10</sup> Ministry of Commerce and Industry, India, “India-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Decide to Pursue Resumption of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Negotiations”, 25 November 2022, <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1878714#:~:text=GCC%20countries%20contribute%20almost%2035,and%2070%25%20of%20gas%20imports>

<sup>11</sup> Ministry of Commerce and Industry, India, “India-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Decide to Pursue Resumption of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Negotiations”.

<sup>12</sup> Ministry of Commerce and Industry India, “India-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Decide to Pursue Resumption of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Negotiations”.

<sup>13</sup> Harsh V. Pant, “India’s Relations with Iran: Much Ado about Nothing”, *The Washington Quarterly* 34, No. 1, (Winter 2011), pp. 61–74.

In the security and defence arena, India has in recent years stepped up its cooperation with the Gulf countries. India's increased security and defence engagement is driven by two aims: to protect India's oil supplies and to counter terrorist activities arising from the region that could pose a threat to Indian economic interests. At this point, India is attempting to formalise its security cooperation with the GCC countries. New Delhi has bilateral defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Qatar in the areas of military training, intelligence sharing, counterterrorism and money laundering. Among all GCC countries, Oman is of particular interest to India. India has several key defence-related agreements with Oman, including a military protocol signed in 1972, under which Indian navy personnel were deputed to man Oman's navy for three years. A joint military cooperation committee (JMCC) was established between the two countries in 2008, which meets on an annual basis to review bilateral defence cooperation. Furthermore, a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation was signed in 2018, which allows the Indian navy access to the strategically located port of Duqm.<sup>14</sup>

**“In the security and defence arena, India has in recent years stepped up its cooperation with the Gulf countries.”**

Remittance inflows from the Indian diaspora play an important role in the development of the Indian economy. The GCC countries account for more than 28 per cent of the remittance inflows into India.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> Geoffrey Kemp, “The East Moves West: India, China and Asia's Growing Presence in the Middle East”, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), pp. 44–46.

<sup>15</sup> Pratap John, “Remittances to India from Qatar, Four Other GCC Countries Drop between 2016 and 2021: World Bank”, *Gulf Times*, 23 January 2023, <https://www.gulf-times.com/article/652616/business/remittances-to-india-from-qatar-four-other-gcc-countries-drop-between-2016-and-2021-world-bank>; Shafeeq Rahman, “Why Remittances from the Middle East Matter to India”, *Fair Observer*, 26 February 2018,

The Gulf region is the most popular destination for Indian expatriates. As of December 2022, over 8.8 million Indians lived and worked in the Gulf region in various capacities.<sup>16</sup> According to estimates, one Indian worker in the Gulf region may support nearly 20 family members in India.<sup>17</sup> The security and well-being of Indian expatriates, as well as the prospect of greater remittances, are two major reasons for India's growing collaboration with the Gulf region through friendly political relations. India is working hard to ensure that Indian workers in the region have legal rights. In this regard, it has signed a number of conventions and agreements with host countries to ensure the safety and well-being of Indian residents.

“The ... culture of maligning Muslims and Islam [in India] has caused a degree of concern in the Gulf countries. ... [But] overall, such incidents have not damaged the positive trajectory of official ties between India and the GCC countries.”

India's growing positive international image has facilitated its relationship with the Gulf countries. However, the Indian domestic political environment, where a culture of maligning Muslims and Islam has emerged in some quarters, has caused a degree of concern in the Gulf countries. This concern was especially evident in the early days of Covid-19, when an international gathering held in India by the Tablighi Jamaat movement led to the spread of the virus. The Kuwaiti government, a princess from the UAE and the Arab intelligentsia condemned the various negative social media posts spawned by the incident, including some by Indians working in the Gulf countries. The

---

[https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle\\_east\\_north\\_africa/global-remittances-middle-east-gulf-india-labor-force-news-43199/](https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/global-remittances-middle-east-gulf-india-labor-force-news-43199/)

<sup>16</sup> Ministry of External Affairs, India, “Population of Overseas Indians”, December 2022 [https://mea.gov.in/images/attach/NRIs-and-PIOs\\_1.pdf](https://mea.gov.in/images/attach/NRIs-and-PIOs_1.pdf)

<sup>17</sup> Geoffrey Kemp, “The East Moves West”, p. 27.

verbal condemnations were followed by actions against the perpetrators of such posts in the GCC countries. Over a dozen Indian expatriates were deported while many were served notice to refrain from posting negative comments directed against any community, religion, caste or creed. Repeated appeals from Indian foreign missions in the GCC countries along with stern action by local authorities served to mute the voices of the vociferous elements among Indians in the region. Overall, such incidents have not damaged the positive trajectory of official ties between India and the GCC countries.

## India-Pakistan and the Quest for GCC Support

Currently, the majority of Islamabad's diplomatic and political elite believe that Pakistan's neutrality in Middle Eastern conflicts is a rational choice, considering the country's demographic structure and its political and security interests. The situation in Afghanistan and terrorism in Pakistan have had an impact on the mindset of the Pakistani public and their leaders. More than four decades of conflict in Afghanistan have resulted in the mass migration of Afghans into Pakistan and burdened Pakistan's already fragile economy. Various social, economic and security problems in Pakistan, especially smuggling and drug issues, are now directly associated with Afghan refugees. Further, terrorism in Pakistan has killed over 70,000 people<sup>18</sup> and inflicted direct and indirect losses of over US\$152 billion,<sup>19</sup> which further crippled Pakistan's economy.

These security concerns have had significant cognitive impacts on how Pakistanis view their external environment and resulted in the propagation of populist narratives. According to this narrative, fighting for others in Afghanistan and the Middle East has severely affected Pakistan's social and economic fabric. The key conclusion that this narrative lends to is that Pakistan should not be involved in security alliances or fight others' wars; it should remain neutral in regional

---

<sup>18</sup> Khurshid Ahmed, "Officials Say 'War on Terror' Caused over \$150 Billion in Losses for Pakistan since 9/11", *Arab News*, 11 September 2021, <https://arab.news/2y3gx>

<sup>19</sup> Khurshid Ahmed, "Officials Say 'War on Terror' Caused over \$150 Billion in Losses".

conflicts.<sup>20</sup> Although this narrative is directed particularly against aligning closely with the United States of America, it also refers to the Gulf countries,<sup>21</sup> especially Saudi Arabia.

But Islamabad still has hopes of reviving its close relationship with the Gulf countries albeit without active involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts. It is confident that the recent efforts of the Gulf countries to manage conflicts through dialogue, notably, the normalisation of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, brokered by China, the re-admission of Syria into the Arab League, the truce in Yemen and the resolution of intra-Arab conflicts, have reduced the diplomatic pressures of Saudi Arabia and the UAE on Pakistan. More significantly, Saudi Arabia's recent refusal to join a G20 tourism working group meeting organised by India in Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, has boosted Pakistan's confidence that it can continue with its policy of neutrality in Middle Eastern conflicts without losing the diplomatic support of the Gulf countries on the Kashmir issue.

**“Islamabad still has hopes of reviving its close relationship with the Gulf countries albeit without active involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts.”**

On the other hand, New Delhi too has bagged various diplomatic successes vis-à-vis the Gulf countries. India's growing economic and political muscle has compelled the Gulf countries to de-hyphenate their policies on Kashmir and economic relationship with India. Since the establishment of the OIC in 1969, Pakistan has used the organisation as a tool to garner the support of Arab and Muslim countries against India on the Kashmir issue. However, despite Islamabad's extraordinary diplomatic efforts and veiled threats since

---

<sup>20</sup> Ayaz Gul, “Khan: Pakistan Can Never Again Be US Partner in War”, Voice of America, 30 June 2021, [https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia\\_khan-pakistan-can-never-again-be-us-partner-war/6207681.html](https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia_khan-pakistan-can-never-again-be-us-partner-war/6207681.html)

<sup>21</sup> Khurram Abbas, “Passive Mediation in Persian Gulf Conflicts”.

2019,<sup>22</sup> it has not been able to convene an OIC summit on the Kashmir issue. Instead, the UAE invited India as a “guest of honour” at the OIC meeting in 2019 despite Pakistan’s concerns and efforts to scuttle the invitation.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, India scored another political victory when the UAE decided earlier this year to invest in Kashmir despite its political stance of supporting Kashmir-related UN Security Council resolutions and regardless of Pakistan’s concerns.<sup>24</sup> It appears that New Delhi has convinced the Arab countries to prioritise economic interests over any political differences on Kashmir.

## Conclusion

Islamabad’s economic crisis, as well as its heavy reliance on the economic assistance of the Gulf countries, has limited any political influence it once had with the latter. New Delhi, on the other hand, has succeeded in recent years in convincing the major Gulf countries to de-hyphenate their political positions from their economic interests, particularly as India’s global political and economic influence increases. This new approach on the part of the Arab Gulf countries is also due to their own changing priorities. These countries have begun mending fences within the region through conflict management and normalisation of relations with regional stakeholders. They have even begun normalising relations with Israel, putting their long-standing political support for Palestine on the back-burner. Today the dominant discourse in the Arab Gulf is how to achieve economic sustainability and social modernisation. In this context, India has more relevance for these countries than a politically unstable and economically fragile Pakistan. Thus, the Gulf countries

---

<sup>22</sup> Islamuddin Sajid, “Pakistan Lashes Out at Saudi-led OIC Silence on Kashmir”, Anadolu Agency, 6 August 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/pakistan-lashes-out-at-saudi-led-oic-silence-on-kashmir/1934076>

<sup>23</sup> Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India Invited as Guest of Honour for 1st Time Ever by OIC; Delhi’s Big Pitch in Islamic World”, *Economic Times*, 23 February 2019.

<sup>24</sup> Fayaz Bukhari, “India’s Jammu and Kashmir Gets First Foreign Investment from Dubai’s Emaar”, Reuters, 20 March 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-jammu-kashmir-gets-first-foreign-investment-dubais-emaar-2023-03-20/>

prioritise mediation over siding with Pakistan in conflicts/tensions involving India and Pakistan.

Pakistan sees the growing India-GCC relationship as a negative sum game, an effort on the part of New Delhi to neutralise Islamabad's long-standing partners, especially on the Kashmir issue. While Pakistan may not require the strategic support of the Gulf countries, their political and diplomatic support on the Kashmir issue is of significant value for Pakistan. We can thus expect to see continuing contestation between India and Pakistan to secure the political support of the Gulf countries on international and regional issues, especially Kashmir. ♦

- \* **Dr Khurram Abbas** is Director, India Study Centre, at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad.



29 Heng Mui Keng Terrace  
Block B #06-06  
Singapore 119620  
Tel: +65 6516 2380; Fax: +65 6774 0458  
Email: [contact.mei@nus.edu.sg](mailto:contact.mei@nus.edu.sg)  
[www.mei.nus.edu.sg](http://www.mei.nus.edu.sg)

